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Through exploration of William Faulkner’s, James Weldon Johnson’s and Nella Larsen’s 
“passing novels,” this dissertation points out that narrative representation of racial passing 
facilitates and compromises the authors’ challenge to the white-dominant ideology of 
early-twentieth-century America. I reveal that, due to their inevitable dependence on language, 
these authors draw paradoxically on the white-dominant ideology that they aim to question, 
especially its system of binary racial categorization. While the “white” body of a “passing” 
character serves the novelists as a subversive force in white-supremacist society (which depends 
on the racial other to define “whiteness”), language, which is essentially ideological, traps the 
writers in racial binary and continually suggests that, while the character looks white, s/he is 
really black. Accordingly, the authors have to write under the constraints of the problem that 
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The Passing Paradox: Representing Racial Chaos within the Symbolic Order 
 
America saw blacks’ increasing mobility in the early-twentieth century, as exemplified 
demographically by the Great Migration which began around 1910. Somewhat reflecting the 
general anxiety about the categorical aspect of such racial mobility, the January 21, 1932 issue of 
The Philadelphia Tribune included an article, “Careful Lyncher! He May Be Your Brother.” Its 
anonymous writer provides examples of undetected passing and emphasizes the fallibility of 
whites’ eyes in their attempt to police the line between white and black. This article is worth 
quoting and analyzing at length, since it demonstrates the complex interrelations between racial 
passing and white ideology—interrelations that inform the central controlli g arguments of this 
dissertation:  
At last it seems as if this “you can tell by their walk, you can tell by their alk, 
you can tell by their uncouth manners” theory of the white man is breaking down. 
The last two or three weeks have brought an additional amount of proof to 
substantiate the conception of most Negroes, that the superior whites are “not so 
smart as they think.” 
The front page of a prominent Negro weekly told, last week, of how a Negro 
woman bore the illustrious first Secretary of the United States treasury, Alexander 
Hamilton, two sons. One of the sons married into a white family and went his 
merry way. The other married a “very light” Negro woman, and one of the sons of 





And the miracle of it is, the superior whites, whose perfect beings are said to 
react naturally when “one drop” of Negro blood heaves into view—never found 
out! 
Two weeks ago a Lieutenant of the United States Army was found shot; most 
probably murdered, on a lonely road. His record showed brilliant service. He had 
been steadily promoted on merit and suddenly it is found that he was a Negro. 
A number of women of the “superior” group had fallen along the army man’s 
paths. He married one from Georgia who “hated niggers” . . . . and they never 
found out. 
There’s a moral in these cases for Southerners, who seem so very bent upon 
lynching Negroes: be careful how you do it—the man may be your brother. (qtd. 
in “Contemporary Coverage” 124-25) 
First of all, this article shows the essential lack of physical difference between a 
“real-white” body and a “passing-white” body.1 Despite the widely believed “you can tell by . . .” 
theories, these cases of passing were “never found out” by those who saw the presumably white 
men. And, with the real-white/passing-white difference dissolved, any “white” person can be 
“passing-white”; as the article’s concluding “moral” goes, a “white” man ay be the “brother” of 
the “Negro” he lynches. This racial chaos has a pernicious implication for the a ticl ’s own 
logic—i.e., the logic that blacks are passing for white without being known to real 
whites—which also assumes the difference between real-white and passing-white. Indeed, while 
the article’s author bases his argument upon textual “proof” such as “a prominent Negro weekly,” 
his own second example, of a man who eluded the “record” of “the United States Army,” 




this murdered lieutenant, the author strategically uses a passive voice to evade th  fundamental 
question who “found that he was a Negro” and how. 
Secondly, the article foregrounds how the blurred boundary between real-white and 
passing-white undermines whites’ racialized and racializing frame of reference. For whites’ 
inability to detect racial passing betrays the ineffectiveness of their race-policing eyes. Indeed, 
while whites’ preeminence (as “superior whites”) and completeness (as “perfect beings”) derive 
from their ability “to react naturally when ‘one drop’ of Negro blood heaves into view,” their 
actual inability to detect passing compromises the validity of whites’ perspective. And the failure 
of whites’ eyes in turn opens up a space for “Negroes”’ subjectivity by “substantiat[ing] the 
conception of most Negroes, that the superior whites are ‘not so smart as they think.’” T is 
example indicates the precarious process in which white subjectivity enforcs and reinforces its 
power by naming, fixating and objectifying a non-white otherness and defining itself as not 
non-white object. Racial passing, neutralizing the very difference between whiteness a d 
non-whiteness, confounds this process and exposes white subjectivity’s fictive authority and 
dependence upon the racial other it fabricates.  
Lastly, despite its critique of the generally assumed real-white/passing-white difference, 
the article draws upon the same assumption in structuring its argument that blacks are passing 
for white without being known to real whites. Given that white ideology maintains itself by at 
once endorsing and dictating the real-white/passing-white binary,2 the author ends up writing for 
the very ideology that he problematizes. Indeed, the article’s subversive potential is already 
stifled when he writes it in the ideo-linguistic context where racial passing means the 
combination of “fake whiteness” and “true blackness.” And the ideologized language of race 




Unless we question the article’s subtly ideologized rhetoric, the writing looks like a logical 
critique of the white-dominant racial system, not a self-contradictory site where ideological 
challenge and entrapment occur at the same time. 
Such conflict and interaction between the endless indeterminacy of racial passng and the 
difference-imposing function of white ideology bear particular significance i  
early-twentieth-century American fictional narratives of racial passing. Through analysis of 
William Faulkner’s Absalom, Absalom! (1936) and Intruder in the Dust (1948), James Weldon 
Johnson’s The Autobiography of an Ex-Colored Man (1912) and Nella Larsen’s Passing (1929), 
this dissertation illuminates the paradox that accompanies the authors’ attempts o explore the 
ideologically disruptive phenomenon of racial passing in an already ideologized medium, i.e., 
language. Indeed, passing characters put into question the very ideas of blackness, whit ness and 
even passing-whiteness, and refute the notion of binary distinctions promoted by the 
white-dominant ideology that underlies the U.S. racial system.3 As a result, these characters are a 
subversive force in white-supremacist society, which depends on the racial other to define 
whiteness. However, even as the authors strive to challenge the racial status quo with passing 
characters, the already ideologized medium of language forces them—even Africa American 
writers like Johnson and Larsen—to write from a white-subject position and entraps them in the 
framework of real-white/passing-white binary difference. Thus, the language used by the 
novelists contradicts the endless indeterminacy of racial passing that they im to emphasize; this 
language suggests that, while the character looks white, s/he is really black. In other words, they 
have to write under the constraints of the problem that American discourse of racmust and, for 
the most part, does systematically suppress the essential lack of physical boundary between a 




authors’ investigation of racial indeterminacy, nevertheless enables their narrative to achieve 
coherence, development and closure by means of clear-cut racial difference. Such a narrative 
order, though in fact fictive, offers the reader an uninterrupted reading experience and in turn 
dissuades him/her from reading for the actual contradictions and contentions in the narrative. 
Analyzing passing narratives in terms of the covert operation of white ideology, my 
dissertation breaks new grounds in literary criticisms of the individual novels, in whiteness 
studies and in studies of passing fiction. On the level of literary criticisms, my tudy ameliorates 
the current scholarship’s inadequate scrutiny, especially concerning the ovelists’ painful 
struggles to engage racial passing in its fundamental indeterminacy. For exampl , visually white 
Charles Bon’s passing-whiteness is not evidenced in Absalom, Absalom! but only claimed by the 
last two of the novel’s four white character-narrators. However, critics such as James Snead, 
Margo Crawford and Maritza Stanchich have betrayed their own ideological entrapment by at 
once acknowledging the undecidability of Bon’s race nd suppressing that very undecidability to 
structure a stable critical discourse around Bon as an oppressed racial other. Scholars of Passing, 
such as Helena Michie, Catherine Rottenberg and Kate Baldwin, point to the multiple, 
open-ended and thus subversive qualities of the work activated by the factor of racial passing. 
However, finding those qualities in scenes after the novel stabilizes visually white characters’ 
“passing-whiteness” as opposed to “real-whiteness,” the critics miss the earlier scenes where 
Larsen simulates passing’s actual invisibility and indeterminacy by not racializing the characters’ 
white body. In doing so, the critics fail to recognize the extent to which the novelist manages to 
push her exploration amid the paradox that narrative representation of racial passing necessarily 
compromises its invisibility and indeterminacy. Not only do my chapters reveal the mechanism 




also elucidate how the ideology entraps us literary scholars in a white-subject position where we 
can figure challenges to the racial status quo only within the framework of 
real-white/passing-white difference. 
Focused on the interrelation between the essentially indeterminate white body and the 
difference-imposing language of white ideology, my study integrates the insights from whiteness 
studies into studies of passing narratives and, by doing so, contributes to the current debat s in 
both disciplines. For one thing, while whiteness scholars such as Ruth Frankenberg illuminate 
how the notion of whiteness—one of the principal effects and instruments of white 
hegemony—operates as a “race-less, unmarked norm,”4 my analysis of this normalizing process 
in a “passing” setting (which lacks a physical boundary between whiteness and non-whiteness) 
reveals the precariousness of a white norm further than whiteness studies have done. In Playing 
in the Dark, for example, Toni Morrison shows how canonical white American writers structured 
and authorized white subjectivity through covert recourse to the silenced and objectified black 
other. Whites’ identity construction, she argues, depends on their “projection of the not-m ” nto 
blackness (38), i.e., making the silenced “Africanist” body signify non-whiteness and thus, 
instead of resorting to a substantial or self-sufficient whiteness (which does not really exist), 
identifying themselves as not non-white.5 While Morrison points out that “the dramatic polarity 
created by skin color” (38) has made such projection possible, my reading of passing novels 
shows how their substitution of a visually white body invalidates the visual binary in Morrison’s 
model and unsettles whites’ narrative agency including that which enables them to na e the 
body “actually black” in the first place. 
The last two chapters of my dissertation complicates Morrison’s model even further by 




With only the white-ideologized, difference-imposing language available for narrativization of 
racial passing, both Johnson and Larsen, despite their efforts to emphasize the actual racial 
indeterminacy of “passing” characters, have eventually to take a white-subj ct position in their 
writings and base their narratives upon a clear-cut difference between real-whiteness and 
passing-whiteness. Here, my argument also points to the formerly unacknowledged relevance of 
Du Boisian “double consciousness”—defined as a “sense of always looking at one’s self through 
the eyes of others [i.e., whites], of measuring one’s soul by the tape of a world that looks on in 
amused contempt and pity” (2)—to the way in which whiteness depends on a racial other to 
establish itself. As Du Bois’ term points to how a history of psychological oppression has forced 
blacks to internalize white subjectivity—as well as the black objectivity it automatically assigns 
to them—in their self-image and self-expression, in African-American passing fiction this 
objectification occurs when the language of white ideology forces the writ r to name an 
essentially indeterminate white body “actually black” against his/her will to challenge the 
ideology.6 Indeed, as my chapters will demonstrate, when Johnson’s and Larsen’s narratives 
define their respective character-narrators as “actually black,” that coincides with the 
character-narrators’ ideologically loaded look at their own white bodies throug  the eyes of white 
characters or white audiences. 
Conversely, my reading of white ideology’s difference-introducing intervention in 
passing narratives helps us answer one of the major questions that studies of passing fiction ask: 
why stability and fluidity, closure and open-endedness coexist in literary works of racial 
passing—a paradoxical coexistence exemplified by “how passing narratives produce the sense of 
an ending or narrative resolution in the context of the contradictions that the subject-who-passes 




(Wald 7).7 As my following chapters demonstrate, such coexistence of mutually contradicting 
elements derives significantly from the tension between the authors’ will to emphasize the 
essential instability of racial passing and the language they have to use, which imposes a stable 
real-white/passing-white difference on their narrative. As Wald suggests, such a contention often 
surfaces at the work’s concluding scene, where the novelist has to finalize his/h r investigation 
of racial passing which actually defies finality.8 Accordingly, each of my chapters analyzes the 
ending of the focused work and elucidates the ways the author strives to sustain a sense of 
indeterminacy in the closing scene—ranging from foregrounding the character-n rrator’s 
ambivalence on race (Faulkner’s Absalom, Absalom!, Johnson’s The Autobiography of an 
Ex-Colored Man) to making a racio-narratively stable ending follow an ambiguous one and 
dropping the stable one in later printings (Larsen’s Pa sing).9 
As I have suggested above, the language of white ideology that constrains the novelists’ 
representation of racial passing also entraps us as readers, who have to rely up n the same 
already ideologized language in our interpretive act. Indeed, the narratives’ coh rence, 
development and closure, enabled by the clear-cut difference between real-whitness and 
passing-whiteness, invite readers to read along the ideological grain. Furthermore, as my analysis 
foregrounds, the readers’ own preexisting immersion in the system of binary racial 
difference—whether themselves white or not—also promotes this ideological complicity. Stanley 
Fish’s theory of “interpretive communities” informs this dimension of my argument. For Fish, 
“the stability of interpretation among readers” results not from the text itself but from the 
readers’ shared approach to the text, as they belong to the same “interpretiv  community” “made 
up of those who share interpretive strategies not for reading (in the conventional sense) but for 




the long history of white dominance in American discourse and the resulting discursive 
indoctrination of non-whites, American “interpretive communities” are white-subjective, if 
sometimes only subtly or covertly, regardless of their actual racial demography—even more so in 
the early twentieth century than today. Discussing readers’ role in white ideology’s systematic 
suppression of racial passing, the following chapters also foreground the discursive scenes of 
early-twentieth-century America. Here, even as white writers like Faulkner wrote assuming 
somewhat unconsciously the whiteness of their readers, black writers’ creations were more or 
less an accommodation to white interpretive communities. Indeed, Harlem Renaissance writers’ 
literary success, or even publication, depended considerably upon the evaluation of white patrons, 
white publishers as well as white-dominant national audience.10 
Given the persistent white hegemony of the U.S. today, dominant ideology’s cooption of 
contemporary readers into the binarized racial system indicates a paradox th t faces us 
twenty-first-century scholars, that is, our own possible complicity in the producti n and 
reproduction of white-subjective meanings. Indeed, in its argumentative reorde ing of the more 
or less chaotic worlds presented by fictional narratives, literary-critical discourse in general is 
prone to linguistic framing, which inevitably contains subversive factors—such as essentially 
indeterminate racial passing—in favor of the status quo. Hence comes the entrapm Abby L. 
Ferber warns us “researchers” of: “By failing to explore our own role in the construction of race 
and continuing to use it as a category of analysis, we produce race as a prediscursive category. 
We reproduce race as a given, obvious, natural category, existing outside of discourse. In other 
words, we counteract and delegitimize our very own claims that race is socially constructed” 
(160). Attempting to address this critical predicament, I begin each of my chapters by carefully 




exemplified by the assumption of the difference between real-white and p ssing-white. Indeed, 
“we researchers” who are susceptible to entrapment inevitably include me, who, with all the 
caution I take, have to write in a language not only available (thus already ideologiz d) to me but 
also accessible (thus, again, already ideologized) to my reader. For exampl , in the last paragraph 
I mentioned American interpretive communities’ “actual racial demography.” But, especially 
given my main claim of problematized racial boundaries, how could I define the races, much less 
actual races, of the members of given interpretive communities? If what I really meant by the 
phrase was “the demography of the racial categories to which the members beli ve themselves to 
belong,” this more accurate but lengthy (and out of context, given the last paragraph’s focus on 
interpretive communities, not on the dissolution of racial categories) alternativ  would most 
likely be corrected because of its disruption of both my own and my reader’s sense of normative 
writing. 
In an attempt to overcome my own ideo-linguistic entrapment, I take particul caution in 
using the terms “whiteness,” “white subjectivity” and “white ideology” among other principal 
keywords of my study. As Frankenberg accurately notes, the very concept of “invisible” and 
“unmarked” whiteness, if casually used as a fixed, essentialized and homogeneous catchword, 
runs the danger of suppressing the actual fluidity, contextuality and multi-dimens onality of 
whiteness to the very advantage of white ideology: “I would argue that whiteness is always 
constructed, always in the process of being made and unmade. Indeed, its characteriz tion as 
unmarked marker is itself an ‘ideological’ effect that seeks to cover the tracks of its 
constructedness, specificity, and localness, even as they appear” (16). Thus, in my analysis of 
how white ideology subtly controls the way passing fiction is written and read, I take pains not to 




context. Rather, I analyze the complex web of discourses—the author’s, the narrator’s, 
characters’, the implied reader’s and contemporary readers’, to name just a few—that underlies 
the text itself, as well as the context of the book’s production, in my attempt to address the 
unique, complex and multifaceted construction of white subjectivity in each individual novel.
The white subjectivities thus extracted necessarily vary from author to authr, from work to work. 
For example, while Absalom, Absalom! defines white subjectivity mostly in terms of whites’ 
epistemological and narrative perspective, Intruder in the Dust focuses more on whites’ 
ideologically determined social praxis. In Johnson’s and Larsen’s narratives, on the other hand, 
the novelists’ “double-conscious” consideration for white norms, narrative as well as social, 
influences their representation of racial passing—in, of course, significantly different ways from 
each other. 
Lastly, poststructuralist interrogations of subjectivity also inform my analysis, if only 
subtly in some chapters, throughout the dissertation. Indeed, Jacques Derrida’s theory of 
“différance” bears particular relevance to my proposition that, while language introduces 
binarized racial difference, its signification is essentially empty due to the actual lack of such a 
difference, as exposed by the indeterminate presence of passing characters. Also, one can 
consider white ideology’s linguistic/narrative containment of racial passing’  endless 
indeterminacy in terms of the Lacanian “Symbolic order” which authorizes fictions of coherence 
through suppression of the “real” categorical chaos. This dissertation also use  such 
poststructuralist concepts as Louis Althusser’s “interpellation” and Mikhail Bakhtin’s “dialogic 
discourse” to incorporate their respective examinations of discourse as a vehicle of dominant 
and/or dissident ideology. For example, Althusser’s theory of “interpellation” helps illuminate 




upon the text’s subtle invitation, the reader structures meaning—and by extension his/her own 
subjectivity—by practicing the white-ideologized interpretive strategy already charged with the 
real-white/passing-white difference: “you and I are lways already subjects, and as such 
constantly practice the rituals of ideological recognition, which guarantee for us that we are 
indeed concrete, individual, distinguishable and (naturally) irreplaceable subjects” (172-73). 
 
The first two chapters of this dissertation elucidate Faulkner’s attempt to expose the 
precariousness and fictiveness of white identity and subjectivity. Even as his white characters 
and narrators define their subject position as opposed to the narratively constructed bla k object, 
the visual complication of passing or mixed-race characters neutralizes such a fiction of 
distancing difference. I point out that Absalom, Absalom! and Intruder in the Dust explore, on 
the narrative and social levels respectively, how Southern racial ideology suppre ses this 
predicament and provides whites with the sense, if illusory, of distinct and superior racial 
identity. 
The first chapter, “Racial Mixture, Racial Passing, and White Subjectivity in William 
Faulkner’s Absalom, Absalom!” foregrounds the narrative dimension of the issue. The novel’s 
white narrators, after repeated failure to structure a coherent story of the Su pens (a failure that 
would discredit the authority of white subjectivity), resort eventually to reading Charles Bon’s 
white body as that of a racial passer and attributing his mysterious murder to his 
“miscegenational” relationship with the murderer’s white sister. While elping the narrators to 
make their story coherent and thus stabilize their subject position, this narrative operation, as 
well as their invention of other “passing” characters, is essentially precarious. Indeed, the 




“passing-white” does not derive from pre-existing validity of white-subjectiv  interpretive 
approach. Rather, the very act of naming—which is at best fictive, given the lack of physical 
difference between real-white and passing-white—enables the narrators to differentiate 
themselves from the invented “actually black” object and thus become white subject. Therefore, 
the whole strategy depends already upon the very white subjectivity that the narrators aim to 
establish. 
As I demonstrate in this chapter, in Absalom, Absalom! Faulkner refutes the assumption 
of real-white/passing-white difference by describing visually white characters—such as Charles 
Etienne and even “coffee-colored” Clytie—in ways that put the very existence of racial mixture 
into question. If a passing person by definition looks the same as whites, Faulkner seems to ask 
in those scenes, how could one tell whether s/he is really passing? While suggesting his own 
answer that one could not and thus foregrounding the essential lack of the 
real-white/passing-white difference, Faulkner takes pains to portray how w ite ideology works to 
suppress the question through the dichotomized language it endorses. Despite the actual racial 
instability of white-looking characters, the already ideologized language contains them in the 
“passing-white” object position. In so doing, this language also translates them into a fixed and 
manageable narrative material for the storytelling of the novel’s white c aracter-narrators, as 
well as for the critical discourse of literary scholars, who have not seen the white body firsthand 
but only heard/read of it (as “passing white”) in the language that dictaes i s user’s distinction 
between real-whiteness and passing-whiteness. 
The second chapter, “Signifying, Ordering, and Containing the Chaos: Whiteness, 
Ideology, and Language in William Faulkner’s Intruder in the Dust,” reveals the novelist’s 




indeterminate body into the white/black binary by encouraging people’s participation in public 
discourse, such as the derogatory slurs “nigger” and “Sambo,” and social practices such as 
lynching. Though the character Lucas Beauchamp does not pass for white, his background, life 
and action which defy racial categorization create all the more confusion in the white/black racial 
binary, as indicated by Faulkner’s portrayal of him as “not black nor white either.” Indeed, the 
story of Lucas offers a noteworthy case of how, reacting to this in-between being whose presence 
undermines a distinct white identity, Southern whites invent a monolithic subjectivity through 
white-supremacist discourse as well as ritualized social praxis. These mob actions in turn 
reinforce the same ideology that has conditioned the whites’ mental and social activ ties in the 
first place. 
This chapter also illuminates the linguistic dimension of this mechanism, as Faulkner’s 
novelistic treatment of Lucas indicates how whiteness is a discursive construct predicated upon 
the reductive operation of language in ordering the essentially chaotic world through 
signification. With no intrinsic signified in material reality, whiteness as a signifier defines itself 
only as opposed to blackness which, as the liminal Lucas shows, also lacks a substantial signified. 
The novel dramatizes the situation where, as dominant ideology penetrates people’s mental 
activity through a particular language it endorses, Southern whites, with their monolithic 
subjectivity authorized by white-supremacist ideology, cannot conceive of blacks except as an 
abstract and homogeneous otherness. This also renders whites unable to question their ow
ritualized social practices such as lynching, thus further reinforcing the sam  ideology that 
determines their behavior. I point out that in Intruder in the Dust Faulkner strategically uses the 
word “Vocabulary” (with capitalized V) as opposed to “vocabulary” (with small v), the former of 




my reading, Faulkner portrays Chick Mallison’s attempt to save Lucas from impending lynching 
in terms of finding a “Vocabulary” with which to express the idea of the man’s innoce ce. This 
pursuit of “Vocabulary,” I go on to argue, challenges white ideology, because it helps Chick 
question the stereotypical notion of “murderous nigger” which not only frames the racially 
indeterminate Lucas into the white/black racial binary but also allows whites to reconfirm their 
“superior” identity as opposed to the inferiorized racial other. 
These chapters also argue that Faulkner’s critical scrutiny of race has its own paradox, 
because the Southern white writer himself has to write in the already ideologiz d language and 
thus cannot be free from the same white subjectivity that he questions. This predicament is 
exemplified by the closure of Absalom, Absalom! where the white narrators’ “interracialization” 
of the visually white Bon indicates the author’s own failure to finalize his writing with the 
endless indeterminacy of the white body intact. Through analysis of Faulkner’s int ntional or 
unwitting stylistic/thematic twists like this, I reveal the author’s strenuous negotiation with the 
white-dominant ideology that even extends to his own writing, and with the undeniable 
dependence of his creative activity upon a stable white subjectivity. 
The second half of my dissertation points out that white ideology even entraps African 
American writers in a white-subject position to contain their representation of essentially 
indeterminate racial passing. The third chapter, “Narrative Order and Racial Hierarchy: James 
Weldon Johnson’s Double-Consciousness and ‘White’ Subjectivity in The Autobiography of an 
Ex-Colored Man and Along This Way,” demonstrates how, in the novel The Autobiography, the 
character-narrator’s internalized white subjectivity leads him to read his own unclassifiable white 
body as “looking white but actually black.” In so doing, the chapter also reveals how the 




coherence, development and dramatization—qualities that the narrator and even the author, in 
their consciousness of white audience, implicitly and explicitly associate w th whiteness. 
Whereas Johnson foregrounds the narrator’s blatant espousal of white norms to alienate his 
readers and encourage their critique of white hegemony, the racialized lnguage that presupposes 
the real-white/passing-white difference entraps the author, as well as the readers who have to 
read with the same already ideologized language, in a white-subject position where one cannot 
figure the essential indeterminacy of racial passing. 
The second part of this chapter discusses Johnson’s own autobiography, Along This Way, 
not only because of the author’s continued dependence upon the language of white ideologybut 
also because the work foregrounds an intersection between race and text in termsof categorical 
indeterminacy. Indeed, Johnson’s anonymous publication of The Autobiography, making the 
novel look like an autobiography written by “an ex-colored man,” exploits the falsifiability of a 
text’s genre and authorship. And the resulting destabilization of the very notion of 
autobiographical self—here the narrator of an “autobiography” can be “fictional”—opens up an 
endless uncertainty that could nullify Along This Way’s claim of authentic black autobiography. 
In this space of endless indeterminacy, just as with the actually non-existing difference between a 
real-white body and a passing-white body, genre and authorship do not have material foothold in 
a body of writing but are merely one’s subjective interpretation. Indeed, th  authorship/genre 
mix-up of The Autobiography and Along This Way causes confusion in racial identity as well; 
here, the “passing” Ex-Colored Man, the fictional narrator of The Autobiography, takes “black” 
Johnson’s place and “passes” for the author of The Autobiography. Amid this categorical chaos, 
in Along This Way Johnson repeatedly draws on rhetorical devices derived from white 




fictionality (against which to define Along This Way as real autobiography). Somewhat similar to 
The Autobiography, thus reestablished binary difference between the two texts’ genres provides 
Along This Way with an apparent logical flow and development and, by doing so, convinces the 
reader of the actually precarious difference between Johnson’s autobiograph cal black self and 
the white-looking, passing and fictional Ex-Colored Man. I point out that this narrative strategy, 
in its reliance on white-oriented discourse, significantly constrains Johnson’s challenge to white 
ideology. Since Along This Way defines Johnson’s racial integrity and autonomy through his 
ability to scrutinize and confront the white-supremacist America, the narrative’s actual 
dependence on white subjectivity undermines the alternative discourse he aims to create to 
critique white hegemony. 
The final chapter, “Ordering the Racial Chaos, Chaoticizing the Racial Order: Nella 
Larsen’s Narrative of Indeterminacy and Invisibility in Passing,” elucidates how the white 
hegemony of 1920s America, as well as the dichotomizing language it endorses, significantly 
undermines the novelist’s effort to represent racial passing in its actual indeterminacy. Though 
Larsen tries to explore the indeterminate and invisible operation of racialp ssing (in opposition 
to the binarized “looking white but actually black” model endorsed by white ideology), that very 
indeterminacy/invisibility, narratively unmanageable if engaged as it is, would not allow her to 
discuss racial passing in the first place. Hence comes her paradoxical reintroduction of the binary 
racial framework in the scene where visually white Irene Redfield and Clare Kendry recognize 
each other as old “black” friends. This narrative move undermines Larsen’s earlier, more faithful 
and thus ideologically disruptive treatment of racial passing. In those early scenes, Larsen does 
not racialize her characters nor her narrative itself, thus keeping the reader uninformed that they 




advantage of the way whiteness operates as a “race-less, unmarked norm” in the U.S. context, 
Larsen recreates a real-life situation where a “passer” is not a “white-looking black” but an 
unracialized—and thus no different from “white”—individual. Indeed, in its actual operation, 
racial passing does not present itself as “faked whiteness” nor “concealed bl ckness” but works 
indeterminately without even presenting itself. However, to convey this insight to her reader, 
Larsen has to present it in language, as she does in the scene of Irene and Clare’s reunion, which 
paradoxically makes passing visible and stabilized in the binary categorization. 
This chapter also points out that Larsen’s narrative treatment of racial p ssing has its 
counterpart within the novel’s fictional world, namely, the character Irene’s i t rnalization of 
whites’ gaze. Indeed, the visually white Irene, the viewpoint character of the novel’s third-person 
narrative, introduces difference and hierarchy to scenes of racial chaos by looking at herself, as 
well as other racially ambiguous people, through the categorizing eyes of “white” characters. 
This process also serves to order Irene’s narrative perspective, otherwise full of confusion and 
contradiction due to her emotional turmoil as well as the categorical chaos she witnesses, into 
coherent and structured units, thus encouraging the readers’ complicity in the whie-subjective 
racio-narrative order as they construct meanings in their interpretation. 
The chapters on Johnson and Larsen also contextualize the authors’ ideo-linguistic 
entrapment against the backdrop of the 1920s Harlem Renaissance. As indicated by Alain
Locke’s call for overcoming the white-dominant America’s discursive constrai ts and 
“concentrat[ing] upon self-expression and the forces and motives of self-determination” (ix), the 
movement advocated blacks’ creative subjectivity first and foremost. At the sam  time, the 
project depended significantly on white power such as white patrons, white-dominant audience 




cooled off and the Great Depression hit the general consumption of art. Placing Johnson’s a d 
Larsen’s respective narrative maneuver in this context, especially their relationship with the 
principal white patron Carl Van Vechten, I point to a parallel between the autors’ discursive 
framing of racial passing and that of their own self-expression, which, just like the passing body, 
may defy whites’ frame of reference but must be contained in an ideological y correct form. 
My study even suggests that this parallel applies to the creative activity of Southern white 
Faulkner, who struggled to get his stylistically and thematically unorthodox, and thus potentially 
subversive, works accepted by the white-dominant readership of early-twentieth-century 
America. Indeed, despite the three authors’ immense difference in backgrounds and writings, 
there are also remarkable similarities between the ways they strived to portray racial chaos in the 
ideologized language that necessarily suppresses indeterminacy. As the following chapters will 
demonstrate, these writers had to scrutinize racial passing at the paradoxical crossroads between 
order-defying body and order-imposing language, ideological critique and entrapment, challenge 






Racial Mixture, Racial Passing, and White Subjectivity 
in William Faulkner’s Absalom, Absalom! 
 
In his 1987 study of the critical reception of Absalom, Absalom! Bernd Engler points out 
that “since the mid-Seventies the only interpretations to gain favour have been thos  which, at 
least partly, regard Absalom, Absalom! as the conscious realization of an open work of art” (246). 
Somewhat testifying to how the text’s indeterminacy specifically concerns the interconnection of 
race and narrative, Engler’s survey also shows that noteworthy monographs from the decade 
include those concerning “Faulkner’s attitude towards racial questions” (252) as well as “the 
novel as a study in narratology and/or epistemology” (256). Indeed, even as Quentin and Shreve 
finalize their reconstruction of the endlessly uncertain past by reading Charles Bon’s 
white-looking body as “passing white,” Faulkner does not supply any evidence for Bon’s racial 
mixture outside the white character-narrators’ invention. 
Engler is quick to note, however, that most race-related scholarship does not fully at end 
to the novel’s open-endedness, as exemplified by four studies from 1983: “Walter Tay or, Eric J. 
Sundquist, Thadious M. Davis, and Erskine Peters begin, as do most others, with the dubious 
assumption that Bon’s identity as Sutpen’s part-negro son has been clearly established in the 
text” (253). And it seems that this problem is still compromising the Absalom, Absalom! 
scholarship.1 For example, while critiquing the discursive domination of “‘legitimate’ white 
caretakers of history,” Maritza Stanchich bases her postcolonial reading upo  the same white 
“legitimacy” and uncritically follows Quentin and Shreve’s re-creation of Bon as “a free mulatto 




mulatto who can ‘pass’ as white and threatens to upset the South’s rigid race caste, their pre-Civil 
War and post-Civil War fears overlap and intermingle. . . . The strategy of the narrative seeks to 
uphold white domination by representing all characters of color through Rosa, Quentin, Geral 
Compson and Shreve, the ‘legitimate’ white caretakers of history” (608). 
Margo Crawford’s 2004 psychoanalytical study of racial mixture in Absalom, Absalom! 
shows the same problem. For, while revealing how the novel’s white subjects cannot represent 
“interracialness” as a coherent other but only as “abstract contradictions,” and thus exposing 
their own “méconnaissance, the recognition that is misrecognition, the ‘me’ that is ‘not me’” (76), 
Crawford fails to apply her critical paradigm to the white subjectivity that has made Bon—her 
most discussed example—“interracial” in the first place. Given that the narrators do not racialize 
Bon until Quentin and Shreve’s conclusion, her discussion sounds highly questionable when she 
finds in Mr. Compson’s “limbo halfway” metaphor for Bon’s elusive existence (Absalom 98) a 
reference to his racial mixture: “He [Mr. Compson] connects ‘blackness’ to the body as pure 
corporeality and ‘whiteness’ to the power of the mind (‘mentality’), and he imagines Bon as 
being a mind that is limited and trapped by a body” (Crawford 81).2
Besides the sense of closure the work appears to offer by ending with Quentin and 
Shreve’s subjective account, one can rightly attribute this persisting pitfall of Absalom, Absalom! 
scholarship to the critical discourses applied by readers. For, attempting to examine the racial 
oppression, physical or discursive, dramatized in the novel, race-oriented readings have 
necessarily had to name Bon a racial other—whether it be Stanchich’s narratively colonized 
“character of color” or Crawford’s “interracial abstraction.” By turning Bon’s indeterminable 
white-looking body into a fixed object of racial investigation, and by doing so for their own 




and thus unwittingly reinforced, rather than elucidated Faulkner’s deconstruction of, white 
subjectivity.3 
That, to make a coherent narrative whole and thus fashion themselves as authoritative 
discursive agents, Quentin and Shreve (and commentators on the level of critical discourse) 
transform Bon into a “black son of a bitch” (Absalom 286) demonstrates Toni Morrison’s theory 
on how white subjectivity relies upon blackness in a circular manner. Whites’ identity 
construction, she argues, depends on their “projection of the not-me” onto blackness (38), i.e., 
making the silenced African American body signify non-whiteness and thus circ larly 
identifying themselves as not non-white. (Hence, as Ruth Frankenberg aptly puts it, “the notion 
of whiteness as unmarked norm” is already “a white delusion” [73].) While Morrison points out 
that “the dramatic polarity created by skin color” (38) has made such projection possible, 
however, Faulkner’s substitution of white-looking Bon neutralizes the visual “polarity” nd 
unsettles whites’ narrative agency including that which enables them to name him a “passing 
mixed-race” in the first place. Thus, in Absalom, Absalom! Faulkner intensifies Morrison’s 
model—which bases itself upon visible white/black difference—with racial passing and points to 
a deeper circularity built in the process. Here, with no substantial reference point for difference, 
one names/fabricates an “interracial object” against which to define himself or herself as “white 
subject,” but in its discursive arbitrariness this strategy depends already upon the very white 
subjectivity that it has to establish. 
Indeed, as the first section of this chapter will point out, Absalom, Absalom! occasionally 
describes characters with “passing” light skin—such as Charles Etienne and eve  
“coffee-colored” Clytie—in ways that put the very existence of racial mixture into question. If a 




how could one tell whether s/he is really passing? While suggesting his own answer that one 
could not, Faulkner takes pains to portray how the language of race works to suppress the 
question. To sustain its system of differentiation, racial ideology capitalizes on the dichotomizing 
operation of language to cover up the essential lack of physical boundary between whit ness and 
passing whiteness—by labeling as “passing interracial” those who show no bodily difference 
from “whites.”4 Hence (apart from the occasional complication mentioned above) come the 
mostly stable “interracial objects” in the narrative space of the novel’s white characters, as well 
as in the critical discourse of literary scholars, who have not seen the white-looking body 
firsthand but only heard/read of it (as “passing white”) in the already loaded l nguage. 
While my first section illuminates Faulkner’s exploration of racial passing in terms of 
indeterminate body versus binarizing language, the following section demonstrates how the 
novel’s central plot of mystery solving deepens his investigation. For, as Faulkner revolves 
Absalom, Absalom! around white character-narrators’ attempts to find truth (and, accordingly, to 
claim their legitimacy as narrative agents), linguistic containment of racial passing at once 
enables them to become white subjects and hampers their epistemological enterprise, thus 
compromising that very white subjectivity. I will point out that, by repeatedly frustrating the 
white narrators’ reconstruction of the past, Faulkner posits the paradox that language in its 
differentiating/distancing operation enables one to order the essentially “chaotic” world 
(exemplified by the endlessly obscure line between white and passing white) into 
comprehensible units and denies him/her access to the same world through inevitable reduction 
and distortion. Thus, Faulkner arranges the final chapters, which approach the hear  of the Sutpen 
mystery “where there might be paradox and inconsistency but nothing fault nor false” (253), so 




object: “now both of them were Henry Sutpen and both of them were Bon, compounded each of 
both yet either neither” (280). Only through such de-subjectification can the whit narrators 
question a white-looking man’s whiteness—a move that foregrounds the essential uncert inty of 
white/passing-white difference—though, as the last part of this chapter will problematize, their 
eventual interracialization of Bon fails to embrace this uncertainty. 
While Faulkner explores racial passing as regards the conflict between different ating 
language and difference-proof body, the narrative setting of Absalom, Absalom! favors the 
former for the most part. For, having seen few personages of the Sutpen legend firsthand, the 
white character-narrators reconstruct the past referring not to physical evidence but to yet another 
set of narratives which, transmitted in language, have already contained the actual indeterminacy 
of white-looking bodies.5 A typical example comes from the story of Bon’s “octoroon” mistress, 
passed down from General Compson, a contemporary, to Mr. Compson and then to Quentin. 
Despite her passable “magnolia-face” reported from General Compson’s firsthand observation 
(157), the whites’ consistent use of “the octoroon” in their reference translates her misleading 
skin color into a definite marker of racial mixture and thus suppresses the possible uncertainty of 
her race. Here, as I have proposed above, white subjectivity contains the racially elusive body to 
recertify itself through a circular process; the term “octoroon” self-explanatorily interracializes 
the woman despite her white-looking body and allows the speaker to establish his white 
subjectivity as opposed to this differentiated/distanced “interracial object,” which retroactively 
endorses his initial application of the “mixed-race” label.6 Protected by this discursive 
self-sufficiency, Mr. Compson manages to appropriate racial passing itself for his own narrative 
purpose. When he develops his “bigamy theory” for Bon’s mysterious death by replacing 




“passing” octoroon (75, 114), this narrative operation carries an ideologically disruptive 
implication as it assumes the visual homogeneity between white and passing-white women. 
However, with “the octoroon” already objectified as a stable other, Mr. Compson has no trouble
turning the debunked white/passing-white difference into a narrative device with which to tell a 
plausible story and, by doing so, reinforce his subjectivity. 
Such narrative formation of interracial object, however, betrays its fictiveness when the 
white-looking body directly confronts the white observer to invalidate the linguistically 
constructed difference. Faulkner suggests this when Mr. Compson, drawing upon his father’s 
firsthand account, reports Judge Jim Hamblett’s confusion about Charles Etienne’s racial identity. 
As the passing “olive face” (164) of Charles Etienne leads the justice to believe his being “a 
white man” and include him in “we [white Southerners]” (165), General Compson’s crrective 
gesture fails to exert an immediate effect: “he [Hamblett] looking at the prisoner now but saying 
‘white’ again even while his voice died away as if the order to stop the voice had been shocked 
into short circuit, and every face in the room turned toward the prisoner as Hamblett cried, ‘What 
are you? Who and where did you come from?’” (165). Hamblett’s “shock” at the white-looking 
man’s possible racial mixture and the resulting “short-circuit” dysfunction of his discursive 
censor (“the order to stop the voice”) cause him to let the word “white”—a marker of 
sameness—escape his lips one last time. Faulkner suggests the ideologically pernicious potential 
of Charles Etienne’s body by making the judge, an instrument of the Southern legal system, 
overreact with the anachronistic language of slavery (“What are you? Who and where did you 
come from?”) where a mixed-race body belongs to the white master as a literalobject. 
In contrast, Mr. Compson, with no access to Charles Etienne’s physical body but only to 




white. Unlike Jim Hamblett, Mr. Compson manages to picture Charles Etienne as a mixed-race 
man who happens to have the passing white look, rather than as a white-looking man who may 
or may not be mixed-race. Therefore, in chapter 6, Mr. Compson’s critique of the fictionality of 
race begins with the already interracial Charles Etienne (whom the “one-dr p rule” fictively 
classifies as black) and skips the deeper-level fictionality of his white-looking body being 
interracialized with no substantial evidence. Accordingly, Mr. Compson finds Charles Etienne’s 
predicament in the fact that his blackness overshadows his whiteness under Southern racial 
ideology, not that his body resists any signification of the black. For instance, the whi e narrator 
refers to Charles Etienne’s outfit at Sutpen’s Hundred as “the delicate garm nts of his pagehood 
already half concealed beneath that harsh and shapeless denim cut to an iron patte n and sold by 
the millions—that burlesque uniform and regalia of the tragic burlesque of the sons of Ham” 
(159-60). Here, Mr. Compson shows his sense of racial mixture as a simple sum of white and 
black, not as a threat to whiteness as a distinct category which has enabled his subjective 
rendering of racial mixture in the first place. Consequently, in Mr. Compson’s somewhat 
stereotypical configuration, Charles Etienne’s identity problem manifests itself as an awkward 
coordination between his original “delicate garments” made of white silk and “that harsh and 
shapeless denim” emblematic of the black race, not between his white-looking body and the 
problematic signs of racial hybridity he has to wear. 
Significantly, when Mr. Compson does mention Charles Etienne’s visual appearance 
through dramatization of him “examining himself” in a shard of broken mirror, the narrator does 
not foreground Charles Etienne “himself”—i.e., his white-looking body—but his no longer 
“white” clothing which, covering the racially indeterminate body, signifies his loss of whiteness: 




himself in the delicate and outgrown tatters in which he perhaps could not even remember 
himself, with quiet and incredulous incomprehension” (162). Objectifying Charles Etienne as 
interracial and claiming his difference this way, Mr. Compson enables himself to exert narrative 
subjectivity with which to recount the unknown. Mr. Compson’s acknowledgement of the 
inaccessibility to the scene (“who to know”) does not keep him from telling Charles Etienne’s 
inner feelings but rather opens to him a free narrative space to fill with his own perspective, as 
registered by the adverb “perhaps.”7 
Thus, in Absalom, Absalom! white narrators’ general lack of direct sighting allows them 
to treat racial passing solely in language and ignore the white-looking body and its subversive 
implication to their subjectivity. Conversely, in rare cases of immediate confrontation such as 
Hamblett’s with Charles Etienne, the white-looking body nullifies the observer’s s nse of 
difference and his discursive dominance predicated on it. Faulkner furthers this paradigm by 
applying it even to Clytie who, with her “coffee-colored” skin and publicly known parental 
origin, otherwise occupies a stable interracial position. By doing so, Faulkner suggsts that, just 
like the “octoroon” label, the “coffee-color” epithet does not faithfully reflect the reality of her 
body but rather carry the speaker’s will to differentiate. In chapter 6, Shreve checks with Quentin 
about the excursion to Sutpen’s Hundred during which the boy Quentin and his friends see 
Clytie, 
watching you with eyes like two shoe buttons buried in the myriad wrinkles of her 
coffee-colored face, who just looked at you and said without even removing the 
pipe and in a voice almost like a white woman’s: ‘What do you want?’ and after a 
moment one of you said ‘Nothing’ and then you were all running without knowing 




the fallow and rain-gutted and brier-choked old fields until you came to the old 
rotting snake fence and crossed it, hurled yourselves over it, and then the ar , 
the land, the sky and trees and woods, looked different again, all right again. 
(174) 
While Rosa’s preceding reference to Clytie’s “coffee-colored face” (109) leads Shreve (and 
presumably Quentin, when he first told Shreve about the episode) to repeat the same color 
description, Clytie’s voice “almost like a white woman’s” renders the confused boy Quentin and 
his friends unable to cast the mixed-race woman in the stereotype of frightening “mixed-breed”: 
they run away “without knowing . . . why since [they] were not scared.”8 Faulkner attributes the 
boys’ puzzlement to Clytie’s ideologically disruptive “sameness” in the metaphorically charged 
second half of the quotation; the boys manage to collect themselves only when they cross “the 
old rotting snake fence”—a half-wrecked boundary that barely splits their ordinary world and the 
world of the other—back into the former sphere where, tellingly, things “looked different again, 
all right again.” 
Faulkner suggests that firsthand—and so not linguistically mediated—experience of the 
supposedly passing body can disrupt the circular process of white subjectivity formation. He 
does so most dramatically in chapter 5, where Rosa narratively revisits her post-Civil War life at 
the Sutpen mansion in stream-of-consciousness style, giving us some direct access to her 
prediscursive psyche.9 Rosa’s report of her confrontation with Clytie (who“passes” for Henry to 
the eye of Rosa who, “running out of the bright afternoon” into “ the dim light” [109], has yet to 
adjust to the darkness) testifies unwittingly to a tension between her transfixio  with Clytie’s 
visual sameness and her defensive impulse to name the woman “interracial other.” And, through 




even as language helps a white subject differentiate himself/herself from the constructed 
“interracial object,” the visual homogeneity created by racial passing can complicate this 
dichotomizing function of language. 
 Rosa’s mental process during her face-off with Clytie illustrates this disruption, as she 
rushes into the mansion without knowing what has happened there, 
and saw the Sutpen face and even as I cried ‘Henry! Henry! What have you 
done? What has that fool [Wash Jones] been trying to tell me?’ realised that I 
had come, not too late as I had thought, but come too soon. Because it was 
not Henry’s face. It was Sutpen face enough, but not his; Sutpen 
coffee-colored face enough there in the dim light, barring the stairs: and I 
running out of the bright afternoon, into the thunderous silence of that 
brooding house where I could see nothing at first: then gradually the face, the 
Sutpen face not approaching, not swimming up out of the gloom, but already 
there, rocklike and firm and antedating time and house and doom and all, 
waiting there (oh yes, he chose well; he bettered choosing, who created in his 
own image the cold Cerberus of his private hell)—the face without sex or age 
because it had never possessed either: the same sphinx face which she had 
been born with. (109) 
Rosa’s confusion of Clytie with Henry shows the former’s passing “white” look in this particular 
scene. The way the passage registers the confusion also indicates that Clytie’s “coffee color” 
reflects Rosa’s interested preconception as much as the body’s physical attribute. For, at first 
referring to what she finds as “the Sutpen face,” Rosa cannot attach “coffee-colored”—a marker 




neutralize her mistake and reestablish difference, Rosa translates her misrecognition into that of 
race-free time (she “had come, not too late as I had thought, but come too soon”) and deduces it 
illogically from a sudden reassertion of difference: “Because it was not Henry’s face.” In 
contrast with Mr. Compson’s logic-controlled representation of racial mixture from a secure 
subject position, Rosa’s direct sighting of the passing body de-subjectifies her and thus makes 
her rendition a chaotic, self-contradictory assortment of images. For instance, Clytie, whom Rosa 
has just positioned on a timeline to claim Henry’s difference, later transcends time (“antedating 
time”) as the white narrator tries to objectify her as “rocklike and firm.” Rosa intends her 
“Cerberus” metaphor (juxtaposed with Sutpen’s masterly “choosing” which had equated Clytie’s 
slave mother with “the other livestock” in Mr. Compson’s account [48]) to objectify Clytie 
through Gothicizing and bestializing of the “half-breed.” However, developing the image into a 
“Sphinx,” another Greek mythological figure, Rosa unwittingly emphasizes the visual sameness 
of Clytie’s passing face. For, though the human-animal hybrid composition of a “Sphinx” can 
suit her desire to solidify Clytie’s “half-breed” otherness, the whole passage’s exclusive 
reference to face attests that in the dark house Rosa can only see the monster’s face (“the same 
sphinx face”) which, unlike its body of a lion, belongs to generic woman. 
In this scene, Faulkner also implies that, as temporally and spatially distanced narrators 
objectify passing characters more easily, physical distance goes hand in hand with conceptual 
differentiation in white subjectivity construction. When Rosa finds the distance violated by 
Clytie’s stopping her from going upstairs, despite her racially binarizing reference to Clytie’s 
“black arresting and untimorous hand on my white woman’s flesh” (111), Rosa cannot help 
realizing that the physical touch, in its bodily directness, exposes the two women’s sameness (as 




black-and-white description predicates itself: “let flesh touch with flesh, and watch the fall of all 
the eggshell shibboleth of caste and color too” (112). Thus, desperately resisting the nullification 
of difference, Rosa’s interjection strives to distance (physically) and differentiate (racially) 
Clytie’s body at the same time: “Take your hand off me, nigger!” (112). Faulkner suggests that 
this interrelation between physical distance and categorical differenc  also has a social 
dimension. For, as the disintegration of Southern slave system forces Rosa, Judith, and Clytie to 
live close together (they, for example, “slept in the same room” [126]), whiteness and mixed race, 
and even the three women’s selves, become indistinguishable. As Rosa admits, “Clyt e . . . in the 
very pigmentation of her flesh represented that debacle” (126) of the South, which has brought 
the post-Civil War situation where “[i]t was as though we were one being, interchangeable and 
indiscriminate” (125). 
In Absalom, Absalom! as I have demonstrated, Faulkner deploys the factor of racial 
passing to expose a discursive circularity built in white subjectivity formation. Here, with no 
substantial reference point for difference, one names/fabricates an “interracial object” against 
which to define himself/herself as a “white subject,” but in its discursive arbitr riness this 
strategy depends already upon the very white subjectivity that it has to establish. As exemplified 
by Mr. Compson’s representation of “the octoroon” and Charles Etienne, this procedure works 
for those narrators whose dependence upon already narrativized materials helps avoid dealing 
directly with the white-looking body. As in Rosa’s direct sighting of Clytie, however, when 
whites do encounter the white-looking body of reputedly mixed-race individuals, its visual 
invalidation of the white/passing-white difference unsettles the former’s narrative agency 
including that which enables them to name the latter “passing mixed-race” in the first place. 




language as a naming/binarizing medium, just as physical mediation in time or space, functions 
to the advantage of the Southern racial system by distancing the white-looking b dy—whose 
physical sameness would otherwise neutralize white subjectivity as a distinct entity—into a 
fictive “interracial object” position. 
 
On the level of the racial ideology under which whites in Absalom, Absalom! perform 
discursive activity, their mostly successful objectification of racial passing means an 
empowerment for becoming independent “white subjects.” However, on the narrative level, 
where the goal is to elucidate the Sutpen saga full of irrationality and inconsstency, the fictive 
nature of their subjectivity and of the narrative reconstruction it executes work  against the 
whole enterprise. For instance, as I have shown, Mr. Compson’s ordering rendition of Charles 
Etienne’s racial mixture (as a logical sum of white and black) endorses and i endorsed by the 
narrator’s secure subjectivity, but his portrayal, unlike Judge Hamblett’s shocked speech, fails to 
capture the difference-defying reality of the passing body.10 On the other hand, though in total 
disarray, Rosa’s retrospective monologue about her confrontation with the “passing” Clytie does 
register the two women’s “actual,” if “contradictory” and thus rationally unacceptable, 
homogeneity as “the two abstract contradictions which we actually were”(111). I shall argue in 
this section that, by setting the white narrators’ truth-seeking efforts as he novel’s thematic 
centerpiece, Faulkner develops his investigation of racial passing and points out a paradox that 
surrounds the differentiating operation of subjectivity, narrative, and ultimately, language. For, 
while ordering the essentially “chaotic” world (exemplified by the endl ssly indeterminable 
white/passing-white difference) into comprehensible binaries, such an operatin at he same time 




Indeed, Faulkner draws a parallel between the passing body and chaotic reality by 
alluding to a binary paradigm’s limitation in capturing their lack of order. While temporal and 
spatial distance enables the narrators to objectify the world they recount, Faulkner implies that, 
just as the passing body defies the white/passing-white dichotomy, the unordered universe resists 
the fictive differentiation between North and South, present and past—and by extension hat 
between subject and object which relies upon distance.11 The North/South difference does not 
inhere in the continent’s topography but only comes from fictive categorization, as evidenced by 
the Mississippi River which, impervious to measuring lines, “is very Environment itself which 
laughs at degrees of latitude and temperature” (Absalom 208). The distinction between past and 
present, too, betrays itself as a doomed attempt to order the intrinsically amorphous flow of time; 
Faulkner foregrounds the disintegration of the dichotomy by describing Quentin in 1909 as “still
breath[ing] the same air in which the church bells had rung on that Sunday morning in 1833” 
(23). 
Predicated upon such fictive difference and distance, narrative subjectivity itself turns out 
fictive and thus insufficient to comprehend reality in its pristine disorder. Inevitably imposing its 
own perspective to create meaning, consistency, and teleology, subjectivity-based reconstruction 
cannot but suppress real-life complexities while providing a rationally organized interpretation.12 
Thus, in Absalom, Absalom! the narrators’ mostly stable subjectivity distanced/differentiated 
from the fictively created narrative object serves paradoxically to frustrate their truth-seeking 
efforts. While taking advantage of their secure subject position in exerting imagination, the 
narrators—whose ultimate goal is to reveal the truth, not a story, of the Sutpens’ liv s—find 
themselves repeatedly reminded of their limitation in retrieving actual human actions which defy 




saga “in life had acted and reacted to the minimum of logic and morality, [and] dyi g had 
escaped it completely, [and] dead remained not only indifferent but impervious to it” (225), Mr. 
Compson locates the root of his narrative impasse in human inability to “know” what is 
“incredible” and “does not explain”: “It’s just incredible. It just does not explain. Or perhaps 
that’s it: they dont explain and we are not supposed to know” (80). Somewhat drawing a parallel 
between the epistemological chaos of passing body and of human action itself, the Rosa-Clytie 
homogeneity (“the two abstract contradictions which we actually were” [111]) echoes 
Faulkner’s annotation on the rationality-defying “love” factor, on which Quentin ad Shreve 
finally zero in as the key to solving Henry’s mysterious murder of Bon: “love, where t re might 
be paradox and inconsistency but nothing fault nor false” (253).13 
In tandem with his critique of subjectivity, Faulkner arranges the novel’s final chapters, 
which approach the heart of the Sutpen mystery, so that Quentin and Shreve have to abandon 
their subject position and fuse with their narrative object. Only through such de-subjectification 
can the narrators question a white-looking man’s formerly taken-for-granted white identity—a 
move that exposes the fictiveness of white/passing-white difference. In chapter 8, by merging 
Quentin and Shreve with Henry and Bon, Faulkner confiscates the narrators’ subjective van age 
point and instead provides them with a direct access to key events of the Sutpen legend. 
Faulkner’s meticulous description of different modes of such merging indicates th  the novelist 
intends the technique to represent Quentin and Shreve’s varying levels of access to th  unme-
diated reality. Initially “the two” in a detached subject position, Quentin and Shreve th n come to 
share Henry and Bon’s time and place as “the four” and see the scenes, including Bon’s 
white-looking body, directly. Later “the four” confound further into a new form of “the two,” 




thus drawing upon the subjectivity of their once narrative objects, abandon their distinct 
subjectivity.14 
For example, by putting themselves in the antebellum South and joining Henry and Bon 
as “the four,” Quentin and Shreve manage to witness the youths’ mysterious departure on the 
Christmas eve of 1860 (“not two of them there and then either but four of them riding the two 
horses through the iron darkness” [237]) as well as to see Bon’s mother whose vindictive plot 
explains his approach to the Sutpen family. When Quentin and Shreve later come back to the 
Christmas eve as the second form of “the two,” their fusion enables them to retrieve Henry’s 
psychology in italicized interior monologue: “So that now it was not two but four of them riding 
the two horses through the dark over the frozen December ruts of that Christmas eve: four of 
them and then just two—Charles-Shreve and Quentin-Henry, the two of them both believing that 
Henry was thinking He (meaning his father) has destroyed us all” (267). Only by “exist[ing] in” 
Bon and approaching the world from his viewpoint can Quentin and Shreve restore the “love” 
factor in its pre-narrativized “paradox and inconsistency”: each of the narrators  
forgave condoned and forgot the faulting of the other—faultings both in the 
creating of this shade whom they discussed (rather, existed in) and in the 
hearing and sifting and discarding the false and conserving what seemed true, 
or fit the preconceived—in order to overpass to love, where there might be 
paradox and inconsistency but nothing fault nor false. (253) 
However, given this strategy of critiquing the fictive subject/object, white/passing-white 
differences and de-subjectifying the truth-seeking plot, it seems highly contradictory that 
Faulkner arranges the ending so that Quentin and Shreve finish their reconstruction by reverting 




permanent indeterminacy of Bon’s white-looking body, to objectify him instead as “pas ing 
interracial,” to reestablish Southern racial hierarchy which this “passing” Bon has allegedly 
violated, and thus to reclaim their white subjectivity (as opposed to the interracial object) with 
which to complete a coherent narrative? This double-sided treatment by Faulkner, I will argue, 
indicates a dilemma inherent in the author’s novelistic activity, i.e., having to use language—a 
medium intrinsically unfit for capturing the chaotic, signification-proof w rld—to finalize a 
book of truth seeking. Indeed, Faulkner prevents this predicament of language from underini g 
his work by sneaking Quentin and Shreve’s subjective intervention into the very moment their 
de-subjectified narrative merging helps retrieve the unmediated past. By o doing, he subtly 
transfers the problem to the level of Quentin and Shreve’s reconstruction and holds them 
responsible for the failure to recoup the true past in its original disorderliness.15 
The following passage exemplifies this. Here, as “four of them,” Quentin and Shreve 
share the same space with Bon’s mother and note her “parchment-colored skin”—a marker of 
possible racial mixture: 
. . . four of them who sat in that drawing room of baroque and fusty 
magnificence which Shreve had invented and which was probably true 
enough, while the Haiti-born daughter of the French sugar planter and the 
woman who Sutpen’s first father-in-law had told him was a Spaniard (the 
slight dowdy woman with untidy gray-streaked raven hair coarse as a horse’s 
tail, with parchment-colored skin and implacable pouched black eyes which 
alone showed no age because they showed no forgetting, whom Shreve and 
Quentin had likewise invented and which was likewise probably true 




Despite the “four of them” narrative setting that features direct sightin , Faulkner implies 
Quentin and Shreve’s subjective intervention by referring to the woman’s retrieved f gure not 
only as an “invention” but also as “probably true enough,” thus insinuating the working of a 
standard for likelihood and acceptability. By doing so, Faulkner sets the report’s authentici y 
level as no higher than General Compson’s imaginative re-creation. When Sutpen’s storytelling 
makes General Compson feel as if “he had just seen her too for a second by the flash of one of 
the muskets,” the evoked image of Sutpen’s future wife has “a white slender arm,” reflecting the 
listener’s presupposition of her whiteness (201). Making Quentin and Shreve’s departure from 
General Compson’s master account sound not like a correction (based on substantive 
counterevidence) but like a rereading (of what is formerly considered “white” as “parchment 
color”), Faulkner subtly undermines the epistemological integrity of the youths’ narrative 
operation.16 
Faulkner makes the narrators’ subjective bias undermine the direct spectatorship licensed 
by “four of them” fusion also when, just before the coexistence of “the four” at the scene 
develops into the compounded “two,” Shreve refutes Mr. Compson on who got wounded at 
Pittsburg Landing: 
Because your old man was wrong here, too! He said it was Bon who was 
wounded, but it wasn’t. Because who told him? Who told Sutpen, or your 
grandfather either, which of them it was who was hit? Sutpen didn’t know 
because he wasn’t there, and your grandfather wasn’t there either because that 
was where he was hit too, where he lost his arm. So who told them? Not 
Henry, because his father never saw Henry but that one time and maybe they 




Confederate army in 1865 would be like coal miners talking about soot; and 
not Bon, because Sutpen never saw him at all because he was dead;—it was 
not Bon, it was Henry. (275) 
Despite the “four of them” setting that would allow him to see and check by himself, Shreve’s 
rebuttal depends not upon visual counterevidence but upon a lack of testimonial, and thus 
discursive, evidence: “So who told them?” With this Faulkner implies that Shreve’s r ision of 
preceding narratives, just as that of Bon’s mother, is not a correction based on direct experience 
of the real past but yet another reading of the same, already narrativized material. Quite fittingly, 
Shreve’s discursive move serves to translate the essentially chaotic and indeterminate world, 
where Bon’s white-looking body dissolves difference and makes him interchangeable with 
Henry (so it could be Henry who got injured), into a differentiating assertion (that it is Henry). 
Tellingly, to justify his claim of interchangeability, Shreve compares the ubiquity of wounded 
soldiers to that of sooted “coal miners,” evoking the image of darkened and de-individualize  
whites. While the visual homogeneity between a white master and “wild niggers” (4) shocks 
Rosa when she witnesses the mud-plastered Sutpen and his black slaves “distinguishable one 
from another by his beard and eyes alone” (28), Shreve’s subjectivity covertly at work allows 
him to appropriate the disintegration of visual—and by implication racial—differenc  as a 
rhetorical tool for advancing his own interpretation.17 
 In this way, Faulkner foregrounds Quentin and Shreve’s narrativization—and thus 
spoilage—of their direct experience of the original, disorderly past. By doing s , he manages to 
claim language’s fundamental inadequacy in capturing chaotic reality and use language to 
elaborate a truth-seeking plot (in which he has to make that claim). This method operates most 




They were both in Carolina and the time was forty-six years ago, and it was 
not even four now but compounded still further, since now both of them were 
Henry Sutpen and both of them were Bon, compounded each of both yet 
either neither, smelling the very smoke which had blown and faded away 
forty-six years ago from the bivouac fires burning in a pine grove, the gaunt 
and ragged men sitting or lying about them, talking not about the war yet all 
curiously enough (or perhaps not curiously at all) facing the South. (280) 
Fitting to the ultimate “two of them” setting, the Quentin-Shreve-Henry-Bon fusion comes not 
only with the 1909 narrators’ direct sensation of a “smell” from 1865 but also with a stylistic 
transformation from roman type to italics signaling a pre-discursive dimnsion. However, as the 
parenthetical addition and its diction of a third party (“perhaps,” “ curiously”) indicate, the 
passage does not faithfully register Henry’s or Bon’s perception. On the contrary, its logic 
suggests Shreve’s narrative control over what appears an unmediated presentation of inner truth. 
The “curiosity” the quote mentions indicates the working of Shreve’s perspective, since the 
Confederate Army’s paradoxical habituation to wartime anomaly such as its “facing the South” 
has attracted particular attention from the Canadian native, for whom the Civil War is 
“something my people haven’t got” (289). And, indeed, Shreve’s theory of Henry’s injury-
spired by the wartime ubiquity of wounds—another extraordinariness that has aroused his 
curiosity—makes its way into the same conversation between Sutpen and Henry that 
interracializes Bon: “You were hit at Shiloh, Colonel Willow tells me, Sutpen says” (282).18 Thus 
manipulating the narrative situation of the scene, Faulkner avoids settling Bon’s essentially 
indeterminable race except on a doubly discursive level—i.e., Shreve’s narrative invention of 




As I have demonstrated, Faulkner’s dual treatment of the de-subjectified narrative 
situation in Absalom, Absalom! indicates his paradoxical attempt to point out the predicament of 
language and prevent the same predicament from compromising his own novelistic narrative. To 
finish his book of truth seeking while claiming truth’s imperviousness to ordering language, 
Faulkner transfers this impasse to his character-narrators and holds them responsible for the 
failure to recoup the true past in its original disorder. Thus, while communicating the message 
that no narrative can finalize the racial origin of white-looking Bon nor his and the Sutpens’ 
actions and motives, Faulkner manages to give the novel a sense of closure, which, ironically, 
has led readers to accept Bon’s racial mixture uncritically. Indeed, just as Quentin and Shreve 
redefine their white subjectivity circularly as opposed to a fabricated narrative object (i.e., Bon 
as “passing interracial” and, by extension, the whole, rationally acceptable version of Sutpen 
legend that they have invented), Faulkner scholarship has sustained itself as an authoritative 
body of critical discourse by presupposing the mixed-race Bon as its object of investigation. And, 
as Engler argues, such a “dubious assumption” (253) has at the same time affected int rpretation 
of Absalom, Absalom! because it does not reflect the novel’s actual open-endedness.20 
The same dilemma faces Quentin and Shreve just after their conclusion. For, with all 
their “solution” to the Sutpen mystery, its—and their regained subjectivity’s—inevitable 
fictionality constantly comes back to frustrate them. Though Jim Bond’s mental disability, 
“saddle-colored” (173) skin and resulting “nigger” position had earlier enabled Shreve to 
objectify him casually into a discursive construct (calling Jim’s mind “what you (not he) would 
have had to call his mind” [174]), in chapter 9 the white narrators realize that the mixed-race 
character is beyond their epistemological comprehension and will not fit into “the whole ledger” 




cant catch him and you dont even always see him and you never will be able to use him. But
you’ve got him there still. You still hear him at night sometimes” (302). 
Thus developing the character of Jim Bond as a subtle symbol of dysfunctional white 
subjectivity, Faulkner furthers his deconstruction of whiteness. While Quentin and Shreve intend 
their conclusion of interracial Bon to reestablish the white/passing-white difference, at another 
level this narrative operation serves to blur that very difference by drawing upon the proposition 
that any white-looking person can be passing mixed-race. Faulkner charges Jim with this 
paradox when the “saddle-color” epithet does not completely disqualify the character for 
passing; the 1909 confrontation at Sutpen’s Hundred activates Quentin and Jim’s possible 
interchangeability so that the third-person narrator has to clarify his pronoun reference (e.g., “he 
(Quentin) hurried forward” [297])—as he did to name two out of the “four of them” fusion: e.g., 
“It did not matter to them (Quentin and Shreve) anyway” (236). The closure-defying presence of 
Jim naturally reminds Shreve that, in interracializing Bon’s white-looking body, he has 
unwittingly opened up the possibility of his own passing. Thus, at the ending of Absalom, 
Absalom! Shreve cannot help imagining that “whites” like himself, a seeing subject (“I who 
regard you”), can always be in fact mixed-race passers and thus “have sprung from the loins of 
African kings”—though his language barely suppresses its pernicious implication by setting the 






Signifying, Ordering, and Containing the Chaos: 
Whiteness, Ideology, and Language in William Faulkner’s Intruder in the Dust 
 
 Coming out of Faulkner’s “dark years,” after his period of “authentic originality nd 
greatness” (Minter 192-93), Intruder in the Dust has attracted relatively little critical attention 
since its publication. When critics do discuss the novel at length, their approach has often drawn 
upon the general conception that “Faulkner failed to give it the intensity and resonance we 
associate with his finest work” such as The Sound and the Fury, Light in August, and Absalom, 
Absalom! (Minter 212). Accordingly, most of this scholarship has treated Intruder in the Dust as 
a kind of political novel and thus focused on Faulkner’s personal attitude toward contemporary 
Southern race relations and how this attitude manifests in his narrative. Unlike the “work of 
authentic originality and greatness” from his prolific years, the novel’s philosophical 
investigation of race itself has suffered critical disregard. 
With its major attention to the author’s explicit or implicit self-expression, the prevailing 
political approach to the novel predicates itself upon a rather simplistic question of whether, and 
to what degree, the character of Gavin Stevens represents Faulkner. Observing that “Stevens 
clearly echoes many of the author’s recorded sentiments,” Carl Dimitri identifies one with the 
other and attributes Stevens’s inconsistency on racial equality to Faulkner’s own inconsistency: 
“It is a testimony to the confused nature of Faulkner’s stance on civil rights, as well as to the 
confused nature of Intruder in the Dust itself, that Stevens contradicts [himself on] these 
sentiments” (21). In contrast, while admitting their shared moderate conservati m, Noel Polk 




between the hypocritical character “so completely wedded, even if he does not know it, to the 
status quo” and the author whose “concern was consistently with the individual Negro” (141). 
Pointing to a middle ground, John E. Bassett describes Faulkner’s attitude toward Stevens as 
“identification mixed with self-irony” (212). However, resorting to the same framework which 
reduces their relationship to identification, opposition, or in-between and, in so doing, 
presupposes a “politicizably” unproblematical, monolithic notion of race, Bassett misses 
Faulkner’s socio-epistemological inquiry into race itself—an inquiry made through his 
characters’ ideologically charged practices. Thus, for Bassett, Intruder in the Dust conveys the 
novelist’s message more explicitly than his preceding “great works”: “In one sense the message 
had been implicit ever since Faulkner first considered the modes of knowing and communicating 
[racial blackness] in Light in August. Now in the last novel in which he confronts the issue 
directly, it is more explicit” (216). 
Keith Clark’s study of Lucas Beauchamp overcomes the reductive critical model of 
placing the character on the same level as the author: “In my treatment of Lucas . . . I approach 
Faulkner’s protagonist not so much as an extension of the author’s own views on race ad racism, 
but instead as a character in the matrix of Faulkner’s art” (67). Through analysis of the way the 
novelist describes Lucas’s blackness in “The Fire and the Hearth” and Intru er in the Dust, Clark 
points out that Faulkner’s background as a white Southerner limits his artistic imagination to the 
extent that his black character cannot attain manhood without “disassociating” from African 
American identity. Clark expands this thesis on Faulkner’s characterization of blacks to include 
his no less problematical narrative configuration in Intruder in the Dust: “not only does Lucas’s 
limited communal place further blemish Faulkner’s depiction, but his narrow narrative space 




text but instead an idea who is abstracted and filtered through the minds of Chick and Gavin” 
(73). As Clark argues, Lucas’s silence “reinforces his marginality”; it not only keeps the 
character from telling his own version of the story but also de-historicizes him out of the African 
American cultural tradition of oral communication (78). However, the critic’s reatment of this 
marginalization as “a deterioration of Lucas Beauchamp” (74) “contrary to what the author may 
have desired” (73) sounds rather precarious, given the novel’s critique of language, which Clark 
does mention but seems to suppress in his exclusive focus on the “special rhetorical significance” 
of language and voice (78). As I shall demonstrate in this chapter, Faulkner suggest  that Lucas’s 
narrative marginalization does not necessarily mean “a deterioration” but rather indicates the 
character’s relative freedom from the already racialized language of th South which contains 
human diversity in a dichotomized racial classification. While Clark’s assumption that Lucas 
could improve only by claiming a black identity derives from another assumption that “Luc s 
Beauchamp does not occupy the liminal position of a Joe Christmas or a Charles Bon” (69), the 
novel’s scrutiny of the binarizing function of language demands us to reevaluate the character’s 
racial ambiguity, which complicates the notion of blackness—and that of whiteness, too, defined 
as its opposite in the Southern socio-linguistic context. 
Indeed, through his characterization of Lucas in Intruder in the Dust, Faulkner points to 
the problematical nature of Southern whiteness as a construct predicated upon the reductive 
operation of language in ordering (by signification) the essentially chaoti  world. With no 
intrinsic signified in material reality, whiteness as a signifier defines itself only as opposed to 
blackness which, as the “liminal” Lucas plainly shows, also lacks a substantial foo hold. The 
novel dramatizes the situation where, as dominant ideology penetrates people’s mental activity 




authorized by the Southern racial ideology, cannot conceive of blacks except as an abstract nd 
homogeneous otherness nor question their own ritualized social practices such as lyncing, thus 
further reinforcing the same ideology that determines their behavior. Therefore, I shall argue, 
Lucas’s silence indicates not only his “marginalization” but also a liberation from the 
ideologized language that reductively defines him as a “nigger” and in turn helps “whites” to 
become such. Chick Mallison’s attempt to save Lucas from impending lynching corresp nds 
with his struggle with ideo-linguistically charged whiteness which, as exemplified by Gavin 
Stevens’s talkative acquiescence to mob violence, limits one’s thinking to that of racism. 
“Race,” as Henry Louis Gates, Jr. argues, “is the ultimate trope of differenc  because it is 
so very arbitrary in its application”: 
The sense of difference defined in popular usages of the term “race” has both 
described and inscribed differences of language, belief system, artistic t adition, 
and gene pool, as well as all sorts of supposedly natural attributes such as rhythm, 
athletic ability, cerebration, usury, fidelity, and so forth. The relation between 
“racial character” and these sorts of characteristics has been inscribed through 
tropes of race, lending the sanction of God, biology, or the natural order to even 
presumably unbiased descriptions of cultural tendencies and differences. (5) 
Gates’s adroit diction of “tropes of race” foregrounds a gap any racial classific tion entails 
between an actual human (who has his/her own unique combination of “language, belief syst m,
artistic tradition, and gene pool, as well as all sorts of supposedly natural attributes”) and a 
discursively conceptualized “racial character” attached to the person. Being “tropes,” racial 
categories do not really signify substantially distinct entities; they only introduce a fictive order 




reaffirms itself as the authorized classification through “popular usages” which repeatedly 
“inscribe” in one’s thinking the figuratively “described” racial differences. 
Faulkner dramatizes this descriptive and inscriptive operation of race in Intruder in the 
Dust. In the postbellum Southern setting of the novel, the “one-drop rule” serves to binarize a 
chaotic variety of individuals into “whites” and “blacks,” with the former on the top of the 
hierarchy. To reinforce the racial hierarchy on which it founds itself, the white-supremacist 
society further describes/inscribes “blacks” with another trope, “niggers,” which not only 
suppresses their diversity, individuality, and personhood but also attaches to them stereotypically 
inferior—and somewhat mutually contradicting—attributes such as “ignorance,” “cowardice,” 
“childishness,” “subservience,” “savageness” and “brutality.” Thus, white men in the novel insist 
on imposing the “nigger” label upon Lucas all the more for his essentially unclassifiable (and so 
potentially disruptive) in-betweenness in terms of race, appearance (e.g., his eyes belong to “not 
black nor white either” [13]), and behavior (“not arrogant at all and not even scornful: just 
intolerant inflexible and composed” [13]): “We got to make him be a nigger first. He’s got to 
admit he’s a nigger. Then maybe we will accept him as he seems to intend to be accepted” (18). 
Faulkner also utilizes Chick’s interior monologue to demonstrate how the white you h, 
influenced by his discursive environment, unwittingly thinks in a fashion already built into the 
highly racialized language. Looking at Lucas sleep silently in jail on the night following his 
alleged crime, Chick conceives of the suspect as a “nigger”: 
He’s just a nigger after all for all his high nose and his stiff neck and his gold 
watch-chain and refusing to mean mister to anybody even when he says it. Only a 
nigger could kill a man, let alone shoot him in the back, and then sleep like a 




Here, following the stereotype of “coward nigger,” Chick defines Lucas as  “nigger” based on 
the false allegation that Lucas has “kill[ed] a man . . . [and shot] him in the back” (which itself 
originates from the “word” [27] of a white man). This “nigger” tag in turn leads Chick to 
describe Lucas’s sleep of the just as that of a “childish nigger” (“like a baby”), which reinscribes 
the old man’s “nigger” identity to reconfirm the original definition. In this passage Faulkner also 
takes pains to represent the tension between chaotic reality and ordering language through his 
syntax; with the concessive preposition “for all,” he presents the reductive “nigger” epithet (“just 
a nigger after all”) as suppressing all the uncategorizable complexities of the real-life Lucas such 
as “his high nose and his stiff neck and his gold watch-chain and refusing to mean mister.” 
Such “tropes of race” describe and inscribe racial characters not only of their addressee 
but of their addresser. Faulkner suggests this through the whites’ obsessive desire to 
linguistically contain Lucas: “every white man in that whole section of the country” has wanted 
to make a “nigger” out of him “for years” (18). The whites’ oversensitivity to what Lucas “seems 
to intend to be accepted” as indicates their own lurking anxiety about self-image, as the old 
man’s boundary-blurring presence exposes the fictiveness of racial difference and, accordingly, 
of their “superior whiteness.” Thus, the whites need Lucas as a “nigger” to definethe r own 
racial identity; they would allow Lucas to be what he “s ems to intend to be accepted” as only if 
he “admit[ted] he’s a nigger” (18) and did not hinder their own becoming what they “intend to 
be” as opposed to the “nigger.” Indeed, predicated upon the existence or nonexistence of a drop 
of black blood in the white vein (that is, “purity” or “impurity” of one’s white blood), the 
Southern one-drop rule seems to define blackness as “non-whiteness” and not vice versa. 
However, that very whiteness fails to be the absolute center of meaning against which o 




relies back on blackness for its origin. One can prove his/her “whiteness” only through 
demonstrating that there are no “black” lineal ascendants—whether really d monstrable or not. 
Here Jacques Lacan’s psychoanalytic theory on language and human subjectivity bears 
much relevance. The following passage elucidates, though not specifically in racial terms, the 
interplay between the lack of substantive, “real” signifieds corresponding to sinifying words, 
the performative (i.e., at once descriptive and inscriptive) function of language which apparently 
covers the lack, and the “symbolic” construction of self which depends upon the empty 
signification: 
the function of language in speech is not to inform but to evoke. 
What I seek in speech is a response from the other. What constitutes me as a 
subject is my question. In order to be recognized by the other, I proffer what was 
only in view of what will be. In order to find him, I call him by a name that he 
must assume or refuse in order to answer me. 
I identify myself in language, but only by losing myself in it as an object. 
What is realized in my history is neither the past definite as what was, since it s 
no more, nor even the perfect as what has been in what I am, but the future 
anterior as what I will have been, given what I am in the process of becoming. 
(84) 
According to Lacan, language works to form human subjectivity not by signifying (“iforming” 
of) something “real” about one’s identity (which does not really exist). Rather, the speaker 
“evokes” a sense of difference from the addressed “other”1 (though, again, such difference does 
not have a substantial counterpart in the real world) who is to recognize the speaker as  subject 




language operates performatively, at the same time describing and inscribing “what I am in the 
process of becoming.” Thus, the white men’s frustration at labeling Lucas a “nigger”—and in 
turn defining themselves as opposed to that “nigger”—derives from the old man’s transcending 
indifference to “assuming” or “refusing” the epithet, a transcendence that disrupts the whole 
system of racial identity construction. Tellingly, when his gold watch-chain and toothpick 
infuriate a white man with their out-of-place extravagance, Lucas responds only to the 
color-blind, familial part of the white’s abuse (“You goddamn biggity stiffnecked stinking 
burrheaded Edmonds sonofabitch”) but does not “assume” nor “refuse” the racially charged term 
“burrheaded”: “I aint a Edmonds. . . . I’m a McCaslin” (19). 
 By having “every white man” buy into the dynamics of racial identity formation based on 
hollow signification, Faulkner sheds light upon the socio-cultural dimension of the issue. He 
alludes to this dimension in his description of the night following Vinson Gowrie’s murder when 
black residents shut themselves up fearing the whites’ displaced revenge. As “they were acting 
exactly as Negroes and whites both would have expected Negroes to act at such a time,” the 
blacks’ absence from the town center enables the whites to recognize their pow r and freedom as 
opposed to the “patient” blacks who “were still there, they had not fled, you just didn’t see 
them—a sense a feeling of their constant presence and nearness . . . —but not here, no sense 
feeling here of a massed adjacence, a dark human presence biding and unseen” (94-95).2 The 
“dark human presence” as a homogeneous “mass,” against which the whites define their racial 
identity, does not exist “here” in reality but only exists “there” in the whites’ imaginary and 
therefore empty signification. Because of the physical absence of blacks “here,” t e whites 
cannot “sense,” “feel,” or “see” the blacks, whereas “there” in their imagination they can “sense” 




signify for the whites to retain their white, “non-black” identity. 
Not only the blacks assuming the (self-)assigned role of patient endurers but ven Lucas, 
whose boundary-blurring existence had frustrated the whites, can serve their significatory 
construction of whiteness when abstracted into a stereotypical “murderous nigger.” Faulkner 
represents the situation in a richly symbolical description of the Jefferson town square on the 
following morning: 
the men and the women and not one child, the weathered country faces and 
sunburned necks and backs of hands, the clean faded tieless earthcolored shirts 
and pants and print cotton dresses thronging the Square and the street as though 
the stores themselves were closed and locked, not even staring yet at the blank 
front of the jail and the single barred window which had been empty and silent 
too for going on forty-eight hours now but just gathering, condensing, not 
expectant nor in anticipation nor even attentive yet but merely in that preliminary 
settling down like the before-curtain in a theatre . . . —the same weathered still 
almost inattentive faces and the same faded clean cotton shirts and pants and 
dresses but no crowd now waiting for the curtain to rise on a stage’s illusion but 
rather the one in the courtroom waiting for the sheriff ’s officer to cry Oyez Oyez 
Oyez This honorable court; not even impatient because the moment had not even 
come yet to sit in judgment not on Lucas Beauchamp, they had already 
condemned him but on Beat Four, come not to see what they called justice done 
nor even retribution exacted but to see that Beat Four should not fail its white 
man’s high estate. (133-34) 




“theatre” simile highlights how the abstracted “murderous nigger” (which, as “the blank front of 
the jail,” its “empty and silent” window and the uselessness to “even stare” a these indicate, 
signifies nothing but a void) enables the onlookers to claim their homogeneous whiteness. In 
“gathering, condensing,” and “settling down” as a spectator differentiatd/distanced from the 
“stage’s illusion” of blackness (by a “curtain” which the “crowd” expects to remain unraised and 
keep the dichotomy’s fictiveness from showing), the whites assume “the same” look and enjoy 
the illusion of a monolithic racial identity despite their actual “absolute lack of trust in one 
another” (198). Later in the passage Faulkner develops the “theatre” image into that of a 
“courtroom” which will give a “judgment” not on Lucas’s case (which, with its uniqueness 
suppressed by the whites who “had already condemned him,” will not even require one) but on 
Beat Four’s enforcement of lynching. In so doing, the novelist foregrounds the white mass’s 
desire to finalize its “superior whiteness” through identifying with the beraved’s violent action 
which inscribes and describes—i.e., demonstrates and is endorsed by—“white man’s high 
estate.” The illusory nature of such uniformity exposes itself in Beat Four’s actual difference 
from other whites, who, deeming Mr. Gowrie “violent foulmouthed godless” (hence Chick’s 
“amazement” to find him mourning for Vinson: “Why, he’s grieving”) and his six sons “lazy idle 
violent more or less lawless a good deal more than just more or less worthless,” would in fact 
regard Vinson’s death as “benefit[ing] his community” (158). As for the BeatFour members’ 
part, too, they “didn’t like most of the things which people from town (and from most of the rest 
of the county too for that matter) did” (93).3 
Faulkner’s exploration of the racialized collective behavior in Southern society 
necessitates that we consider Louis Althusser’s theory of ideology in the essay “Ideology and 




signification in subjectivity construction, Althusser expounds how ritualistic pratices fashion 
individuals as social subjects. As I have explained above, Lacan’s speaker finds his/her identity 
not by signifying something real for proof but by “evoking,” through performative enforcement 
of empty signification, a fiction that offers an imaginary foundation for selfhood. For Althusser, 
similarly, while individuals believe that they conduct rituals voluntarily as a signification of their 
social identity, the rituals themselves do not vouch for a solid identity (which does not really 
exist outside ideology). Rather, in a circularly performative fashion, the fact that hey behave 
ritualistically, thus unwittingly buying into the ideology underlying such rituals, lets the 
individuals invent their subjectivity in terms of that ideology and define themselves “mistakenly” 
as those who are autonomously acting on the ideology: “you and I are always already subjects, 
and as such constantly practice the rituals of ideological recognition, which guarantee for us that 
we are indeed concrete, individual, distinguishable and (naturally) irreplaceable subjects” 
(Althusser 172-73). Suggesting a continuity between this theory of “interpellation” (i.e., 
ideology’s transformative recruitment of individuals into ideologically defined subject positions) 
and Faulkner’s representation of the Southern racial ideology, the novelist’s description of the 
whites’ “ritual” of gathering at the town square to subjectify themselves (as opposed to Lucas as 
a “murderous nigger” as well as to absent black residents) foregrounds their acual lack of 
substantial, distinct or independent selfhood due to the totalizing operation of ideology. To 
become white subjects, the onlookers assume “the same . . . faces” (134), leading them to a 
“complete relinquishment of individual identity into one We” (135). As part of this 
de-individuated, identical “We,” they are “not faces but a face, not a mass nor even a mosaic of 
them but a Face: not even ravening nor uninsatiate but just in motion, insensate, vacant of 




In his particular concern with language in Intruder in the Dust, Faulkner demonstrates the 
interaction between ideology and discourse in the white-supremacist South by pointing out that 
the reductive function of racialized language prevents whites from thinking (and thus acting) 
outside the scope of ideology. Highlighting certain aspects of reality while exc uding others and 
also reinforcing itself through repetitious description/inscription processes, raci t discourse not 
only needs just a limited lexical resource but also anesthetizes its users into thinking and 
speaking comfortably within the limit. Thus, as Faulkner alludes to the interchangeability of 
white subjects under the racial ideology, Chick hears the same explanation about Lucas’s crime 
and forthcoming lynching three times (at the barbershop, from Mr. Lilley, and the  from his 
uncle Gavin): 
“But just suppose——” he said again and now he heard for the third time almost 
exactly what he had heard twice in twelve hours, and he marvelled again at the 
paucity, the really almost standardised meagreness not of individual vocabularies 
but of Vocabulary itself, by means of which even man can live in vast droves and 
herds even in concrete warrens in comparative amity: even his uncle too. . . . (79) 
Frustrated in his attempt to make Gavin imagine the possibility that Lucas did not kill Vinson 
Gowrie (“Suppose it wasn’t his pistol that killed him” [78]), Chick realizes that his uncle does 
not have a language in which to think of the possibility. By characterizing this impasse as a 
problem “not of individual vocabularies but of Vocabulary itself,” Faulkner makes the point that 
it results not from the intellectual inadequacy of white men (Gavin, to the contrary, commands a 
sophisticated discourse as an educated lawyer) but from their want of the very vehicle for 
communicating ideologically unorthodox ideas such as the innocence of Lucas, a “black” man, 




pistol in his pocket” (79). By precluding whites from getting beyond a shared, closed set of 
conceptual possibilities, the “paucity” of “Vocabulary itself” encourages th m to live in the 
peace and harmony of well-tamed animals, which further benumbs them to the ideological 
containment: “by means of [the paucity] even man can live in vast droves and herds even in 
concrete warrens in comparative amity” (79). 
As “Vocabulary” (whose capitalized V foregrounds the language’s primal function of 
expressing ideas, whether ideologically correct or not) fails white Southerners, this “paucity” not 
only hinders independent thinking but also determines their action by denying them a specific 
language (“vocabulary” with a small v) with which to question their ritualized racist practices. 
On the following night of Lucas’s arrest, Mr. Lilley, a white storekeeper, gives an account of the 
old man’s fate which is “almost exactly what the man in the barbershop had said this morning” 
(47). Through Chick’s response to such repetition, Faulkner points out that, with “vocabulary” 
reduced to the level of cliché, the only language available for a white man to describe Southern 
race relations not just limits but de-individualizes his thinking and feeling and contains him as an 
ideologized subject “within his whole type and race and kind”: “he [Chick] remembered his 
uncle saying once how little of vocabulary man really needed to get comfortably and even 
efficiently through his life, how not only in the individual but within his whole type and race and 
kind a few simple clichés served his few simple passions and needs and lusts” (47). 
In his focus upon the dichotomizing function of racialized language, Faulkner represents 
the operation of Southern racial ideology in a way that seems to further modify Althusser’s 
model. Echoing the Lacanian “Other” with a capital O, the father as the imagined authority of 
identity, Althusser introduces “a Unique, Absolute, Other Subject” with a capital S, the imagined 




(178). Thus, for Althusser, ideological subjects shape themselves as the Subject’s “mirrors, his 
reflections”—such as Christian subjects “made in the image of God” (179)—thus becoming a set 
of de-personalized, indistinctive and replaceable instruments of ideology. On the other hand, as I 
have demonstrated through discussing the whites’ obsessive “niggering” of Lucas as well as their 
gathering at the town square, Faulkner proposes a somewhat dyadic model of interpellation at 
work in Southern racial ideology. For people in the novel become racialized subjects, whether 
“white” or “black,” not by identifying themselves with any “Subject” who has self-sufficient 
racial identity but rather by differentiating themselves from what they sould not be; without an 
absolute authority, “whites” define their racial identity only as “non-black” and vice versa. 
Faulkner describes such a dualistic mechanism through Gavin’s annotation on a ritualistically 
racialized comment by Mr. Lilley (whose name, punning on “lily-whiteness,” signals the 
fictionality of discursive whiteness since the grocery storeowner, who trades mostly with 
“Negroes,” looks “darker than shadow” [46] when Chick sees him): 
“You see?” his uncle said. “He has nothing against what he calls niggers. If you 
ask him, he will probably tell you he likes them even better than some white folks 
he knows and he will believe it. . . . All he requires is that they act like niggers. 
Which is exactly what Lucas is doing: blew his top and murdered a white 
man—which Mr Lilley is probably convinced all Negroes want to do—and now 
the white people will take him out and burn him, all regular and in order and 
themselves acting exactly as he is convinced Lucas would wish them to act: like 
white folks; both of them observing implicitly the rules: the nigger acting like a 
nigger and the white folks acting like white folks and no real hard feelings on 




Despite his own entrapment in the Southern racist ideology which renders him unable to question 
the equation of Lucas with “murderous nigger,” Gavin’s commentary illuminates the way 
ideology, through the channels of racialized discourse and ritualistic practice, in erpellates 
people into “white” or “black” subject positions. Alluding to the empty signification of the 
“nigger” epithet (the word does not refer to actual human beings but rather tautologically to 
“what he calls niggers”), Gavin explains that the denomination molds “blacks” into “act[ing] like 
niggers” and wanting to kill “whites.” Once a murder takes place, the “whites” define their racial 
identity as opposed to those “niggers” through playing the role of a magisterial pun sher; as 
suggested by Gavin’s telling juxtaposition, acting “like white folks” must always entail acting as 
they—just like Mr. Lilley—are “convinced [a ‘nigger’] would wish them to act.” All this 
subjectivity construction occurs in ritualistic practices in which both “whites” and “blacks” 
participate: in a fashion “all regular and in order,” they “observ[e] implicitly the rules” 
prescribing what “whites” should do to the “murderous nigger” as well as what “blacks” should 
expect “whites” to do. Here, significantly, ideological predetermination contains he working of 
feelings. For the lack of “Vocabulary” allows “no real hard feelings on either side” of ideological 
subjects outside the preset proceedings of retaliation and patient endurance, nor, just as the 
“nigger” epithet conceptually necessitates Lucas’s “blow[ing] his top,” doesit allow a subject to 
imagine how individual humans really feel. 
Engaging mostly white men in such repetitious discourse of race, Faulkner seems to 
consider white adult males a major subject of Southern racial ideology as opposed to blacks, 
women, and children. Ephraim, an old black sage, insinuates that white “menfolks,” bound up 
with already ideologized “facks” (70), cannot see “truth”—such as the whereabouts of Mrs. 




done outside the common run, dont waste yo time on the menfolks; get the womens and children 
to working at it” (70). As Carl Dimitri pointedly argues, “If the ‘common run’ implies the 
established order or the mainstream concerns of the community, then it would follow that whi e 
men—or the powerholders—are apparently capable of only working within and affirming the 
rules established by a thoroughly racist order” (20). Furthermore, Faulkner highlig ts women’s 
and children’s relative freedom from ideological control by representing how language, 
especially “vocabulary” and “Vocabulary,” operates in their discursive activity. As I have 
illustrated above, Faulkner makes the point that the ideological containment of white male 
subjects’ “Vocabulary” (capacity for communicating ideas regardless of their ideological 
correctness) causes a shortage of specific “vocabulary” with which to speak outside the norm. 
Even a mastery over a certain kind of “vocabulary,” however, does not necessarily liberate one 
from ideological constraint, as demonstrated by Gavin’s self-deceptive grandiloquence which 
serves to defend the status quo. Conversely, as the sixteen-year-old Chick’s questioning of 
ideologized social practices suggests, a small lexical resource does not always mean a lack of 
“Vocabulary.” 
Faulkner points this out also through a conversation between Chick and Miss Habersham, 
whom he carefully characterizes as “a kinless spinster of seventy” living “on the edge of town” 
(75) to indicate her marginalization from the white-male-dominant social system. Chick’s small 
“vocabulary” causes him difficulty in verbalizing the idea of “go[ing] out there and dig[ging] 
him [Vinson Gowrie] up and bring[ing] him to town where somebody that knows bullet holes 
can look at the bullet hole in him” (88). However, though communicated “badly,” Chick’s 
explanation is “explicit and succinct” enough to move Miss Habersham to challenge the town’s 




unlike adult males’ lack of “Vocabulary,” her lack of “vocabulary” (which obliges h r to 
“repeat” and “paraphrase” Chick’s sentence) does not prevent her from thinking outside the 
racist society’s assumption of “murderous nigger”: 
“Yes,” Miss Habersham said. “Of course. Naturally he [Lucas] wouldn’t tell your 
uncle. He’s a Negro and your uncle’s a man:” and now Miss Habersham in her 
turn repeating and paraphrasing and he thought how it was not really a paucity a 
meagerness of vocabulary, it was in the first place because the deliberate violent 
blotting out obliteration of a human life was itself so simple and so final that the 
verbiage which surrounded it enclosed it insulated it intact into the chronicle of 
man had of necessity to be simple and uncomplex too, repetitive, almost 
monotonous even; and in the second place, vaster than that, adumbrating that, 
because what Miss Habersham paraphrased was simple truth, not even fact and so 
there was not needed a great deal of diversification and originality to express it 
because truth was universal, it had to be universal to be truth and so there didn’t 
need to be a great deal of it just to keep running something no bigger than one 
earth and so anybody could know truth; all they had to do was just to pause, just 
to stop, just to wait: “Lucas knew it would take a child—or an old woman like 
me: someone not concerned with probability, with evidence. Men like your uncle 
and Mr Hampton have had to be men too long, busy too long.—Yes?” she said. 
(88) 
Miss Habersham’s “repeating and paraphrasing” of the idea of reinvestigation, enabling her to 
think against the grain of racist ideology, show Chick that “it was not really a paucity  




monosyllabic diction which lacks “diversification and originality,” the repeated sentence (“Go 
out there . . .”) claims its substantial “Vocabulary” by expressing the “universal” truth about the 
fallibility of “facts” (which, as Ephraim intimates, depend on the observer’s preconception), 
“probability” (predicated upon an assumption of regular course of events), and “evidence” 
(which entails an interpretation to be “evidenced”).4 Unlike “a child—or an old woman” whose 
peripheral social position makes it possible “just to pause, just to stop, just to wait,” white men 
are “busy too long” with ideologically formulated rituals. In the discursive practice of such white 
male subjects, the want of the “Vocabulary” with which to defy the ideological orthodoxy 
reduces “a human life” of Lucas to an abstracted “nigger” and thus, by encouraging violent 
racism, causes physical destruction through “the deliberate violent blotting ut obliteration of a 
human life” as in lynching. Because this whole process predicates itself upon “so simple and so 
final” a reductive ordering of in fact chaotic realities, “the verbiage” in which white male 
Southerners like Gavin justify their dominance does not grant them “Vocabulary” to signify 
complex realities with but rather remains “simple and uncomplex too, repetitive, almost 
monotonous even.” 
As Faulkner critiques the ideologized language of the South in Intruder in the Dust, 
Lucas’s silence, which Keith Clark criticizes as the author’s “devoic[ing] of] his ‘strong’ black 
protagonist” (78), rather indicates a disruption of the reductive categories of the “black” and the 
“nigger” when it helps him evade responding to (i.e., “assuming” or “refusing”) these epithets.5 
Even when he does talk, Lucas’s reticent words, such as the above-discussed remark that “I ain  
a Edmonds. . . . I’m a McCaslin” (19), work to defy the racializing function of the language. 
Tellingly, when the situation forces him to adopt a racially hierarchizing langu ge, Lucas does so 




thinking neither and he knew you knew it” (18); thus exposing to the whites the emptiness of the 
honorific signifiers and the fictiveness of the “niggerish servility” which supposedly underlies 
their usage. On the whites’ part too, in a somewhat different way, silence—in tandem with 
“Vocabulary”—can help liberate individuals if it provides a receptive space for ide logically 
unorthodox discourse. Thus, whereas white male adults resort to filling in Lucas’s frustrating 
silence with the “murderous nigger” stereotype (as Gavin scolds him in jail, “if you just said 
mister to white people and said it like you meant it, you might not be sitting here now” [60]), 
Chick’s capacity to “hear the mute unhoping urgency of [Lucas’s] eyes” (67) and accept his 
account against the ideological grain leads eventually to the old man’s release. Symbolically, in 
accepting Lucas’s rescuing “voice,” the drowning twelve-year-old Chick unconsciously 
overcomes his already learned sense of racial difference which would have forbidden h m to get 
help from a “nigger”: “it didn’t matter whose [voice it was]” (6). In contrast, the w ite boy later 
resents the same “voice” which—saying, “Pick up his money . . . Give it to him” (16)—refuses 
the money he offers for a dinner at Lucas’s house. Back under the influence of racist ideology, 
Chick cannot listen to the “voice” that hinders his ritualistic self-subjectification as a “superior 
white.” According to Chick’s ideologized sense of “honor,” as Erik Dussere cogently argues, 
“having been given the gift of Lucas’s hospitality, [Chick] is now metaphorically in the position 
of social inferior to a ‘nigger’” (46). 
While illuminating the liberating potential of silence and “Vocabulary,” Faulkner takes 
pains to represent a paradoxical dilemma whites must face in developing a discursive resistance 
into a real one. For, in the 1930s Southern society of Yoknapatawpha, to act on one’s own 
requires white adult citizenship accompanied by ideological subjectification especially for males. 




yet “sitting there [in Sheriff Hampton’s car] like a spanked child” (186) and thus places him in 
between boyhood naïveté and adult indoctrination, so that the white male protagonist not only
manages to think outside the ideological norm to save Lucas but also has to face his own 
powerlessness in challenging adults’ persistent racism as well as to struggle with the temptation 
to succumb to ideology’s interpellation and himself become a subject. Discerning but 
unauthorized, Chick needs Gavin’s intervention (and, in Gavin’s logic, Miss Habersham’s 
supervision) to convince Sheriff Hampton of the need to reinvestigate Lucas’s case: “‘You aint 
listening just to two sixteen-year-old children,’ his uncle said [to the sheriff]. ‘I remind you that 
Miss Habersham was there’” (107). Likewise, Chick’s designation as Lucas’s vindicator results 
not from the former’s fully autonomous individuality as “himself, Charles Mallison junior” nor 
from the white youth’s ideologically charged desire to offset his shameful indebtedness to a 
“nigger” (for having “eaten the plate of greens and warmed himself at the fire” [67] when the old 
man rescued him from drowning) but from the fact that Chick’s adolescent apprenticeship to his 
lawyer uncle “with some similitude of responsibility even if not actually of necessity” (21) 
makes him available (hence Lucas’s initial request: “You, young man. . . .Tell your uncle I wants 
to see him” [44]) and unique in his attentiveness among “all the white people Lucas would have 
a chance to speak to”: 
[Chick] saw, heard Lucas saying something to him not because he was himself, 
Charles Mallison junior, nor because he had eaten the plate of greens and warmed 
himself at the fire, but because he alone of all the white people Lucas would have 
a chance to speak to between now and the moment when he might be dragged out 
of the cell and down the steps at the end of a rope, would hear the mute unhoping 




Faulkner dramatizes the tension between the emancipatory potential of and the 
ideological pressure due to Chick’s adolescence when the character, willing to help Lucas but 
lacking the necessary resources available only to adults, gets overwhelmed by th  difficulty 
expected in digging out Vinson Gowrie’s body for reexamination. In his imaginary conversation 
with Lucas, Chick cannot help but subjectify himself as a “superior white” to suppress his 
frustration as a powerless minor. In so doing, with all his scrupulous reading of Lucas’s reticence 
earlier in jail, Chick fills in the old man’s absent and thus silent body with his wishful 
invention—echoing adult white male Southerners’ imposition of stereotypical qualities upon 
silenced blacks in defining themselves as opposite to the “niggers.” With no convincing ex use 
at hand for asking an adult—whether it be Gavin, Mr. Mallison, or Miss Habersham—for an 
automobile (81), Chick finds himself “thinking seeing hearing himself trying to explain that to 
Lucas too”: 
We have to use the horse. We cant help it: and Lucas: 
You could have axed him for the car: nd he: 
He would have refused. Dont you understand? He wouldn’t only have refused, 
he would have locked me up where I couldn’t even have walked out there, let 
alone had a horse: and Lucas: 
All right, all right. I aint criticising you. After all, it aint you them Gowries is 
fixing to set afire. . . . (83) 
Bakhtin’s theory of dialogic discourse helps us examine this passage. According to Bakhtin’s 
analysis of the relationship between language and ideology, one’s language receiv s de p-rooted 





As a living, socio-ideological concrete thing, as heteroglot opinion, language, for 
the individual consciousness, lies on the borderline between oneself and the 
other. . . .Language is not a neutral medium that passes freely and easily into the 
private property of the speaker’s intentions; it is populated—overpopulated—with 
the intentions of others. Expropriating it, forcing it to submit to one’s own 
intentions and accents, is a difficult and complicated process. (293-94) 
As exemplified by the white men’s identical commentaries on Lucas’s impending lynching 
which Chick hears three times in twelve hours, language does not serve as a “neutral medium” 
for free communication of independent ideas; it is rather “populated—overpopulated—with the 
intentions of others” already subjected to the dominant ideology. A speaker, Bakhtin 
acknowledges, has to follow “a difficult and complicated process” to transform such an 
ideologically charged language into “private property.” 
Significantly, Faulkner fashions the above-quoted interior dialogue by Chick in a way
that adjusts Bakhtin’s theory to accommodate the dyadic working of Southern racial 
ideology—just as the novelist’s representation dualizes Althusser’s monistic model of 
interpellation to depict the situation where “whites” construct their subjectivity as opposed to 
“blacks” and vice versa. While “privatization” and “appropriation” (293) of someone else’s 
language can promote liberation from the dominant ideology, Bakhtin’s nuanced diction suggests 
the possibility that this very act could rely upon the speaker’s own ideologically endorsed 
dominance; much more so if one is filling in someone else’s “silence” and thereby monopolizing 
the discursive arena. Imaginatively constructing Lucas’s verbal response, Chick’s interior 
dialogue betrays his unwitting but highly ideologized cooption of the “black” man’s silence, as it 




through subjectifying himself as opposed to the racialized “someone else.” Echoing t e 
Bakhtinian paradigm, Chick has difficulty repelling from the imaginary conversation Lucas’s 
possible “intention” to complain about the minor’s incompetence in launching a reinvestigation: 
“You could have axed him for the car.” Betraying his dilemma caused by young age, Chick’s 
excusatory response predicates itself upon his sense of ineffectiveness again t n authoritative 
male adult—whether his father or uncle—who not only denies Chick an empowering car but also 
inhibits the youth’s intellectual and physical freedom: “He wouldn’t only have refused, he would 
have locked me up where I couldn’t even have walked out there, let alone had a horse.” Chick 
overcomes his frustration in the white-adult-male-dominant society only when he at once 
subjects himself to the racial ideology through differentiating himself from the “black” Lucas 
(who, in Chick’s imagination, admits that “i aint you”); privatizes Lucas’s discourse by filling in 
his silence with ideologically correct contents (the “black” man’s patient acquiescence to 
lynching); and constructs an imaginary Lucas who, through forgiving the conflict-ridden Chick, 
helps the adolescent become a coherent “white” subject: “I aint criticising you. After all, it aint 
you them Gowries is fixing to set afire.” Though in this interior dialogue the actually silent Chick 
tries to listen to the silenced Lucas, he cannot help basing this potentially liberating activity upon 
his ideological/epistemological subjectivity as a white.6 Through the dilemma Chick encounters 
as an “in-between” white male adolescent, Faulkner demonstrates the difficulty of developing 
discursive freedom into substantial resistance and of avoiding the constant and penetrativ  
working of ideological recruitment. 
White male adults serve as a major instrument of Southern racial ideology in Faulkner’s 
observation; thus Chick’s burgeoning sense of white manhood subtly dissuades him from acting 




marginality to male authority and its rational, hierarchical ordering helps encourage Chick in his 
attempt to help Lucas. Whereas Chick cannot help but imagine himself begging for a car from 
his uncle or his “Pop” (81) (who, as the “he” in Chick’s interior dialogue with Lucas, denies the 
youth access to the potentially subversive means), Miss Habersham’s alienation from white male 
power relations spares Chick such an imaginary encounter with the interdicting authority: “not 
Miss Habersham; he never thought of her again. He just remembered a motor vehicle sitting 
empty and apparently unwatched on the street not fifty yards away” (81). On the con rary, just as 
her “Vocabulary” impresses Chick with its attentiveness to ideologically unorthodox “truth,” 
Miss Habersham’s voluntary offer of her truck and other tools, along with her inclusion of the 
adolescent into a nonhierarchical, cooperative “we,” surprises him with its departur from the 
ideologically correct course of events: “[Miss Habersham] saying, already turning: ‘We’ll need a 
pick and shovel. I’ve got a flashlight in the truck—’ . . . ‘We?’ he said” (88). 
Faulkner also characterizes Mrs. Mallison, Chick’s mother, in terms that elude logical 
ordering. In her universal “motherhood” which, as Gavin notes, “doesn’t seem to have any 
pigment in its skin” (121), Mrs. Mallison vehemently opposes Chick’s growth into 
self-help—e.g., “button[ing] his own buttons and wash[ing] behind his ears” (34)—as well as his 
initiation into riskily competitive sports such as football, shooting, and hunting on horseback 
(121-23) and into the world of the racist South. (She rebukes Chick for using the word “nigger” 
as she keeps him away from the town center on the night of Lucas’s arrest [31-32].) The 
“long-worn verbiage of wailing” (123) she resorts to—echoing Julia Kristeva’s “semiotic” 
language which, originating from the pre-Oedipal mother-child oneness, transcends “the 
dominant symbolization systems” of the symbolic order (Kristeva 30)—contrasts markedly with 




“Vocabulary,” serves to restrict the speaker’s thinking to that of racist orthodoxy. In tandem with 
her cry which defies logical reasoning, Mrs. Mallison’s overtly inconsistent actions such as her 
resilient enthusiasm for what she had fiercely resented—including Chick’s ballgame, riding, and 
involvement in Lucas’s case—place her outside the Southern ideological framework predicated 
upon the “battlefield”-like binary between the “defeater” and the “defeated”: Gavin and Chick 
realize through Mrs. Mallison “how you not only couldn’t beat them [women], you couldn’t even 
find the battlefield in time to admit defeat before they had moved it again” (121).7 Faulkner 
presents these “feminine” attributes as enabling spontaneous action. Contradicti g the 
“agreement” she herself had forced Gavin into, Mrs. Mallison serves coffee t her
not-old-enough son (125) and symbolically encourages him to grow up and confront the world 
dominated by adult white males. Though Chick’s incomplete adulthood obliges him to thin the 
coffee with “hot milk” (126) indicative of the permeating female influence upon the youth, it 
does help him stay awake to rescue Lucas: “But at least he was awake. The coffee had 
accomplished that anyway” (131). Significantly, Mrs. Mallison’s offer invites a negative reaction 
from Mr. Mallison who, saturated with the sense of hierarchy between white adults, white 
children, and “darkies,” trivializes Chick’s potentially disruptive enterprise by “reducing it to the 
terms of a kind of kindergarten witchhunt” (130) and by facetiously asking the son if each 
grave-robber acted out his/her ideologically assigned role: 
asking him just how scared Aleck Sander was and if he wasn’t even scareder than 
Aleck Sander only his vanity wouldn’t allow him to show it before a darky and to 
tell the truth now, neither of them would have touched the grave in the dark even 





Faulkner’s strategy of scrupulously depicting the tension between both sides of the 
Southern racial scene—i.e., between possibilities of resistance and the formidable ideological 
status quo—continues into the final chapter with a sketch of the unaffected Jefferson square on 
the first Saturday after Lucas’s successful exculpation: “that Saturday and Sunday and Monday 
only a week past yet which might never have been since nothing of them remained” (231). 
Faulkner suggests the same tension as he ends the novel with Lucas’s demand of a receipt—an 
act that has struck most scholars as the old man’s pointed resistance.8 For instance, in Noel 
Polk’s reading the request shows Lucas’s firm distrust of Gavin in “a symbolic way of protecting 
himself” (Polk 143). For Neil Schmitz, Lucas’s action, in “out-patronizing Stevens, out-ironizing 
him,” turns the table on whites and reveals “Lucas’s racism [which claims] white folks lie, cheat, 
break their promises” (259). Faulkner’s highly tactical representation, however, shows how 
Southern racial ideology, which has endangered Lucas’s life throughout the book, still works to 
contain the released old man with all his subversive potential. Gavin’s description of the legal 
process reveals that Lucas’s discharge has involved normalizing “in such a way that Mr 
Hampton could get enough sense out of it” all the ideologically aberrant parts of Lucas’s account 
which frustrated Gavin so much that “the more I tried it the worse it got and the wors it got the 
worse I got until when I came to again my fountain pen was sticking up on its point in the floor 
down here like an arrow” (239). Also, as it turns out, Lucas’s acquittal results as much from the 
vocal lawyer’s discursive power endorsed by “the county” as from Chick’s unconventional 
action which Gavin playfully forbids to be rewarded because of the “minor”’s out-of-place 
“practicing [of] law without a license” (238): about what Lucas could pay back for his release, 
Gavin explains that “Of course the paper belongs to the county but the fountain pen was mine 




a subtle symbolism when Lucas pays the two dollars first in a dollar bill, a half doll r, four dimes 
and two nickels and then, upon second thoughts, replaces the half dollar with “four bits in 
pennies” (240). Despite his meticulous management of coins, whose puzzling eccentricity 
prompts a page-long “defamiliarized” description, Lucas ironically accedes to a form of 
acknowledgment, the receipt, that suppresses the complexity of his action by documenting only 
the two-dollar payment and not the specific means by which he has paid that amount. Faulkner 
pushes the symbolism further by making Lucas, through a mirror image, physically fa e an 
embodiment of hierarchical ordering (“the purse [that] had at least two different compartments 
and maybe more” [240]). Somewhat echoing Althusserian ideological subjects who fashion 
themselves as the Subject’s “mirrors, his reflections” (179), Lucas’s effort to buy himself out of 
the ideologically defined “dependent nigger” category paradoxically involves looking at himself 
reflected in an “ordering” mirror: “Lucas stood looking down into it [the purse] exactly s you 
would look down at your reflection in a well” (240). Thus, while Lucas’s request of “My receipt” 
(241) can demonstrate the old man’s discursive ability to exploit Gavin’s jesting role-play (“This 
is business” [240]), in responding to Gavin’s remark Lucas at the same time “assumes” the white 
man’s subtle “evocation” of a racialized hierarchical relationship where, just as the 
twelve-year-old Chick had insisted (16), the “black” Lucas has to be “the one to count them 
[coins]” (240). 
Intruder in the Dust dramatizes the interaction between Southern racist ideology and the 
racialized language of the South. Through his description of white Southerners’ ideologically 
ritualized response to an alleged race murder, Faulkner makes the point that, in reducing the 
chaotic complexity of realities to simple notions, the racially clichéd discourse of the South 




the talkative white males who have “vocabulary” but not “Vocabulary,” Lucas’s silence, Miss 
Habersham’s attentiveness to “truth” with her “Vocabulary,” and Chick’s willingness to listen to 
the discursively oppressed show a certain potential for escaping the control of ideolgized 
discourse. At the same time, Faulkner’s careful description of how the racist regime works subtly 
to hinder or even incorporate potentially subversive thoughts and actions suggests a pr dicament 
at a broader, literary-artistic level. As Toni Morrison elucidates in her Playing in the Dark, 
regardless of their attitudes toward the racial ideology, white writers’ na rative conceptualization 
of the silenced African American body has necessarily entailed a certain ideological framing. 
Written in the racially charged mid-twentieth-century South, Intruder in the Dust shows the 
novelist’s keen struggle to write against the linguistic-ideological grain. Not only does he adopt 
lengthy and convoluted run-on sentences to complicate the differentiating operatin of the 
language, Faulkner also scrupulously depicts the problematics of the racist society which may 






Narrative Order and Racial Hierarchy: 
James Weldon Johnson’s Double-Consciousness and “White” Subjectivity 
in The Autobiography of an Ex-Colored Man d Along This Way 
 
As indicated by its self-explanatory title, Johnson’s 1912 novel Th  Autobiography of an 
Ex-Colored Man sets as a given the protagonist’s racial movement from “colored” to “passing 
for white.” As Samira Kawash points out, however, such a binary reading of fake whiteness 
versus true blackness would only “repeat the cultural logic of race and passing” wh ch the text 
actually refutes: 
The narrative itself works against the simple “black passing for white” logic of 
passing . . . and its attendant model of race as the expression of a prior, embodied 
identity. Although the narrator claims to be “really black,” the terms of blackness 
and whiteness as they emerge in the narrative belie the possibility of identity or 
authenticity that would allow the narrator to be black or white. As the novel 
unfolds, Ex-Coloured Man’s relation to blackness is shown to be as inauthentic as 
his relation to whiteness; rather than being “both black and white,” he is in fact 
neither black nor white. (70) 
This “cultural logic” derives from the white-dominant culture of the U.S., as it has helped to 
order the boundless diversity of human beings into a hierarchy with “whites” on top.1 Kawash 
reveals how this logic operates in the Ex-Colored Man’s narrative to reduce his endle sly 
unclassifiable white body to the dichotomized model of “black passing for white.”2 One may, 




For, in the above passage and elsewhere, Kawash writes so that “the narrative” itself—not 
Johnson—resists the binary framework, thus leaving the author’s involvement unclear. 
Indeed, critics have yet to elucidate Johnson’s own position adequately,3 not only because 
of the long-lasting influence of New Critical “intentional fallacy”4 but also because of the novel’s 
own ambiguity. On one hand, as Kawash shows, Johnson’s text implicitly disproves the 
Ex-Colored Man’s culturally predicated notion of racial passing. On the other hand, by making 
his character-narrator end up bitterly regretful of living as white, the author seems to advocate 
African American identity and thus betray his own failure to recognize the ac ual instability of 
that very passing. The uncertain distance between the author and the narrator also adds to the 
difficulty. As Donald C. Goellnicht notes, Johnson’s critical inquiry of white-supremacist society 
uses the Ex-Colored Man as his mouthpiece and a negative example: “The narrator is frequently 
self-consciously ironic in his treatment of significant issues concerning himself and his race, and 
thus appears to be a subject of considerable self-knowledge; but at other times he is blind to the 
narrowness and bigotry of his own perspective and thus becomes the object of Johnson’s, a d our, 
ironic gaze” (116). Furthermore, as Johnson’s novelistic writing coincides with the Ex-Colored 
Man’s autobiographical narrative, it is not easy to isolate the two and identify what the narrator’s 
limited understanding of race means about the author’s own attitude toward it. This overlapping 
even bothered Johnson himself. He ended up repeatedly claiming his difference from the 
fictional narrator—first through Carl Van Vechten’s explanatory introduction to the novel’s 1927 
republication and, when it failed to convince readers fully “that the story was not the s ory of my 
life” (Along 239), then in his own 1933 autobiography, Along This Way. 
This chapter attempts to reveal Johnson’s creative strategies behind The Autobiography’s 




which even affected the autobiographical Along This Way. As I demonstrate in the first section, 
Johnson’s configuration of The Autobiography shows that, in order to investigate and critique the 
dominant “cultural logic” of passing, he must apply and even embody that logic with n h s 
writing, as reductive and white-oriented as it is. Johnson uses the Ex-Colored Man’s endlessly 
indeterminate white body to expose the fictiveness of race, but that very indeterminacy, if 
engaged as it is, would undermine the whole novel which draws plausibility, coherence, 
development and dramatization from the character-narrator’s belief of his part-blackness. Hence 
comes Johnson’s paradoxical reintroduction of the conventional racial logic, indicati g no  only 
his narrative application of but also accommodation to white subjectivity. For his “nat onal, 
largely white readership” “expecting a pleasant excursion into black life as local color” 
(Andrews xvi) necessarily requires the white-looking protagonist’s stable black identity and 
resulting difference/distance from itself. 
Johnson’s simultaneous challenge and recourse to the ideologically loaded framewo k of 
racial passing also accounts for the overlapping of his writing with the Ex-Colored Man’s 
narrative. Through this device, Johnson subtly shifts to the narrator the responsibility for drawing 
upon the white-derived paradigm he has to critique. As I will argue below, Johnson does so by 
repeatedly foregrounding the Ex-Colored Man’s absorption of whites’ viewpoint in the form o  
“double consciousness”—a term defined by W. E. B. Du Bois as the “sense of always looking at 
one’s self through the eyes of others, of measuring one’s soul by the tape of a world that looks on 
in amused contempt and pity” (2).5 In such moments, Johnson turns the narrator into “the object 
of Johnson’s, and our, ironic gaze” (Goellnicht 116) to camouflage his own “double-conscious” 
conformity to white audience’s expectations. And, as Goellnicht’s apt diction indicates, this 




“objectified” narrator. The subjectivity thus activated is white subjectivity, since its indictment of 
the Ex-Colored Man’s lack of black pride results from reading his white body as “black passing 
for white” according to the cultural logic. Thus implicated in the Ex-Colored Man’s in fact 
unstable passing position and convinced by the plot that revolves around this fictively stabilized 
identity, the readers of The Autobiography —whether themselves white or not—incline 
themselves to overlook the text’s actual problems such as the one illuminated by Kawash.6 
The second part of this chapter focuses on Johnson’s own autobiography, Along This Way, 
demonstrating his continued dependence upon the white-derived structure of racial and textual 
order. By claiming to be an autobiography written by “an ex-colored man,” The Autobiography 
exploits the falsifiability of a text’s source. And the resulting destabiliz tion of the very notion of 
autobiographical self opens up an endless uncertainty that could nullify Along This Way’s claim 
of authentic black autobiography. Here, genre and authorship are not a text’s intrinsic ide tity but 
only its interpretive effect—just as neither whiteness nor passing-whiteness inhere in a white 
body. Amid this categorical chaos, Johnson repeatedly draws on white-oriented rhetorical 
devices—whether they be white personae or “double-conscious” storytelling—to stabilize The 
Autobiography’s fictionality (against which to define Along This Way as real autobiography). The 
thus reestablished binary difference between the two texts’ genres provides Along This Way with 
an apparent logical flow and, by doing so, helps convince the reader of the difference betwe n 
Johnson’s autobiographical black self and the white-looking, passing and fictional Ex-Colored 
Man. At the same time, I will go on to argue, since Along This Way defines Johnson’s racial 
integrity through his ability to scrutinize and confront the white-dominant America, the 





To make The Autobiography a legitimate passing narrative, Johnson puts the 
protagonist’s actually unstable race under multiple discursive containments—such as the n me 
“Ex-Colored Man”—until it becomes the clear-cut identity of “black passing for white.” Indeed, 
to co-opt the reader into uncritically believing the character-narrator’s pas ing, the very first 
chapter begins with a confessional reference to his racial “deception”: “I know that in writing the 
following pages I am divulging the great secret of my life” (1). And the thus solidified passing 
identity helps structure a coherent, plausible and dramatic story by making available the 
prototypical plot factors of passing or mixed-race narrative—e.g., the protagonist’s move out of 
his birthplace due to the white father’s intra-racial marriage (3-4, 30), his subsequent return 
because of “[t]he peculiar fascination which the South held over my imagination” (36), his 
aspiration to become “a colored composer” who incorporates “all the joys and sorrows, the hopes 
and ambitions, of the American Negro, in classic musical form” (108), and his eventual failure as 
he ends up living as white in the North.7 
At the same time, Johnson’s critical scrutiny of racial passing even confounds the 
narrator’s self-definition. For example, toward the end of the novel, the Ex-Colored Man cannot 
help wondering if he is really part-black: 
It is difficult for me to analyze my feelings concerning my present position in the 
world. Sometimes it seems to me that I have never really been a Negro, that I 
have been only a privileged spectator of their inner life; at other times I feel that I 
have been a coward, a deserter, and I am possessed by a strange longing for my 
mother’s people. (153) 
The Ex-Colored Man’s occasional feeling that “I have never really been a Negro” betrays how 




threatens to disrupt the narrative’s structure, purpose and operation. For, quite opposite to the 
1912 edition’s preface which promises to illuminate black subjectivity by “giv[ing] a view of the 
inner life of the Negro in America” (The Autobiography xxxiv), if the Ex-Colored Man has 
“never really been a Negro” then the whole narrative would be just another white-biased look at 
blacks. In other words, the narrator would not qualify as an authentic “ex-colored 
autobiographer” but “only a privileged spectator of their inner life”—very much like the novel’s 
white audience to whom the preface promises “an elevation where he can catch a bird’s-eye 
view” (xxxiv). As the questionability of the Ex-Colored Man’s part-blackness undermin s the 
narrative framework, the passage’s rhetoric itself is rife with illogical “feelings” (which are 
“difficult to analyze”), uncertainty (“it seems to me that . . .”) and inconsistency (“sometimes . . . 
at other times”). And this logical instability in turn foregrounds the instabiliy of his race. Instead 
of knowing his part-blackness for sure, the Ex-Colored Man “feels” that “a strange lo ing” has 
“possessed” him to pursue the black identity. 
As these examples show, in The Autobiography the stability of “black passing for white” 
identity secures that of the narrative itself and vice versa. Conversely, once the ultimate 
indeterminacy of the white/passing-white difference returns to the surface, the whole narrative 
suffers from a weakened control over its logic and structure. 
As I have proposed above, to prevent racial uncertainty from undermining the work, 
Johnson reactivates white subjectivity and its “cultural logic” under the guisof the Ex-Colored 
Man’s “double consciousness.” Thus, when the narrative detects a “passer” in a group of whites 
and accordingly reintroduces the difference between white and passing-white, it also registers the 
narrator’s application of whites’ viewpoint. For example, as a boy the Ex-Colored Man notices 




his newly acquired self-consciousness as “colored” begins to frame his mentalactivity in the 
“dominant,” “all-pervading” white supremacy: “From that time I looked out through other eyes, 
my thoughts were colored, my words dictated, my actions limited by one dominating, 
all-pervading idea . . .” (14). Likewise, when informing his future wife of his “passing,” the 
Ex-Colored Man feels as if it was the white woman’s gaze that “object”-ified and “black”-ened 
him: “she was gazing at me with a wild, fixed stare as though I was some object she had never 
seen. Under the strange light in her eyes I felt that I was growing black and thick-featured and 
crimp-haired” (149). 
Thus, in the Ex-Colored Man’s narrative space, white subjectivity stabilizes racial
passing by turning it into a discernible entity. And Johnson subtly invites his readers to see it the 
same way. Indeed, the foregrounded double consciousness of the Ex-Colored Man—itself 
predicated upon the assumption of his “black passing for white” identity—serves to place the 
readers in a white subject position from which to judge his racial “desertion.” Furthermore, given 
the narrative setting that blurs the lines between the narrator’s storytelling and the novelist’s 
writing and between the Ex-Colored Man’s narratee and Johnson’s reader, Johnson designs th  
narrator’s white-oriented perspective to appeal to his own white-dominant audience, especially in 
its expectation of a rational, well-organized and entertaining passing narrative structured tightly 
around the “cultural logic” of race.8 
Johnson’s assumption of—and covert accommodation to—such an audience expectation 
is suggested by the narrative’s repeated reference to the readers’ possible response. For instance, 
in Chapter IX on the Ex-Colored Man’s European trip with the white “millionaire friend,” 
Johnson foregrounds the character-narrator’s entertainment of his white patron and of his white 




I played for the guests at all of them [the millionaire’s parties] with an effect 
which to relate would be but a tiresome repetition to the reader. I played not only 
for the guests, but continued, as I used to do in New York, to play often for the 
host when he was alone. This man of the world, who grew weary of everything 
and was always searching for something new, appeared never to grow tired of my 
music; he seemed to take it as a drug. He fell into a habit which caused me no 
little annoyance; sometimes he would come in during the early hours of the 
morning and, finding me in bed asleep, would wake me up and ask me to play 
something. This, so far as I can remember, was my only hardship during my 
whole stay with him in Europe. (95-96) 
Here, to disguise as the Ex-Colored Man’s his own double-conscious consideration for the white 
audience, Johnson activates a narrative counterpart of the character’s subordination to the white 
patron and thus holds the character-narrator accountable for cutting out the piano performance’s 
“effect.” While “the reader” to whom “to relate [the effect] would be but a tiresome repetition” 
can be Johnson’s real-life audience as well as the Ex-Colored Man’s narratee, the passage’s 
language silences the former possibility by foregrounding the parallel between h  Ex-Colored 
Man’s accommodation to whites’ desire as a character and as a narrator. Indeed, as the shared 
diction of boredom (“tiresome,” “weary” and “tired”) connects the two dimensions, the passage’s 
avoidance of “repetition” strikes the reader as a logical consequence of the narrator’s 
within-story subservience to whites exemplified by his disruption of life routine to offer the 
white patron “something new.” Similarly, as Johnson elaborates the last sentence of the quotation, 
the Ex-Colored Man restrains his account in a way that shows his scrupulous consideration fo  




description of the “hardship,” which would help avoid villainizing the white inflictor as well as 
antagonizing the white reader, results not from the power they have over the character-narra or 
but from his own limited memory. 
Johnson’s assumption of and consideration for an impatient audience that expects 
straightforward narration show through his character-narrator also at the end of the European plot. 
To keep the chapter compact, the author has the Ex-Colored Man explain that, despite the 
millionaire’s “peculiar and striking character” which could be entertaining, he refrains from 
dwelling upon it. Taking “several chapters,” a full account would not only “tire the reader” but 
also stray from “my narration” and disturb the story’s order: “My affection for him was so strong, 
my recollections of him are so distinct, he was such a peculiar and striking character, that I could 
easily fill several chapters with reminiscences of him; but for fear of tiring the reader I shall go 
on with my narration” (108).9 
As I have proposed, Johnson’s (though disguised as the Ex-Colored Man’s) 
double-conscious recourse to white subjectivity helps him stabilize the character-n rrator’s 
passing-whiteness and, accordingly, reorder the narrative itself. And the reinforced narrative 
structure in turn invites us readers to follow the text’s logic without questioning its validity. This 
is exemplified in Chapter IV. Here, set in what he calls the “strange city” of Atlanta, no one can 
tell the Ex-Colored Man’s race, so his white body assumes more categorical indeterminacy than 
ever before. Accordingly, the narrative foregrounds the Ex-Colored Man’s white body when the 
Pullman porter tells him, “they wouldn’t know you from white” (41). Also, when the company of 
this black friend is likely to cause the weary repetition of eating at dirty places “where a colored 
man could get a meal” (41), the narrator’s language resembles that of the impatint white 




of another meal in the greasy restaurant of the day before” (42). This heightened indeterminacy 
of race also affects the narrative level. In tandem with the blurring of racial boundaries, for 
instance, the narrative loses its control of chronological order. Indeed, Johnson leaves 
time-markers throughout the narrative by, for example, making his scrupulous character-narrator 
mention his birth year (2) as well as specify his age (23).10 But, in this chapter, the 
character-narrator “somehow mixed my dates” and nearly misses the opening day of Atl nta 
University (42). 
To contain this racio-narrative instability and bring the Atlanta chapter to a sound 
conclusion, Johnson foregrounds the character-narrator’s self-definition as black, thus 
accommodating the white audience’s expectation of racial difference as wll as plausible plot 
development. The day after his arrival at Atlanta University, the Ex-Colored Man loses his $400 
school funding: 
After thinking for a while as best I could, I wisely decided to go at once back 
to the University and lay my troubles before the president. I rushed breathlessly 
back to the school. As I neared the grounds, the thought came across me, would 
not my story sound fishy? Would it not place me in the position of an impostor or 
beggar? What right had I to worry these busy people with the results of my 
carelessness? If the money could not be recovered, and I doubted that it could, 
what good would it do to tell them about it? The shame and embarrassment which 
the whole situation gave me caused me to stop at the gate. I paused, undecided, 
for a moment; then turned and slowly retraced my steps, and so changed the 
whole course of my life. 




useless to try to describe what my feelings were; he could not understand. If he 
has been, it is equally useless, for he understands more than words could convey. 
(45) 
When the Ex-Colored Man “turned and slowly retraced my steps, and so changed the whole 
course of my life,” the narrative reads his swerved “course” on two different levels—namely, the 
course of his steps within the story and the course of his life which corresponds with plot 
development. This signals the continuity between the Ex-Colored Man’s double consciousess a  
a character-narrator and Johnson’s own as an author, with the white president of Atlanta 
University (whom the Ex-Colored Man is to tell “my story” about the stolen money) as a 
within-text counterpart of the novel’s reader. Here the Ex-Colored Man as a character-n rrator 
absorbs the white-dominant racial ideology and defines himself as opposed to the white 
president—a “busy” white audience whom he does not want to bother “with the results of my 
carelessness.” By “chang[ing] the whole course of my life,” this white-oriented discourse 
dissuades the Ex-Colored Man from reentering into the white sphere—as indicated by the fact 
that the gate he “stop[s] at” to turn back is the same gate that he had walked through bef re, 
leaving the visually black Pullman porter (43). 
The reestablished racial boundary in turn helps re-stabilize the narrative structure, thus 
discouraging us readers from reading against the grain and questioning the Ex-Colored Man’s 
“black passing for white” identity. For example, the foregrounded blackness of the Ex-Colored 
Man makes a slave-narrative technique—namely, that of making a point through emotionality 
and indescribability11—available for Johnson to overturn the character’s “wisely” and “best” 
thought-out decision to tell the president the true story. According to the second paragra h of the 




logical reasoning those words had produced. Through this rhetoric, Johnson not only makes the 
Ex-Colored Man’s withdrawal sound understandable but also places the character-narrator in the 
mold of slave narrator, a more familiar model to the white audience.12 
One can situate this process of racio-narrative reordering in Toni Morrison’s theory of 
white subjectivity formation in American fiction. She argues that white writers have narratively 
structured a monolithic subjectivity through “projection of the not-me” onto “Africanist” 
presence (38), i.e., making the silenced black body signify non-whiteness and thus circularly 
identifying themselves as not non-white. Johnson’s white-audience-conscious writing not only 
follows but also complicates this schema by connecting white subjectivity and a “non-white” 
body in one character-narrator. Influenced by the white-oriented cultural logic, the Ex-Colored 
Man projects non-whiteness onto his own white body. And the thus stabilized “black passing for 
white” presence in turn helps to suppress narrative instability and indeterminacy a d offers a 
monolithic interpretive space for readers who read with white-subjective fram of reference. 
This procedure even underlies multiple chapters of The Autobiography, such as Chapters 
VI-VIII on the Ex-Colored Man’s New York life. In the environment where gamblers, 
entertainers and bohemians live chaotically hedonistic lives, boundaries break down between 
genders (exemplified by “the girlish-looking youth” among the millionaire patron’s male guests 
[87]), between classes (as rich people can gamble away “all the money and jewelry they 
possessed” and become “virtually prisoners” [70]), between individuals (as initilly well-dressed 
gamblers become “a dozen men . . . similarly clad” in identical “linen dusters” [70]) and, most 
important, between races. Indeed, with the Club frequented by “both white and colored” (77) and 
with “several [colored patronesses] just as fair” as whites (79), the Ex-Colored Man cannot tell if 




they were white” (78-79). 
And, as in the Atlanta University segment, the disorderly world within the story affects 
the narrative order itself. On the stylistic level, in the first portrayal of the Club’s habitués, the 
disintegration of categories necessitates an awkward subordinate clause for clarification of racial 
identities: “When we got inside, I saw a crowd of men of all ages and kinds grouped about an old 
billiard table, regarding some of whom, in supposing them to be white, I made no mistake” (68). 
Furthermore, not only do past-tense sentences such as “Whether these mystic incantations [of a 
gambler] were efficacious or not I could not say” (69) indicate the Ex-Colored Man’s lack of 
epistemological control as a character; the heightened indeterminacy also reaches the present 
time of storytelling, thus directly affecting Johnson’s novelistic writing. I deed, these chapters 
include a considerable number of present-tense references to narrative uncertainty such as “I am 
not sure” (88), “I cannot tell” (90) and, most frequently, “I do not know” (69, 85, 90). The 
weakened control of narrative materials disrupts chronological order as well. As the Ex-Colored 
Man dissipates at “late hours” and loses his former lifecycle (82), the beginnin  of Chapter VIII 
succeeds Chapter VI to recount his second day in New York; the in-between chapter, Chapter VII, 
describes what he finds out after the first days. 
To suppress these narrative problems, Johnson has his character-narrator resort overtly to
white subjectivity. In the chapters’ “Club” setting characterized by carnivalesque fluidity and 
mobility, the Ex-Colored Man repeatedly annotates his narrative moves to justify them as 
coherent, teleological, and fitting to the white audience’s expectation. For instance, when the 
wild first night in New York disrupts the temporal order of his life (he goes to bed wh n “day 
was just breaking . . . . with ragtime music ringing continually in my ears” [74]) and his narrative 




I shall take advantage of this pause in my narrative to describe more closely
the “Club” spoken of in the latter part of the preceding chapter—to describe it as I 
afterwards came to know it, as an habitué. I shall do this not only because of the 
direct influence it had on my life, but also because it was at that time the most 
famous place of its kind in New York, and was well known to both white and 
colored people of certain classes. (75) 
Here, the Ex-Colored Man addresses a specifically white audience, as indicated by the proposed 
fulfillment of the preface’s promise to give “a view of the inner life of the Negro in America” 
(xxxiv). The curious but impatient addressee he assumes also overlaps with the “parties of white 
people” whose rather capricious curiosity results in the random duration of their stays: “ ome of 
them would stay [at the Club] only for a few minutes, while others sometimes stay d until 
morning” (78). Johnson foregrounds the Ex-Colored Man’s anxiety about this white audience’s 
response through the narrator’s repetitious reference to, as well as defensively redundant 
justification of, his storytelling (“not only because . . . but also because . . . ”). According to this 
self-reflective rhetoric, while the “pause in my narrative” would affect the chronological linearity 
expected in an autobiography, the inserted description of the Club would not only serve the 
genre’s objective (because of “the direct influence it had on my life”) but also accommodate the 
audience’s curiosity about “the most famous place of its kind in New York.” 
As white subjectivity defines itself in opposition to an objectified racial other, is 
narrative strategy involves restoration of the racial hierarchy undermined by the Club’s 
boundary-lacking setting as well as the Ex-Colored Man’s visual whiteness. At the beginning of 
the New York segment, somewhat preempting the upcoming categorical fluidity, Johnson has the 




metropolis’ “alluring white face” (65). Later, when the Ex-Colored Man’s wild life reaches at its 
chaotic peak, Johnson activates the language of slave narrative to reframe the 
character-narrator’s storytelling: 
My New York was limited to ten blocks; the boundaries were Sixth Avenue from 
Twenty-third to Thirty-third Streets, with the cross streets one block to the west.
Central Park was a distant forest, and the lower part of the city a foreign land. I
look back upon the life I then led with a shudder when I think what would have 
been had I not escaped it. But had I not escaped it, I should have been no more 
unfortunate than are many young colored men who come to New York. During 
that dark period I became acquainted with a score of bright, intelligent young 
fellows who had come up to the great city with high hopes and ambitions and 
who had fallen under the spell of this under life, a spell they could not throw off. 
(82-83) 
Drawing upon the slave narrative tradition familiar to a white audience, this quotation serves to 
stabilize not only the Ex-Colored Man’s racial position but also the narrative itself. A sociating 
the protagonist with “many young colored men,” Johnson makes the language of a fugitive slave 
available to his narrator. The Ex-Colored Man’s “shudder,” for instance, alludes to Frederick 
Douglass’ when the slave, intending to escape, imagines what would happen if he gets cau h : “It 
required no very vivid imagination to depict the most frightful scenes through which I should 
have to pass, in case I failed” (Douglass 69). Comparing the “under life” in New York to that on 
Southern plantation, the words Johnson puts in the narrator’s mouth also draw on the tradition by 
foregrounding the spatial circumscription where “limits” and “boundaries,” clearly demarcating 




land”— through and toward which Southern slaves ran for freedom—are unavailable until he 
“escapes.” And the passage’s failure to specify time translates itself in o an associative reference 
to blackness (“dark period”) which echoes ex-slave narrators’ typical diction for slavery, e.g., 
Douglass’ “the darkest hours of my career in slavery” (28) and “the dark night of slavery” (45).13 
Similarly, right after the Ex-Colored Man “regret[s] that I cannot contrast my views of 
life among colored people of New York” because his disorderly life distances him from the black 
community (83), Johnson has him compensate the white audience with an entertaining—and 
racially binarized—melodrama between a “very black young fellow” and a white idow with 
“very white skin” (79). While this side story eventually provides a logical plot development 
toward the Ex-Colored Man’s flight to Europe, Johnson puts the transgressive aspect of th  
miscegenational relationship under multilayered containment. For example, the Ex-Colored Man, 
who has himself got children with a white woman at the time of his narration, here conforms to 
the general white sentiment of early-twentieth-century America against interracial union: 
“somehow I never exactly enjoyed the sight [of the couple]” (79). Johnson also checkst  
Ex-Colored Man, on the pretext of avoiding digression, when the narrator mentions how 
common such relationship is among the Club habitués: “I learned, too, that he was not the only 
one of his kind. More that I learned would be better suited to a book on social phenomena than to 
a narrative of my life” (79). 
At the end of this plot segment, the gruesome murder of the white widow puts the 
Ex-Colored Man to narrative disarray—so “how many [shots the black man fired] I do not 
know” and “[h]ow long and far I walked I cannot tell” (90)—as well as beyond the 
above-discussed “boundaries” of his activity: “Just which streets I followed wh n I got outside I 




Johnson draws upon white subjectivity to reestablish order. He arranges for the white millionaire 
to rescue the Ex-Colored Man from the jumble spatially (by checking his out-of-place presence 
“on Fifth Avenue,” saying, “What on earth are you doing strolling in th s part of the town?” [90]), 
racially (by substituting the Ex-Colored Man for Walter the valet [91]) and narratively (by 
functioning as “the means by which I escaped from this lower world” [84] and thus leading the 
story to the next phase set in Europe). Along the same line, the New York chapters’ conclusion 
equivocates on the disruptive potential of the miscegenational relationship not only by killing off 
the white widow but also by immediately translating her “beautiful white throa  with the ugly 
wound”—symbolical of the penetrated white womanhood—into a less racialized “red stain” (91). 
With its subversive potential thus stifled, the episode disturbs the Ex-Colored Man’s “memory” 
only in the past tense (i.e., as a character), not at the present time of his narrat on: “still I could 
see that beautiful white throat with the ugly wound. The jet of blood pulsing from it had placed 
an indelible red stain on my memory” (91). 
As I have shown, Johnson’s novel draws its plausibility, coherence, development and 
dramatization from the Ex-Colored Man’s “black passing for white” identity, which, given his 
white body, is in fact endlessly uncertain. To contain the racial and narrative instabilities which 
occasionally claim themselves in the story, Johnson resorts to white subjectivity under the guise 
of the character-narrator’s double-conscious application of whites’ perspective. This paradigm of 
dominant ideology not only endorses the Ex-Colored Man’s self-definition as part-black but also, 
by providing clear-cut frameworks, enables the narrator—and, accordingly, the author—to 
produce an ordered narrative discourse which in turn recertifies the paradigm’s (actually fictive) 
validity and authority. Thus enforced and reinforced in a circular fashion, white subjectivity 




essentially indeterminable race and the text’s actual precariousness. 
 
Johnson first published The Autobiography in 1912 as an anonymous autobiography and 
did not reveal its fictionality and his authorship until 1927, when the work was republished wit  
his name on the title page and Carl Van Vechten’s explanatory introduction. Even this edition did 
not fully convince the readers, however, as Johnson reports in his 1933 autobiography, Along 
This Way: 
When the book was republished, I affixed my name to it, and Carl Van Vechten 
was good enough to write an Introduction, and in it to inform the reader that the 
story was not the story of my life. Nevertheless, I continue to receive letters from 
persons who have read the book inquiring about this or that phase of my life as 
told in it. That is, probably, one of the reasons why I am writing the present book. 
(Along 239) 
Through exploitation of the falsifiability of a text’s origin, the 1912 edition ended up putting into 
question the very notions of genre and authorship. Here, as indicated by the miscommunication 
between Johnson and his readers, genre and authorship are not a work’s inherent identity but 
themselves “texts” to be written and then interpreted.14 These de-essentialized parameters 
threaten to invalidate Along This Way’s claim of “true autobiography” and, by extension, the 
selfhood Johnson structures through the text. Thus, the last sentence of the quoted passag  
suggests a tension between Johnson’s endangered autobiographical self and his attempt to 
salvage it. On one hand, through the present-tense self-reference to his “writing the present 
book,” Johnson tries to capture his authorship and the book’s autobiographical truthfulness in the 




book’s present-tense sentences—betrays how, in this precarious narrative moment, he ca not 
fully explain himself nor specify the causal origin of the text. 
Due to Along This Way’s primary focus on race, the interaction between the instability of 
genre/authorship and that of narrative does not occur without racial undertone. Indeed, the 
interaction shows a significant parallel with the causal connection between racial passing and 
narrative order in The Autobiography. In both cases, first of all, narrative instability derives from 
the ultimate fictiveness of the identities attached to a racial or textual body; just as neither 
whiteness nor passing-whiteness exists outside one’s reading of a white body, genre and 
authorship are not a text’s essential attribute but only its interpretive effect. Secondly, Johnson’s 
attempt to clarify the distinction between fictional The Autobiography and autobiographical 
Along This Way involves racial differentiation between the narrators—i.e., between the 
Ex-Colored Man, a white-looking “passer,” and the dark-skinned Johnson proud of his black 
identity. 
This continuity between race and genre/authorship evidences itself also in the 
intertextuality between the two works. When Along This Way describes his feelings about the 
anonymous publication of the 1912 The Autobiography, Johnson’s rhetoric echoes the 
Ex-Colored Man’s explanation of his racial passing. While the Ex-Colored Man makes a covert 
enjoyment out of unsuspecting whites and “frequently smiled inwardly at some remark not 
altogether complimentary to people of color” (The Autobiography 144), Johnson draws a similar 
“pleasure” from those uninformed of his authorship: “I did get a certain pleasure out of 
anonymity, that no acknowledged book could have given me. . . . I had the experience of 
listening to some of these discussions [about the author’s identity]” (Along 238). And Johnson’s 




originally affixed my name to it as a frank piece of fiction” [Along 238]) echoes the Ex-Colored 
Man’s when he, at the end of his narrative, “cannot repress the thought that, after all, I have 
chosen the lesser part, that I have sold my birthright for a mess of pottage” (The Autobiography 
154). 
The similarity between the two works concerns not only their (racio-)narrative problems 
but also Johnson’s strategy to solve them. As I will demonstrate below, in Along This Way 
Johnson repeatedly draws on white subjectivity to stabilize The Autobiography’s fictional status, 
confirm Along This Way’s autobiographical truthfulness (as opposed to the now stabilized Th  
Autobiography), and thus authenticate his black selfhood (as opposed to The Autobiography’s 
narrator now stabilized as a fictional passer). As in The Autobiography, the white subjectivity 
that underlies Along This Way’s narrative derives from Johnson’s “double-conscious” application 
of whites’ perspective as well as consideration for the white part of his audience;15 i deed, his 
acceptance of whites’ help—from Brander Matthews (193, 238, 289-90), Van Vechten (239) and 
H. L. Mencken (305)—accompanies all of Along This Way’s four references to The 
Autobiography. And the thus reestablished difference between the two texts, authorizing Along 
This Way as Johnson’s authentic life story, invites the reader to disregard the fundamental 
contradiction that white subjectivity underlies a black autobiography—especially an 
autobiography that claims black selfhood through the protagonist’s confrontation with 
white-supremacist society. 
Along This Way’s reference to Van Vechten’s 1927 introduction to The 
Autobiography—which I have discussed as an example of the two works’ genre/authorship 
instability—also registers Johnson’s strategic resort and accommodation to white subjectivity in 




Renaissance, acknowledging that “to a person who has no previous knowledge of the author’s 
own history, it reads like real autobiography” (Van Vechten v-vi), unwittingly highlights that 
“[t]he distinction between true history and fictional narrative is not in the text but in the reader” 
(Kawash 60). His authentication misfires concerning the book’s origin as well. Instead of 
proving Johnson’s authorship conclusively, he suggests how the text goes beyond the scope of an 
individual’s work as if it were “a composite autobiography of the Negro race in theUnit d States 
in modern times” (Van Vechten vi). Nevertheless, Johnson’s account in Along This Way 
foregrounds the helpfulness, not failure, of the white voucher whom Johnson would naturally 
expect to read the passage. Johnson’s juxtaposition of his “affix[ing] my name” and Van 
Vechten’s introduction focuses so heavily on the “good” white’s contribution that it makes a 
lengthy, syntactically awkward sentence: “When the book was republished, I affixed my name to 
it, and Carl Van Vechten was good enough to write an Introduction, and in it to inform the eader 
that the story was not the story of my life” (Along 239). Moreover, while apparently repeating 
Van Vechten’s observation, Johnson’s report in Along This Way subtly belittles The 
Autobiography’s authorship problem by transforming the confused readers’ profile from Van 
Vechten’s “a person who has no previous knowledge of the author’s own history” to those 
familiar with Johnson enough to “inquir[e] about this or that phase of my life as told in it” (Along 
239). According to this rhetoric, readers mistook the novel for an autobiography because they 
knew the author well, not because they did not. 
Along This Way’s application of white subjectivity stabilizes The Autobiography’s 
fictional status—and, in turn, its own autobiographical narrative—also in Chapter XVII featuring 
the first half of the 1900s decade. As Johnson lives a double life as the principal of Edwin M. 




chapter is full of unrealities and uncertainties. For instance, the immense fortune from the song 
The Maiden with the Dreamy Eyes “seemed to possess an element of magic” (Along 187); 
Johnson now has to decide which career, educational or musical, to pursue, which “was by no 
means a simple matter” (188), and his eventual choice of the latter would lead him “to a path that 
led I knew not just where” (189). These instabilities carry a potential for disdering Johnson’s 
autobiographical narrative. Indeed, at once dealing with “facts” to reopen the fire-torn Stanton 
(184) and writing songs for “some rather inconsequential dreams” (187), Johnson’s dual life 
itself blurs the generic boundary between reality and fiction. Johnson also finds his 
autobiographical persona, now one of the “Broadway personalities” (191), so different and 
distant from his present self that he has to discontinue the segment abruptly, saying, “All of this 
[his celebrity status] seems to me now to belong to a distant and distinct existence” (192). 
Here Johnson inserts a two-page-long episode to finish the chapter, describing his talk 
with Brander Matthews, white professor of dramatic literature at Columbia Un versity: 
I continued my work at Columbia for three years, not allowing for an interruption 
of several months in the spring of 1905. Before I left I talked with Professor 
Matthews about my more serious work, and showed him the draft of the first two 
chapters of a book which, I said to him, I proposed to call The Autobiography of 
an Ex-Colored Man. He read the manuscript and told me he liked the idea and the 
proposed title, and that I was wise in writing about the thing I knew best. I also 
showed him some of my poems. After he had looked them through, he gave me a 
note to Professor Harry Thurston Peck, who was then editing The Bookman. 
(Along 193) 




advisor endorses Johnson’s novelistic moves—such as borrowing episodes from his life 
experience—by “lik[ing] the idea and the proposed title.” Here, despite the misl ading potential 
of the title “The Autobiography,” the white professor’s approval, predicated upon the casual 
presupposition that the book is a piece of fiction (so “writing about the thing I knew best” is a 
“wise” strategy to choose, not a necessary prerequisite), silences the genre problem as out of 
question.16 
This generic stabilization of The Autobiography (and, by implication, Along This Way 
itself) authorizes Johnson’s autobiographical voice to reorder the chapter’s jumbled narrative 
materials in a convincing anecdotal sequence. At the end of the quoted passage, Matthews’ 
endorsement leads to Johnson’s meeting with Harry Thurston Peck. This, on the narrative level, 
justifies the associative chronological leap to the next, chapter-ending paragraph, where, “about 
ten years later,” after “the difficulties he had had at Columbia . . . which had led to his severance 
from the University,” the devastated professor commits suicide (193). And, in turn, this poignant 
episode of a professor’s downfall supplies a narrative flow back to the interrupted story of 
Johnson’s prosperity as a songwriter. Thus, grafting the tone of Peck’s story onto the content of 
the main plot, the following chapter opens with a sober observation about success: “Success is a 
heady beverage. It can be as deleterious as any alcoholic drink. It seems to me that a man drunk 
with success is more of a fool than the maudlin inebriate; and, certainly, he is more dangerous to 
himself and to others” (194). Aptly, though the remaining uncertainty about “the distant and 
distinct existence” still necessitates a reservational “probable,” Johnson’s narrative comeback 
coincides with the autobiographical persona’s distinction between fancy and reality as well as 
grasp of the latter: “It is probable that one of the reasons why I did not fly off at a tangent was 




As I have shown in this chapter, in Johnson’s writing, race is a narrative construct and 
narrative is racially conditioned. With this close interconnection between rac and narrative, 
restoring the narrative order of Along This Way involves reestablishing the racial hierarchy 
between white and black. The above-discussed reordering of Chapters XVII provides an example, 
as Johnson’s sense of blacks’ appropriate place in relation to whites underlies the developm nt of 
events. According to Johnson’s reasoning, “it may have been the shadow of race” that prevented 
him from “offer[ing] him [Harry Thurston Peck] some little help” (193), leading to the suicide of 
the former professor. 
Likewise, when describing how, as the “real” but yet unidentified author, he enjoyed 
people’s confusion about The Autobiography’s origin, Johnson activates the binary between 
white and black to the extent of invalidating the novel’s exploration of the instability of race: 
The authorship of the book excited the curiosity of literate colored people, and 
there was speculation among them as to who the writer might be—to every such 
group some colored man who had married white, and so coincided with the main 
point on which the story turned, is known. I had the experience of listening to 
some of these discussions. I had a rarer experience, that of being introduced to 
and talking with one man who tacitly admitted to those present that he was the 
author of the book. (Along 238-39) 
Given that “most of the reviewers, though there were some doubters, accepted it as a humn 
document” (238), the object of people’s search should naturally be a suspicious “white” who, 
like the Ex-Colored Man, is “the owner and part-owner of several flat-houses” in white society 
(The Autobiography 143). Yet, by reporting how the readers checked “some colored man who 




only translates the indeterminate white body of the searched man into the detectabl  binary 
combination of “colored man” and “white woman.” He also underrepresents his scrutiny of race 
in The Autobiography by naming interracial marriage, not racial ambiguity, “the main point on 
which the story turned” and thus making the Ex-Colored Man’s race visible. Moreover, this 
narrative maneuver displaces the factor of passing into a safe episode of comical “rarer 
experience,” portraying the pretender of “the author of the book” as a laughable joke, not as a 
threat to Johnson’s authorship which he potentially is. 
Johnson’s final reference to The Autobiography, again regulated by the white/black racial 
hierarchy, similarly displaces the novel’s investigation of race. Chapter XXVIII covers the period 
“nearly a decade before” the Harlem Renaissance, when blacks have difficulty getting their 
writings published. Here, Johnson goes to meet H. L. Mencken, “then one of the editors of Smart 
Set,” to broaden his network with white men of letters (305). The racial schema of thisscene 
somewhat echoes the above-discussed Atlanta University segment in The Autobiography. 
Johnson characterizes himself as “a mere stranger” as opposed to “busy” Mencken who sustains 
“a very pleasant relation” with Johnson but has little interest—especially “that of an editor”—in 
his work (305-06). When Mencken claims that “What they [black writers] should do . . . is to 
single out the strong points of the race and emphasize them over and over and over; asserting, at 
least on these points, that they are better than anybody else,” Johnson “called to his attention that 
I had attempted something of that sort in The Autobiography of an Ex-Colored Man” (305). Here 
Johnson foregrounds his authorship of The Autobiography only to distort the work’s contents in 
accordance with the white’s opinion. Johnson’s response involves his willful misreading not only 
of the Ex-Colored Man who, far from reiterating blacks’ “strong points,” passes because of the 




137) but also of the novel’s challenge to racial difference and hierarchy which assume that one 
race is “better than” another. 
Hence comes a paradox. For, though itself designed to help buttress Johnson’s 
autobiographical self, Along This Way’s incorporation of white subjectivity and resulting 
reintroduction of racial hierarchy compromise that very selfhood. In other words, while his 
self-fashioning as a black subject predicates itself upon his resistance to white ideology, 
Johnson’s narrative strategy necessarily requires his autobiographical persona to act within 
white-oriented frames of reference. An example comes from Chapter XII, in an episode at a 
bicycle shop in Jacksonville:  
One afternoon I stopped in at Gilbert’s and found a half-dozen or so white men 
gathered there, none of whom I knew particularly well. I joined in the talk, which, 
through me, I suppose, finally shifted to the race question. I was expressing some 
of my opinions when I was interrupted by a nondescript fellow, who remarked 
with a superb sneer, “What wouldn’t you give to be a white man?” The remark hit 
me between the eyes. The sheer insolence of it rocked me. The crowd tittere . 
The hot retort surged up for utterance. With great effort I collected and held 
myself and replied in as measured and level a tone as I could command, “Let me 
see. I don’t know just how much I would give. I’d have to think it over. But, at 
any rate, I am sure that I wouldn’t give anything to be the kind of white man you 
are. No, I am sure I wouldn’t; I’d lose too much by the change.” (135) 
This scene promotes Johnson’s black selfhood by depicting his courage to initiate “the race 
question” to an all-Southern-white audience as well as his rejection to “be a white man”—a 




man,” “sold my birthright for a mess of pottage” (The Autobiography 154). His convincing 
declaration of racial pride notwithstanding, as Jennifer Schulz points out, the scene’s ontrolling 
dynamics—allowing Johnson to participate in the conversation only as an “inferior” 
non-white—shows how Johnson has to buy into the white-dominant ideology to make that very 
declaration: “In order to enter into the American social contract [of democracy], Johnson must 
consent to the racial hierarchies of citizenship that preclude social equality and hat, in effect, 
undermine the contract’s own logic” (33). 
I would add to Schulz’s discussion and argue that Johnson’s inevitable participation in 
“racial hierarchies” involves narrative accommodation to whites, since Johnson’s language also 
indicates his meticulous caution not to antagonize the white part of the readership. Indeed, the 
within-text “half-dozen or so white men” who amusedly await Johnson’s response to the 
condescending question correspond with Johnson’s real-life white audience who, yet unfamiliar 
with black subjectivity, “might be brought to understand the African-American pointof view” 
(Fleming 225).17 As his claim of black selfhood depends significantly on white audience’s 
acceptance both within and outside Along This Way, Johnson writes so that, immediately after his 
answer, the white crowd stops “titter”-ing and its insulting gaze becomes “th  eyes of the 
witnesses to the incident” checking the possible retaliation of Johnson’s challenger (135-36). 
With the challenger characterized as a “nondescript” straw man whose despicability is obvious to 
any reader, Johnson’s refusal “to be the kind of white man you are” would not apply to the fair 
white audience in the scene, let alone the white reader of Along This Way. 
Such dependence on white subjectivity underlies another major form of Johnson’s black 
self-fashioning, namely, his rejection of segregation. As he states that “all my life I have made it 




numerous scenes of Johnson’s train ride to define him as an outspoken protester against racism. 
Also, Johnson’s righteous composure in the white car posits a direct antithesis not only t the 
Ex-Colored Man’s silent entrance into the “smoking-compartment” for whites (The 
Autobiography 115) but also to the character’s “admiration” for the “principle”-d racism he 
overhears there: “I must confess that underneath it all I felt a certain sort of admiration for the 
man [a racist white passenger] who could not be swayed from what he held as his principles” 
(120). Twice in Along This Way, Johnson manages to stay in the white car with impunity because 
whites, seeing his Spanish-speaking friend and Panama hat respectively, misidentify him as a 
Cuban black (65, 88-89). Despite his successful self-placement in “the first-clas  car” (64) and 
“the men’s [smoking] room” (88), Johnson’s action suggests his internalization of the ideology of 
white-dominant America on multiple levels. For one thing, the success derives actually from 
whites’ exoticizing gaze on otherness, which differs little from racial discrimination in limiting 
his subjectivity. In the latter example of his Latino passing, the white passngers abandon their 
racial “scrutin[y]” of Johnson only to fetishize his Panama hat, “then rare in theUnit d States,” 
“pass[ing] around and examin[ing] [it] with expressions of admiration” (88). Also, Harilaos 
Stecopoulos finds in Johnson’s appropriation of fake Latino identity “his own version of the 
imperial aggression so tantalizing to white Americans, north and south” (41), considering th  U.S. 
imperialistic interests in the post-Spanish-American-War Latin America as well as Johnson’s 
own ambition leading to his consulate career in Venezuela and Nicaragua. Accordingly, as 
Stecopoulos argues, “His Latino act in the Jim Crow South at once challenges and supports the 
white hegemony of an expansionist United States” (41). 
Another train ride provides an instance where Johnson allows himself to fo low Jim Crow. 




during his 1896 travel from Charleston to Jacksonville, Johnson examines the car before making 
a decision: 
After my inspection I went back and told the conductor that I couldn’t ride in the 
forward car either. When he asked why, I gave as a reason the fact that there wer  
white passengers in that car, too. He looked at me astonished, and hastily 
explained that the two men were a deputy sheriff and a dangerously insane man, 
who was being taken to the asylum. I listened to his explanation, but pointed out 
that it didn’t change the race of either of the men. He pleaded, “But I can’t bring 
that crazy man into the ‘white’ car.” “Maybe you can’t,” I said, “but if I’ve got to 
break this law I prefer breaking it in the first-class car.” The conductor was, after 
all, a reasonable fellow; and he decided to stand squarely by the law, and bring 
the two white men into the “white” car. (87) 
The white conductor, who understands Johnson’s claim, is the within-text counterpart of Along 
This Way’s white readers, whom Johnson tries to convince not only of “the absurdity of the 
situation” (86) but also of the logical consistency of his racial protest and, by extension, the 
validity of his black subjectivity. To accommodate and eventually win this real-lif  audience, 
Johnson foregrounds the “not objectionable” but “apologetic” manner the conductor bears when 
asking him to move (86). And, once Johnson “gave . . . a reason” and this “reasonable fellow” 
accepts it, the two form a law-abiding comradeship as opposed to the white passengers whos  
illogical protests would naturally alienate Along This Way’s white readers: “As I left the car, there 
were protests from men and women against the change. The maniac continued his ravings; but 
both I and the conductor stood squarely by the law” (87). However, Johnson’s 




parameters within the framework of white-dominant racial ideology. Thus, Johnson’s argument 
begins with the essential stability of racial identities, assuming that circumstances will not 
“change the race.” Furthermore, while apparently expressing his challenge to Jim Crow, 
Johnson’s conclusion that “I prefer breaking it in the first-class car” only reiterates its precepts. 
For, with white supremacy’s identification of “white” with “first-class”—and with the scene’s 
observance of it by binarizing the setting into “white first-class” and “black” cars to the 
exclusion of other divisions—the tautological idea of “breaking it in the first-class car” does not 
carry a personal “preference” but repeats the very definition of the law. 
 
As I have argued, both The Autobiography and Along This Way indicate Johnson’s 
strenuous negotiation with white-dominant racial ideology and its subjects who read the books. 
While white subjectivity offers him an authoritative narrative framework with which to structure 
a racial investigation as well as a black selfhood, the resulting dependence on what he aims to 
critique makes his projects the arena, not end-product, of his struggle as a writer. Given all this, 
Johnson’s impressively multidimensional career in literature (e.g., as journalist, critic, poet, 
novelist, and editor) and elsewhere (e.g., as educator, lawyer, songwriter, diplomat, litician and 
activist)—in some of which he was the first African American to establish himself—may suggest 
his constant search for new modes of (self-)expression outside the oppressive frameworks 
assigned by the white-supremacist society. Indeed, recounting his first try at prose fiction with 
The Autobiography, Johnson’s language evokes that of an ex-slave now away from the master’s 
yoke: “The use of prose as a creative medium was new to me; and its latitude, its flexibility, its 
comprehensiveness, the variety of approaches it afforded for surmounting technical difficulties 




motion” (Along 238). The appropriateness of Johnson’s comparison goes beyond its literal 
meaning. Just as the Emancipation was far from the end of African Americans’ f ght with the 
persistently white-dominant America, The Autobiography marks only the beginning of Johnson’s 






Ordering the Racial Chaos, Chaoticizing the Racial Order: 
Nella Larsen’s Narrative of Indeterminacy and Invisibility in Passing 
 
In May 1932, Nella Larsen visited James Weldon Johnson, then professor at Fisk 
University, and his wife Grace in Nashville. During the first week of her stay with the couple, the 
light-skinned Larsen, together with more “passably” white-looking Grace, passed for white for 
the first time in her life. She excitedly reports this experience in a letter to Carl Van Vechten, a 
major white patron of the Harlem Renaissance: 
You will be amused that I who have never tried this much discussed “passing” 
stunt have waited until I reached the deep south to put it over. Grace Johnson and 
I drove about fifty miles south of here the other day and then walked into the best 
restaurant in a rather conservative town called Murfreesborough and demanded 
lunch and got it, plus all the service in the world, and an invitation to return. 
Everybody here seems to think that quite a stunt. Jim told me to be sure to tell you. 
(“To Carl Van Vechten” 170; emphasis in orig.) 
At this time, Larsen and Johnson had already written and published thoughtful inquiries of racial 
passing that questioned the whole notion of racial difference. Given that, Larsen’s tone, as well 
as Johnson’s suggestion to tell Van Vechten, sounds strikingly frivolous. Indeed, while treating 
the ambiguity, if only temporary, of her race, Larsen’s report predicates itself upon the writer’s, 
the reader’s and “everybody”’s unquestioned presupposition that she may look white but is 
actually black. Despite its implication of dismantling the binary difference between white and 




“amusing” “stunt” casually presentable to white Van Vechten. It is particularly noteworthy that 
Larsen refers to her passing as “a stunt”—a word defined by The New Oxford American 
Dictionary as “an action displaying spectacular skill and daring,” “something unusual done to 
attract attention.” While her race was invisible and indeterminable to the whit s at the Tennessee 
restaurant, her letter to Van Vechten, another white audience, not only visualizes her passing as a 
public performance but also re-stabilizes the racial binary that her action has put into question; if 
Larsen’s passing is audacious and extraordinary as the word “stunt” connotes, it is precisely 
because she cannot be white. 
To present the difference-defying racial passing within the framework of white/black 
binary opposition, Larsen’s language also suppresses Grace Johnson’s passing which occurred 
along with her own. “[A]s fair as any White woman in the country” (Fleming 228), Grace has a 
more racially indeterminate body which would expose the essential lack of difference between a 
“real-white” body and a “passing-white” body.1 To downplay the disruptive potential of this 
liminal figure, the second sentence of the quotation portrays the two women’s action in one unit 
under the plural subject “Grace Johnson and I” and, by doing so, brackets in Larsen’s “amusing 
stunt” Grace’s passing which does not really require extraordinary skills. As Larsen tells her 
story in an undisruptive, entertaining fashion to Van Vechten, her linguistic binarization of 
in-between beings even applies to the scene of her passing. Categorizing Murfreesborough, 
Tennessee, somewhat forcibly as “the deep south,” Larsen highlights the binary opposition 
between the North and the South, thus distancing Van Vechten, a New Yorker, not only from the 
white people she tricked but also from the “rather conservative” site of collective racial anxiety.2 
This letter to Van Vechten foregrounds a gap between racial passing as it re lly is and as 




early-twentieth-century America, dictates a clear-cut difference between white and black as well 
as between “real-white” and “passing-white.”3 Indeed, actual “passers,” whose bodies show no 
definitive evidence for either real-whiteness or passing-whiteness, refute the notion of racial 
difference promoted by white ideology. In addition to this categorical indeterminacy, racial 
passing is also invisible; when a person “passes” in a group of “whites,” to everyone else in the 
group she is not a “passer” but just one of the “whites.” When put in words, however, racial 
passing loses its indeterminacy and invisibility, because the medium of language inevitably 
translates passing into an expressed, dichotomously (though fictively) stabilized combination of 
“fake whiteness” and “actual blackness.” The most striking example is the very word “passing.” 
A “passer,” by definition, shows no visible difference from “whites” on the level of physical 
body, but a “passer,” by definition, is not “white.” 
As I demonstrate in this chapter, this tension between the chaotic, invisible and 
indeterminate nature of racial passing and the order-imposing function of language underlies not 
only Larsen’s personal letter to Van Vechten but also her fictional narrative Passing (1929). 
Unlike the letter, however, Larsen’s configuration of the novel indicates her will to engage the 
chaotic reality of racial passing and thus challenge the binary racial system of white ideology. 
Nevertheless, since Larsen has to do so in writing, the ordering function already built in language 
entraps her in a visible, stable and binary representation of passing. Thus, once she mentions 
racial passing in the novel, her language contradicts the endless indeterminacy and invisibility 
she aims to emphasize. Whereas Larsen strives to expose the actual lack of difference between a 
“real-white” body and a “passing-white” body, this language suggests that, w ile the character 
looks white, she is really black. 




racial dimension of Larsen’s characterization and plot construction. In this novel, a third-person 
narrator tells the story from Irene Redfield’s point of view. Both Irene a d her childhood friend 
Clare Kendry Bellew have “passable” white skin. Irene, married to a dark-skinned physician 
Brian and proud of her black identity, commits herself to “[u]plifting the brother” (39) as a 
member of the “Negro Welfare League.” Larsen, however, suggests Irene’s espousal of white 
middle-class norms through, for example, her occasional passing “for the sake of convenience, 
restaurants, theatre tickets, and things like that” (70). On the other hand, Clare leaves the black 
society and passes for white to marry John Bellew, a wealthy white businessman. In the summer 
of 1925, Irene and Clare accidentally reunite after twelve years of no contact at he rooftop café 
of the Chicago Drayton Hotel, a segregated place where both women have entered by racial 
passing. (This scene first reveals their “passing-whiteness” to the novel’s reader.) Several days 
later, Clare invites Irene to join her and Gertrude Martin, their common “passable” friend, at her 
suite. Irene becomes angry when John, who does not know that Clare, nor her white-looking 
guests, is “black,” affectionately calls his wife by the nickname “Nig,” but Irene keeps passing 
before him to protect Clare. In the meantime, unable to resist her desire “to seNegroes, to be 
with them again, to talk with them, to hear them laugh” (51), Clare repeatedly visits Irene and 
her black circle in New York. Then, unable to overcome her disagreements with Brian, who 
wants to leave the U.S. for racially liberal Brazil, Irene comes to suspect his affair with Clare and 
wishes to remove Clare from her life. One day, Irene runs into John while walking rm in arm 
with a friend who is “golden, with curly black Negro hair” (70). John, realizing Irene’s, and by 
implication Clare’s, “blackness,” later breaks into a black-only party nd confronts his wife there. 
The story closes when Clare dies by falling from the sixth floor, though the ending does not 




unintentionally pushed her through the window. 
By illuminating Larsen’s effort to capture racial passing in its invisble and indeterminate 
reality, my argument ameliorates the critical inadequacy of the current Larsen scholarship. For, 
while critics have discussed Larsen’s description of Clare’s and Irene’s racial passing to show the 
novelist’s challenge to the U.S. racial system, the most ideologically subversive part of Larsen’s 
racial scrutiny actually comes before she writes about the women’s passing, i.e., before the 
Drayton-café scene makes the characters’ race visible and dichotomously fixed as “looking white 
but actually black.” Larsen informs the novel’s opening scenes with racial passing’s invisibility 
and indeterminacy paradoxically by not writing about racial passing. 
Failing to recognize this actual depth of Larsen’s racial investigation, scholars of Passing 
have generally neglected the racial chaos that opens the novel. For example, while pointing to 
the “dangerous” and “problematical” nature of Clare’s passing, Helena Michie finds her evidence 
in the Drayton-café scene where Larsen actually compromises her inquiry by identifying the 
character as actually black. Accordingly, for Michie, the “danger” and “problematics” of racial 
passing result from the character’s disregard of “other people’s opinions, assumptions, glances” 
(149), not from the essential lack of real-white/passing-white difference to which Larsen alludes 
earlier in the novel. Catherine Rottenberg accurately points out that passing put the very 
existence of racial categories into question: “passing interrogates and problematizes the ontology 
of identity categories and their construction” (435). However, the example she analyzes to 
“unravel some of the distinctive mechanisms through which race norms operate” (436) is the 
Drayton-café scene where, as Rottenberg herself acknowledges, “the reader understands Irene 
has been ‘passing herself off as white’” (438). Kate Baldwin cogently argues that the generally 




is already a social construct combined with racial essentialism: “Passing faces its own 
impossibility, that is, the possibility that it cannot exist without some priorasc iption to either 
(racial) essentialism or (social) constructionism both of which, as Pas ing demonstrates, insist on 
understanding the self without examining the structures of the symbolic (or ‘white’ superiority) 
in which these discourses are embedded” (465). Nevertheless, Baldwin erroneously r ad  the 
novel’s opening chapter as “Irene’s racializing account of Clare’s body” (474), assuming that 
“Clare is a passer” (473) at this point of the narrative already. In so doing, she mi ses Larsen’s 
strategy of carefully removing racial evidence from the scene; here, t “impossibility” actually 
includes that of applying any “racializing account” to Clare’s indeterminate white body.4 
This chapter traces back to the novel’s opening Larsen’s struggle with the conflict 
between order-defying racial passing and order-imposing language. Here, she attempts a faithful 
depiction of racial passing by, paradoxically, not writing about it. Larsen’s first reference to racial 
passing, however, inevitably forces her to write about passing and thus make it visible and fixed 
in the binary characterization of “looking white but actually black.” Thus, in my reading, the 
Drayton scene registers the onset of her strenuous pursuit of alternative narrative modes to depict 
racial passing’s invisibility and indeterminacy within the framework of ideologized language. My 
analysis of Larsen’s configuration of post-Drayton scenes will reveal how, with Irene’s and 
Clare’s white bodies fixed in the “passing-white” position, the novelist substittes Irene’s 
“unreliable” narrative perspective as an alternative site of invisibility and indeterminacy. In so 
doing, Larsen also foregrounds Irene’s entrapment in what the character herself criticizes as 
“white people”’s erroneous racial views, thus turning the reader’s attention away from the 





As I have pointed out, Passing does not mention race or racial passing until the 
Drayton-café scene where Irene and Clare identify each other. And this “race-less” opening, I 
argue, is not a contingent plot arrangement but Larsen’s highly intentional strategy to recreate the 
real-life situation of passing. Here, racial passing works invisibly to refute the generally assumed 
difference between a “real-white” body and a “passing-white” body. 
Indeed, Larsen’s first novel Quicksand (1928) already evidences her keen awareness that, 
since racial difference is a linguistic construct, a mixed-race individual, who does not fit into the 
normative system of white/black categorization, often eludes signification and, accordingly, is 
“nonexistent” on the level of discourse. When Helga Crane, Quicksand’s “impassable” but 
light-skinned protagonist, tells Mrs. Hayes-Rore, a black rights activist, abouther black West 
Indian father and white Danish mother, the issue of racial mixture undergoes a silent 
containment: 
During the little pause that followed Helga’s recital, the faces of the two 
women, which had been bare, seemed to harden. It was almost as if they had 
slipped on masks. The girl wished to hide her turbulent feeling and to appear 
indifferent to Mrs. Hayes-Rore’s opinion of her story. The woman felt that the 
story, dealing as it did with race intermingling and possibly adultery, was beyond 
definite discussion. For among black people, as among white people, it is tacitly 
understood that these things are not mentioned—and therefore they do not exist. 
(Quicksand 42) 
Here, Larsen’s narrator attributes the characters’ silence primarily to their reaction against “race 
intermingling and possibly adultery,” rather than to the epistemological elusiv ness of racial 




themselves through discourse, one’s racial identity derives not from the physical reality of the 
body but rather from the discourse that surrounds it. Symbolically, the two women’s att mpt to 
act within ideological correctness (which both “black people” and “white people” are to follow) 
suppresses the bodily dimension of their existence: their “bare” faces are now “masked.” And, 
being “beyond definite discussion” and thus “not mentioned,” Helga’s binary-defying 
background virtually does “not exist.” 
Drawing upon this observation of race and discourse, Larsen alludes to the existential 
problem of racial passing—i.e., the problem that there is no physical clue to “passing-whiteness” 
as opposed to “real-whiteness”—paradoxically by not mentioning race or racial p ssing in the 
novel’s opening scenes. Larsen carefully de-racializes her language when describing those 
elements that could otherwise carry racial connotations. In the opening chapter, for example, 
Larsen describes Clare’s attempted return to Irene’s social circlewithout showing the racial 
attribute of that community: “Nor would she [Irene] assist Clare to realize her foolish desire to 
return for a moment to that life which long ago, and of her own choice, she had left behind h r” 
(7). Likewise, when mentioning the “derisive rhyme” the neighborhood boys sing to Bob Kendry, 
Clare’s mixed-race father as a janitor, Larsen portrays it as directed to his race-neutral bodily 
feature (“certain eccentricities in his careening gait” [6]), not as a raci l derision which would 
cohere with the novelist’s primarily racio-economic characterization of him later in the story. 
Furthermore, in the opening scenes, every time she refers to Irene’s or Clare’s skin color, Larsen 
takes pains to describe the color as a manifestation of the body’s non-racial aspect. For instance, 
the end of the first chapter presents Irene’s “warm olive cheeks” as an indicator not of race but of 
her emotion (“humiliation, resentment, and rage”) aroused by Clare’s letter (7). With regard to 




attractive-looking woman” (9) without evoking the factor of race. 
Here, taking advantage of the way whiteness operates as a “race-less, unmarked norm” in 
the U.S. context,5 Larsen recreates a real-life situation where a “passer” is not a “white-looking 
black” but an unracialized—and thus no different from “white”—individual. Larsen’s 
de-racialization of the opening directly influences the reader’s interpreive activity. On one hand, 
to the reader who is willing to read race or racial passing into these scenes, Larsen does not offer 
any definitive evidence. On the other hand, a reader immersed in the unconscious (though in fact 
ideologically derived) presupposition of whiteness as an “unmarked norm” would not imagine 
the possible presence of race in these scenes. And Larsen seems to encourage her re d r to take 
the latter approach and unsuspectingly join this supposedly homogeneous “white” spher, o that 
racial passing remains invisible and indeterminate in the reader’s mind.6 Indeed, given the 
multiple meanings of the title, “Passing,” most of which do not concern race, as well as the book 
cover which identifies Larsen only as “the author of Quicksand,” readers with no prior 
knowledge of Larsen’s race and work, unless deliberate enough to read the disproportionally 
small-fonted blurb (“Cover of Passing”), would not even suspect that the novel concerns race.7 
Larsen invites those readers to translate the characters’ “race-lessn ss” automatically into 
“whiteness” just like those whites tricked by the passer do.  
Paradoxically, however, this rendition of the invisibility of racial passing makes that very 
rendition invisible and unnoticeable to the reader. And, to communicate her point, Larsen has 
necessarily to make racial passing visible and, accordingly, stabilized in the binary-oriented 
identity of “black passing for white,” as she does at the Drayton scene when first revealing 
Irene’s and Clare’s “passing-whiteness.” While the thus introduced real-white/passing-white 




framework by presenting it as an effect of white ideology rather than as a re l difference in the 
physical body. In this scene, as Irene rests at the segregated Drayton café, she finds herself stared 
at by a “white” woman (who later turns out to be the “passing” Clare): 
And gradually there rose in Irene a small inner disturbance, odious and 
hatefully familiar. She laughed softly, but her eyes flashed. 
Did that woman, could that woman, somehow know that here before her very 
eyes on the roof of the Drayton sat a Negro? 
Absurd! Impossible! White people were so stupid about such things for all 
that they usually asserted that they were able to tell; and by the most ridiculous 
means, finger-nails, palms of hands, shapes of ears, teeth, and other equally silly 
rot. They always took her for an Italian, a Spaniard, a Mexican, or a gipsy. Never, 
when she was alone, had they even remotely seemed to suspect that she was a 
Negro. No, the woman sitting there staring at her couldn’t possibly know. (10-11) 
As Larsen attempts to avoid essentializing “passing-whiteness” as a physically corroborated 
identity, the second paragraph of the quotation refers to Irene’s “passing” not in the hird-person 
narrator’s objective description of her body but in Irene’s interior monologue indicative of her 
entrapment in white-dominant ideology. Here, in naming herself “a Negro,” Irene looks at herself 
through a “white” eye; Irene envisages her body objectified “before her [the ‘white’ woman’s] 
very eyes.” To suggest further that racial difference derives from white-subjective interpretation 
of an in fact uncategorizable body, Larsen has Irene claim the failure of “white people”’s reading 
of bodily features such as “finger-nails, palms of hands, shapes of ears, teeth.” Thus, a body can 
be that of “an Italian, a Spaniard, a Mexican, or a gipsy” at the same time, depending on the 




While exposing the subjective and fictive nature of “white people”’s racial differentiation, 
Larsen takes pains to emphasize the power that this dominant viewpoint wields over the 
psychology of “black” Irene. In so doing, Larsen also foregrounds Irene’s immersion in 
white-dominant ideology, thus subtly shifting the responsibility for the activation of racial binary 
to the character. Indeed, Larsen arranges her diction so that, reading retrospectively, the reader 
can find a causal relationship between the “white” woman’s stare and Irene’s increased 
self-awareness as “colour”-ed: Irene “[f]eel[s] her colour heighten under the continued 
inspection” (10). This scene also indicates the pervasive effect of an ideologically dominant 
perspective. The “white” gaze that forces Irene to identify herself a  “a Negro” belongs actually 
to “passing-white” Clare, thus showing how Irene’s (this time mistaken) co sciousness of white 
gaze, rather than the white gaze itself, evokes racial difference in her mind. While indicating the 
fictiveness of white subjectivity and its authority, this process also exemplifies its penetrating 
and persistent operation in the form of “double consciousness,” defined by W. E. B. Du Bois as
the “sense of always looking at one’s self through the eyes of others [i.e., whites], of measuring 
one’s soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity” (2). Du Bois’ term 
points to how a history of psychological oppression has forced blacks to internalize white 
subjectivity—as well as the black objectivity it automatically assigns to them—in their 
self-image and self-expression. In the above passage, Irene looks at her own white body through 
a “white”’s gaze and names the body “passing-white” according to the white-dominant ideology 
that she has internalized which dictates the real-white/passing-white difference.8 This 
“double-conscious” introduction of the racial binary to the uncategorizable white body even 
applies to Irene’s realization of Clare’s “non-whiteness.” Irene suspects that the “white” woman 




the white women who know the nickname (11). Here, too, Irene’s self-consciousness vis-à-vis 
whites’ viewpoint, namely the way they call her, serves to position Clare’s white body in the 
category of “passing-white.” 
Larsen’s introduction of the real-white/passing-white difference necessarily frames her 
narrative into the “white”/“black” racial dichotomy, with which, as I will demonstrate later, she 
has to negotiate in order to explore race and racial passing for the rest of the novel. Indeed, the 
Drayton scene binarizes into “white” and “black” not only the characters’ races but also the 
narrative itself, which now draws upon the “black” Irene’s mental process influenced by the 
double-consciously internalized “white” viewpoint. This racially dual narrative s tuation also 
places the novel’s reader in “white” and “black” subject positions at the samtime. For example, 
when Irene as “a Negro” claims “white people”’s inability to detect raial passing, the reader, 
informed of Irene’s perspective as well as her “passing-whiteness,” is placed on this “black” 
character’s vantage point. At the same time, the same scene activates the binary racial 
positioning between the “white” spectator (Clare as a “white” woman and Ire e who looks at 
herself from Clare’s “white” viewpoint) and the “black” spectacle (Irene’s racialized body), 
defining the reader as the former—whether himself/herself white or not—who, to c mprehend 
the scene, has to read Irene’s “Negro” body with racial binaries in mind. 
And this coexistence of “white” and “black” narrative perspectives problematizes and 
even undermines Larsen’s challenge to white supremacy.9 For example, John Bellew does not 
suspect Clare’s “passing” until the novel’s ending, despite his insistence on the racial “line” 
between white and black: “I draw the line at that. No niggers in my family” (29). Here, 
foregrounding the white supremacist’s villainy, ignorance and bigotry, Larsen t ies to alienate her 




from the subject position that Larsen defined as “white” at the Drayton scene, because another 
ideologically loaded “line”—i.e., between real-white and passing-white—already constitutes the 
story’s premise. Indeed, the reader can cast an ironical gaze on John because, unlike this 
unsuspecting husband, the reader knows that Clare is not white but passing-white. Here, too, the 
“black” subjectivity introduced to the reader, while providing him/her with this “knowledge,” is 
already embedded in the binary racial system of white ideology. 
Larsen’s narrative framing of Irene’s and Clare’s white bodies into “passing-white” 
identity undermines her prior engagement in the invisible and indeterminate operation of racial 
passing. The Drayton scene’s introduction of the white/black racial binary also undermines the 
“race-less” narrative space she created for her exploration, as the scene splits the space into 
“white” and “black” narrative, as well as interpretive, perspectives. For the emainder of the 
novel, as I will elucidate below, Larsen has to negotiate a narrative framework ssentially 
unsuitable for capturing racial passing’s chaotic reality. 
 
While the Drayton scene entraps Larsen in the system of binary difference, the novelist’s 
configuration of the rest of the narrative indicates her continued effort to expose the chaotic 
operation of racial passing as well as white ideology’s systematic suppression of that chaos. For 
instance, Larsen uses the character Brian Redfield to address how racial pass ng, if engaged in its 
real indeterminacy, can nullify racial difference. Indeed, Larsen chara terizes Brian as resistant 
to the racist ideology that, through circulation and repetition in American public discourse, 
naturalizes racial difference and hierarchy in people’s mind. The novel’s white characters obtain 
and reinforce their assumption of the white/black (and by implication real-white/passing-white) 




“[a]lways robbing and killing people. And . . . worse” (30) as well as the “long articles headed: 
‘Will the Blacks Work?’” that lead Clare’s white great-aunts to assign “hard labour” to this 
visually white girl (18-19). In contrast, long anxious to move to the less racially prejudiced 
Brazil, Brian makes an issue of “a lynching . . . in the evening paper” and points out how 
America—the site of “the pleasant routine of her life” for his ideologically entrapped wife 
Irene—is in fact a “hellish place” (72-74). Larsen develops Brian’s will to see beyond the orderly 
surface of American racial situation to the extent of questioning the differenc  between 
real-whiteness and passing-whiteness. He attributes the unanswerable question why “passers” 
identify themselves as “black,” as well as why they always come back to the black society, to the 
elusiveness of the concept of “race” itself: “If I knew that [the reason for passers’ return], I’d 
know what race is” (38). Accordingly, in his discussion of racial passing, Brian refers to whites 
as “the so-called whites” (39), thus insinuating that, given the discursive and fictive nature of the 
real-white/passing-white difference, “whites” are “white” not for any substantial reason but only 
because they are “so called.” 
We should note, however, that Larsen limits her own use of Brian as a perceptive analyst 
of race and racial passing. Indeed, she bases the plot of Passing thematically upon the 
disagreement between Irene and Brian and stylistically upon Irene as th narrative center. In the 
above-discussed scene, for example, “Irene didn’t at all agree” with Brian’s observation of racial 
passing and simply drops the topic from the conversation, which, on the narrative level, 
necessarily cuts off the reader’s access to his insight: “Ignoring his unqualified ssertion, she slid 
away from the subject entirely” (39). In this way, Irene’s entrapment in white-dominant ideology 
does not grant Brian’s critique much voice in the narrative. 




resulting suppression of Brian’s racial views connect to the strategy Larsen devises to describe 
the actual indeterminacy of racial passing after the Drayton scene. This strategy consists of 
making narrative confusion mirror racial chaos. To create an alternative mod  of racial scrutiny, 
Larsen appropriates Irene’s narrative space which, despite the character’s claim of representing a 
“black” perspective, is loaded with “white” discourse and is thus self-contradictory, unstable and 
unreliable. In other words, now that Clare’s and Irene’s white bodies are named “passing-white” 
and cannot serve as the site of invisibility and indeterminacy, Larsen uses Iren ’  consciousness, 
which repeatedly but unsuccessfully attempts to signify reality in an orderly narrative, as a 
substitute for the arena of racial chaos. When Irene does manage to order her nar ative, Larsen 
foregrounds the operation of “white” discourse, thus at once indicating the fictiveness of 
racio-narrative order and downplaying the novelist’s own dependence on the ideologically 
charged language in structuring those scenes. 
Indeed, after the Drayton scene, Passing revolves around what Irene does not know as 
much as what she does. Even about what Irene claims she does know, Larsen makes the 
character contradict herself, thus emphasizing to the reader the unreliability and instability of 
Irene’s narrative perspective. With regard to Brian, for example, Larsen not only refutes Irene’s 
pride that “[s]he knew him as well as he knew himself, or better” (41) but also signals that the 
character’s inability to accept her falsity will baffle the reader’s attempt to stabilize meaning: 
“And she, who had prided herself on knowing his moods, their causes and their remedies, had 
found it first unthinkable, and then intolerable, that this [Brian’s restlessness] . . . should be to her 
incomprehensible and elusive” (60). Thus, when Irene first suspects an affair between Brian and 
Clare (which Larsen never verifies in the narrative), Larsen presents Ir e’s psychology in terms 




from exact expression” [63]) and lack of evidence: “Nothing. She had seen nothing, heard 
nothing. She had no facts or proofs” (67). 
Into this unstable narrative space of Irene, Larsen strategically weaves the factor of race 
to create the impression that the character’s “black” identity itself is que tionable. For example, 
at the end of Part 3, Chapter 2, distressed by the alleged affair of her husband, Irene thinks of 
acting against her “allegiance” to “her race” and telling John of Clare’s repeated contact with the 
black community (69). While this thought presupposes Clare’s and Irene’s “actual blackness,” 
Larsen subtly undermines it by satirizing Irene’s overemphasis on her responsibility as “a 
Negro.” Indeed, Larsen arranges Irene’s occasional “passing” for conveniec , as well as her 
dismissal of black beauty as an effect of blacks’ “repugnan[ce]” (55), so that the character’s 
racial pride strikes the reader as opportunistic and even spurious by this point. Larsen also 
suggests that Irene’s conflict is actually personal, rather than racially motivated, when the 
character wishes “that Clare’s Margery [mixed-race daughter] were ill, or dying” so that Clare 
will leave America soon (69). While encouraging the reader to cast an ironical eye on Irene’s 
thoughts, Larsen makes the character wish to become a race-less “woman, an individual” so that 
no “burden of race” would oblige her to protect Clare from the white husband: “Irene Redfi ld 
wished, for the first time in her life, that she had not been born a Negro” (69). Whereas Irene 
believes that her “born a Negro” identity would not allow such de-racialization, Larsen suggests 
to the reader that Irene is somewhat “a woman, an individual,” given the way her “Negro” 
identity, as well as “the burden of race,” results from her self-naming and self-appointment 
throughout the narrative.  
Larsen utilizes Irene’s unstable and self-contradictory narrative spac as an alternative 




passing. Irene’s claim of whites’ inability to detect racial passing, along with that of blacks’ 
ability to do so by “[j]ust—just something. A thing that couldn’t be registered” (56), helps Larsen 
disprove the validity and authority of white subjectivity and compromises that very critique by 
paradoxically essentializing the real-white/passing-white difference under the name of “blacks”’ 
perceptiveness. To minimize the latter effect and indicate the ultimate indeterminacy of racial 
passing, Larsen repeatedly portrays Irene as herself confused by the real-whit /passing-white 
difference she assumes. For example, having just recognized Clare at the Drayton café, Irene 
casually deduces the “passing-whiteness” of Clare’s great-aunts from that of Clare even though 
she has heard of their “real-whiteness”: “[Irene said,] ‘I see. They were “passing” too.’ [Clare 
said,] ‘No. They weren’t. They were white’” (18). Also, when at Clare’s Chicago suite John 
Bellew’s blatant racism forces Irene and Gertrude to “pass” together with Clare, Larsen portrays 
the scene as follows: 
It was, Irene thought, unbelievable and astonishing that four people [Irene, 
Clare, Gertrude and John] could sit so unruffled, so ostensibly friendly, while they 
were in reality seething with anger, mortification, shame. But no, on second 
thought she was forced to amend her opinion. John Bellew, most certainly, was as 
undisturbed within as without. (31) 
As her indignation at John’s remarks destabilizes Irene’s narrative space (as indicated by the 
interjection, “But no”), this scene registers Irene’s decreased epistemological control over what 
she perceives. For instance, Irene not only “could not define” what Clare’s eyes tell when John 
calls her “Nig” (28) but also “couldn’t tell which,” “a snort or a giggle,” the sound is that comes 
from Gertrude (30). Taking advantage of this uncertainty in Irene’s narrative perspective, Larsen 




bracket all the four people, including “white” John, in the “passing-white” position where “anger, 
mortification, shame” smolder due to John’s racist remarks. Only after correcting her initial 
thought does Irene distinguish John, whose “whiteness” exempts him from such inner 
commotion, from the three “passing-white” women. 
Furthermore, to prevent Irene’s theory of “blacks”’ ability to detect passing from 
implying an essential real-white/passing-white difference, Larsen makes Irene contradict herself 
in the very application of the theory. While dismissing as “silly rot” (11) “white people”’s belief 
in bodily evidence for passing, Irene herself asserts the “Negro” identity of Clare’s eyes once she 
recognizes Clare at the Drayton scene: “Ah! Surely! They were Negro eyes! mysterious and 
concealing. And set in that ivory face under that bright hair, there was about them something 
exotic” (21). Larsen refutes Irene’s racializing reading of Clare’s eyes by repeatedly 
foregrounding the impossibility of any reading; indeed, as Irene realizes later in the story, Clare’s 
eyes are un-“define”-able (28), “unfathomable” (29, 33), un-“name”-able (33), “masked” and 
“unrevealing” (65). Moreover, Larsen exposes Irene’s own entrapment in “white people”’s 
illusion also through the character’s “exotic”-izing objectification of what she finds “mysterious 
and concealing.” Here, too, Larsen portrays Irene as falling into her (Irene’s) own critique of 
“white” viewpoint, as the character claims elsewhere that whites find blacks “beautiful” simply 
because of “something so different that it’s really at the opposite end of the pole from all your 
[whites’] accustomed notions of beauty” (55). 
This strategy of creating narrative confusion to simulate racial indeterminacy culminates 
in Part 2, Chapter 3. Here, utilizing Irene’s unstable narrative perspective, Lars n informs a 
significant portion of the chapter with dissolved racial categories. By doing so, the novelist 




scene of categorical chaos, Larsen fills this chapter, featuring the Negro Welfare League’s dance 
party in 1927 to which Irene takes Clare, with narrative uncertainties and disorders n account of 
Irene’s exhaustion and lack of epistemological control. Here, the third-person narrative does not 
give an orderly or real-time account of Irene’s experience but depends upon “[t]he things which 
Irene Redfield remembered afterward,” which “seemed, to her, unimportant and unrelated” (53). 
As many as seven paragraphs in this four-page chapter, whose mutual connections Irene herself 
does not know, begin with the phrase, “she remembered” (53, 54, 56), thus indicating an 
increased unreliability and disorganization. This setting breaks down boundaries and hier rchies 
necessary to create meanings out of the chaotic assortment of narrative materials. While what 
Irene does not remember degenerates into “a blurred memory,” what she does remember loses 
not only its causal interconnection but also its distinction from its likes: “Except for these few 
unconnected things the dance faded to a blurred memory, its outlines mingling with those of 
other dances of its kind that she had attended in the past and would attend in the future” (56). 
In such a disorderly narrative sphere, Larsen situates a breakdown of clear-cut racial 
differences. Indeed, admitting anyone who pays a dollar, the Negro Welfare League party serves 
actually as a site of diversity where “[a]ll sorts of people go” (50). Thus, one of the segments that 
begin with the phrase “she remembered,” featuring a conversation between Iren  and white Hugh 
Wentworth, reflects the racial and narrative jumble simultaneously: 
She remembered a conversation she had with Hugh Wentworth in a free 
half-hour when she had dropped into a chair in an emptied box and let her gaze 
wander over the bright crowd below. 
Young men, old men, white men, black men; youthful women, older women, 




slim women, stately women, small women moved by. An old nursery rhyme 
popped into her head. She turned to Wentworth, who had just taken a seat beside 
her, and recited it: 
   “Rich man, poor man, 
   Beggar man, thief, 
   Doctor, lawyer, 
   Indian chief.” 
“Yes,” Wentworth said . . . . (54) 
In the second paragraph of the quotation, the purposeless “wander”-ing of Irene’s “gaze” and 
thought registers the miscellaneous crowd in a syntactically awkward sentenc  whose subject 
Irene’s whimsical enumeration makes a long compound noun phrase. The heterogeneity f th  
attendees then invokes in Irene’s mouth a “nursery rhyme” that only signifies the categorical 
chaos of the sight. As Irene’s consciousness gradually loses its clarity, those adjectives related to 
racial identity (“white,” “black”) get more and more outnumbered by those that directly concern 
physically and visibly recognizable features (“fat,” “thin,” “tall,” “short,” “stout,” “slim,” and 
“small”). By deactivating the “white”/“black” racial difference (while sustaining the 
“men”/“women” gender difference throughout the paragraph), Larsen suggests that racial 
identities do not reside in physical bodies but rather in the observer’s interpretation. Furthermore, 
the “white”/“black” racial binary that categorizes Irene’s first description of men shifts to the 
binary-defying colors “pink” and “golden.” Indeed, in the context of early-twentieth-century 
passing fiction, the color “pink” often signals unknown or undecidable racial origin, such a  “t e 
pearl and pink whiteness of Amy’s skin” in Jessie Fauset’s “The Sleeper Wakes” (286). And, in 




to “pass”—or to a mixed-race skin like Felise’s “golden cheeks” (70). Utilizing Irene’s chaotic 
narrative space and semantically ambiguous language, Larsen insinuates that racial passing 
might be occurring anywhere in the scene, invisibly and indeterminately. 
Just as in the Drayton scene, however, Larsen has to suppress this chaotic narrative space 
in order to articulate her claim of indeterminate racial passing. Indeed, to develop Irene’s random 
perception of the miscellaneous crowd into a structured and explicit racial critique, featuring 
Wentworth’s acknowledgement that he “couldn’t pick some of ’em [passers] if my lie depended 
on it” (55), the novelist has paradoxically to reestablish a racial binary. In so doing, on the 
narrative level, Larsen has also to structure her writing around the order-imposing gaze of 
Wentworth, characterized by his “long, searching look that was really a stare” (55) reminiscent 
of the “white” Clare’s stare that introduces racial differences to the Drayton scene. Right after 
Irene registers the scene’s racial chaos with the “nursery rhyme,” Wentworth turns her attention 
to what he calls a “[n]ice study in contrasts” between white-looking Clare and “unusually dark” 
Ralph Hazelton (54-55). This leads Irene to rewrite her original description, which was all the 
more faithful to the racial chaos for its lack of ordered meaning, into an expression of binary 
antithesis: “Clare fair and golden, like a sunlit day. Ralph Hazleton dark, with gleaming eyes, 
like a moonlit night” (54). Wentworth’s impulse to identify and categorize Clare by “find[ing] 
out . . . the name, status, and race of the blonde beauty out of the fairy-tale” (54) goes so far a  t  
reintroduce the real-white/passing-white difference to the scene when he asks Irene about the 
possibility of Clare’s passing: “Or isn’t she [white]?” (55). While this development of 
conversation leads the characters to discuss the actual elusiveness of racial passing, the very 
reference reestablishes the real-white/passing-white differenc  in the reader’s interpretive 




and accordingly the narrative itself, never revisits the racially chaotic crowd. 
Just as the Drayton scene, in tandem with the restored racial order, Irene’s perspective 
regains narrative order as well. While all the other “she-remembered” segments are fragmentary 
with no more than three short paragraphs, only this one covers multiple pages, developing with a 
sound causal relationship once Wentworth’s “stare” guides Irene’s “gaze.” And, given that Irene’s 
inner experience constitutes the novel’s plot development, Larsen’s configuration of his chapter 
indicates the novelist’s own dependence on “white” subjectivity as she organizes the character’s 
perceptions into logical and meaningful narrative units. Here, too, on account of the ideological 
nature of language, Larsen’s project is inevitably paradoxical; to represent racial chaos in a 
structured narrative, she has to use a language that, as a vehicle of white-dominant ideology, 
necessarily suppresses such chaos. 
 
Given Larsen’s struggle with the order-imposing language in Passing, what does the 
novel’s ending, especially its two different versions, tell about her strategy to present race in its 
actual precariousness? After Clare falls to death from the Freelands’ sixth-floor apartment, Irene 
loses consciousness while answering “a strange man”’s question on the ground: 
Her quaking knees gave way under her. She moaned and sank down, moaned 
again. Through the great heaviness that submerged and drowned her she was 
dimly conscious of strong arms lifting her up. Then everything was dark. 
Centuries after, she heard the strange man saying: “Death by misadventure, 
I’m inclined to believe. Let’s go up and have another look at that window.” (82) 
While the first printings of the novel included both of these paragraphs in the ending, Knopf’s 




why (Madigan 522-23). Critics generally find a racio-narrative open-endedness in this 
multiplicity. For example, Kate Baldwin reads into it a case of “abjection”—i.e., dissolution of 
the subject/object dyad—where the breakdown of racial difference coincides with that of textual 
order: “In much the same way that Passing leaves us uncertain as to the real closure of the text, 
passing continues to spin us into the realm of the ‘imaginary,’ that is, outside the realm of the 
symbolic, to its underside where we find abjection” (467). Since Larsen’s narrative h s long 
established the real-white/passing-white difference in the reader’s interpretation, however, 
Baldwin sounds unconvincing when she argues that the two endings’ coexistence itself “spin[s] 
us into” a disorderly interpretive space in which to find the chaotic reality of racial passing. 
Rather, I propose that the specific way the final scene is multiple indicates Larsen’s continued 
effort to address chaotic indeterminacy not “outside the realm of the symbolic” but within the 
framework of racially and narratively order-imposing white ideology. 
Indeed, examined closely, the final section combines a racially clear-cut scene setting, 
which draws upon Clare’s stable “black passing for white” identity, with Irene’s unstable 
narrative space, where Clare’s white body bears heightened indeterminacy and invisibility. On 
one hand, the scene finalizes the real-white/passing-white difference with the revelation of 
Clare’s “passing-whiteness” to John, the last main character in the novel to discover it. 
Accordingly, this section treats the visually heterogeneous attendants of the Freelands’ party as a 
racially homogeneous crowd. Though John’s violent intrusion causes “confusion” in the scene,
Felise the hostess responds to the white man with the language of clear racial difference: 
“Careful. You’re the only white man here” (79). On the other hand, upset by Clare’s fall, Irene’s 
narrative perspective registers Clare’s body in terms not only of absence and invisibility (with 




“white”): “Gone! The soft white face, the bright hair, the disturbing scarlet mouth, the dreaming 
eyes, the caressing smile, the whole torturing loveliness that had been Clare Kend y” (80). 
Considering this duality of the final scene, I argue that Larsen’s inclusion of both 
paragraphs in the first printing indicates the writer’s self-censorship which accommodates white 
ideology despite her attempted emphasis on racio-narrative indeterminacy. Indeed, the first 
paragraph ends with Irene’s “dark”-ened perception where everything is ivisible and 
indeterminate. In the first printing, however, Larsen frames this chaotic ending with the second 
paragraph which features a “strange man” who, given his “official and authoritaive” manner 
(82), is likely to be a white police officer. And this man proposes to restore order by r examining 
the “window,” an act that has a significant racial implication because this “window” failed to 
check Clare’s move from the all-black party to “the whiteness of the [snow-clad] courtyard 
garden” (78). Furthermore, “inclined to believe” that Clare’s racially symbolical move is a 
“misadventure,” i.e., out of the normative course of events, this character even embodi s 
white-oriented discourse that takes fixed racial positions for granted. 
Larsen’s containment of the potentially disruptive concluding paragraph is attributable to 
the socio-historical context of her composition. As numerous historians have pointed out, the 
writers of Harlem Renaissance had to write in ways that accommodated the dominantly white 
audience, white publishers and white patrons who contributed to the popularity of the movement. 
Launching her literary career in the 1920s and supported by the major white patron Carl Van 
Vechten, Larsen herself was constrained by, and entrapped in, white-derived standards: as 
Thadious M. Davis argues, “Larsen and other racially defined writers” tended to consider that 
“[a]chievement consisted of both publication and reception by an audience, preferably a white 




Renaissance writers’ critique of the status quo. As Nathan Huggins points out, “[a]s long as the 
white norms remained unchallenged, no matter what the Negro’s reaction to them, he always 
needed to return to the white judge to measure his achievement. It would have required a much 
more profound rejection of white values than was likely in the 1920s for Negroes to have freed 
themselves for creating the desired self-generating and self-confident Negro art” (306-07). 
In this chapter, I have shown Larsen’s struggle to challenge white ideology by means of 
language that essentially impedes that challenge. Paradoxically, however, hil  the dissolution of 
real-white/passing-white difference would necessarily put the white audi nce’s very “whiteness” 
at risk, Larsen’s failure to present the dissolution in its entirety made the book acceptably 
disruptive according to the standards of white readership. Hence come the “largely favorable” 
and “insightful” reviews Passing received from the contemporary audience; some readers even 
appreciated the text’s defiance of white readers’ “ignorant” preconception of “racial difference”: 
“[Margaret Cheney] Dawson, too, praised the way Larsen avoided sensationalizing racial 
difference for the titillation of white readers, taking the manners of her chara ters for granted, 
with no concessions to white ignorance” (Hutchinson 328-29). Considering Larsen’s strategy and 
its effect in the first printing, I find it curious that Larsen chose to drop the final paragraph, or at 
least allowed the change to happen, to make Irene’s blackout end the third and some subsequent 
printings. Whatever Larsen’s intention, the fact remains that the indeterminate a d invisible 
ending made its way to the general readership from then on. And, while Van Vechten—himself 
an “official and authoritative” white champion of black arts—read and actively promoted 
Passing in its first publication, Larsen would naturally expect him not to read the third printing 





Toward a Language for the Real, Chaotic and Unnamable 
 
It was the summer of 2000. I was walking below the scorching sun of Charlottesville, 
Virginia, when a car pulled over to my side and an elderly woman called out from behind the 
wheel. 
“Excuse me, do you know how to get to the chapel?” 
It had been just a week since I arrived in the U.S. with no prior experience of living in a  
Anglophone country. Quite naturally, everything native speakers said was mystery to me. But, 
for some reason—probably her mild tone of voice—I understood that she was asking me for 
direction to the university chapel near the humanities library. I explained, stammering and 
stuttering. The woman, at once puzzled and willing to be nice, said in the same friendly tone, 
“Thank you. Where are you from?” 
“I’m from Japan.” 
She said thank you again and started the car. As she turned at the intersection and 
disappeared, I could not help having an awkward feeling—a feeling, I later found, of being 
caught in the act of “passing.” When she talked to me, she most likely assumed that I was an 
American of Asian extraction, until my broken English exposed me. Hence her question about 
my national/geographical origin. As long as one’s “passing for American” is working, such a 
question is irrelevant, especially in a conversation about direction. Only when he is recognized as 
a “foreigner” does the question become an option. And, as involuntary as it was on the elderly 
woman’s part, the question served her to map me in an appropriate position outside of American 




the boundary between American and non-American, it also restored the order of things in her 
thoughts. Now she was convinced why this person, who at first looked like an American, did not 
speak English the way Americans should. 
I found it also curious that I somehow tried, though unsuccessfully, to live up to her 
assumption of my “American” identity. I may simply have attempted an “amusing stunt” just as 
Larsen did at a Tennessee restaurant in 1932. Or I may have wanted to experience a cultural 
difference firsthand; in mostly mono-racial and mono-cultural Japan, no one will ask you for 
direction if you look racially different. But I still remember how, when I recognized the woman’s 
misunderstanding, I felt somewhat obliged to prevent it from surfacing and to fit myself into her 
sense of smooth turn of events. Weren’t there, I cannot help asking, power relations at wrk? Not 
only was the woman’s “majority” position unquestionable to me as a foreigner, but she, if 
unwittingly, also had the discursive upper hand in the conversation. Indeed, lacking in English 
skills, I did not have the language in which to contradict her. It is her discourse (asking me for 
direction) that let me “pass,” and it is her discourse (confirming my foreign ori in) that 
terminated the action. 
Two years later, again quite unexpectedly, I ended up “passing for American” for the 
second time, this time in Japan. It was the summer of 2002, when I was back home for a 
two-month vacation before moving to Lawrence, Kansas. An American friend Eric took me to a 
bar called Izakaya-Ja-Nai, a popular foreigners’ hangout in downtown Okazaki. (In a bizarre 
coincidence, Izakaya-Ja-Nai means, “It’s not a bar,” in Japanese. The bar itself was “passing”!) It 
was the night of the city’s firework festival, and I could feel the aftermath of the event’s 
excitement even from the outside. Before we entered the bar, Eric turned to me and said, 




The inside was a site of international diversity, except for the bartenders who were all 
Japanese. As Eric introduced me to his friends, I found they were from various places in the 
world—North and South Americas, Europe as well as South and Southeast Asia. Some of them 
followed the Japanese tradition and wore colorful yukata for the occasion, further complicating 
the sense of national differences. We took a counter table, just before a Japanese bartender in a 
light-blue yukata. She only knew minimal English. In his broken Japanese, Eric introduced me as 
a Hawaiian friend, probably thinking that the large Japanese-American population in the state 
would make the story more plausible. My English had an accent, and I did not know how to 
speak Hawaiian English. But it seemed that Eric’s company, as well as thefac  that I only spoke 
English, convinced her of my “Hawaiian” origin. She brought our beers and then turned to me, 
rotating a hand back and forth near her ear with the thumb and the small finger extended. 
“Do you do this?” She said in halting English. 
“Telephone?” I said. I felt Eric’s elbow nudging me under the counter. 
“No, to surf.” She said. I did not know this “Shaka sign” was associated with Hawaiian 
surfers. 
“He doesn’t know it,” Eric took over and explained in Japanese. “It’s a tourist thing. Real 
Hawaiians don’t do that.” 
“I see. I thought it was a real Hawaiian thing.” She said in Japanese, smiling to me. My 
“passing for American” was successful this time. 
Though Eric’s tactful intervention surely saved me from exposure, I cannot help thinking 
that this “passing” worked primarily because of the discursive power he and I had from the 
beginning—the power that I did not have in Charlottesville two years before. Then, the elderly 




fit me into her story. The non-English-speaking Japanese bartender, on the other hand, had 
inevitably to depend upon American Eric’s naming of me as well as my own English self-naming. 
Here, that American identity is at stake makes English the vehicle of “dominant discourse” 
despite the scene’s Japanese locale. Thus, though she did know the Shaka sign, a shibboleth for 
Hawaiian American identity, it was easy for Eric not only to overturn this actually valid criterion 
as wrong but also to dismiss it as non-Hawaiians’ typical misunderstanding. Furthermore, Eric 
managed to do so in his imperfect Japanese, an act that could have undermined his discursive 
authority and empowered her, a native speaker, to oppose his explanation. With the discursive 
power hierarchy established from the outset, however, his potentially risky adoption of the 
bartender’s language did not compromise his naming of me nor refutation of her. Rathe, it 
provided him with a shared, and thus more effective, communicative space for persuasion. 
 
When I began working on this dissertation, I found myself revisiting these mmories of 
my own “passing.” They informed me that, while passing may sound like the “passer”’s action, 
its mechanism, process and success depend rather upon the dominant discourse that surrounds 
the situation. And, given the general direction of passing from minority to majority f r he 
latter’s privilege, the logic that underlies the passer’s action is often not his/her own logic. My 
main argument, especially its focus on white subjectivity (which apparently has little to do with 
the person whose “true identity” is supposed to be black), originates from this observation. 
Though it may seem that racial passing occurs at the passer’s body, it is actually a discursive 
phenomenon on the part of the observer as an ideological subject. It is the epistemological 
paradigm of white ideology that turns the visually white body into a “black-passing-for-white” 




of a “passing-white” body exposes the lack of demonstrable difference between “real-whiteness” 
and “passing-whiteness.” When we conceive of racial passing as opposed to “real-whit ness” (as 
we usually do), we unwittingly buy into white ideology, placing ourselves in a white-subject 
position whether we are ourselves “white” or not. 
My individual chapters analyzed Faulkner’s, Johnson’s and Larsen’s novelistic treatments 
of racial passing and revealed the authors’ struggle with such ideological entrapment. I 
particularly foregrounded the linguistic dimension of their struggle; for, to write about racial 
passing, writers have necessarily to transform the endlessly indeterminat —thus narratively 
unmanageable—white body into an ideologically loaded “black-passing-for-white” body. I 
demonstrated that, in one way or another, the authors have to negotiate with the ideologically 
subversive but essentially indescribable phenomenon of racial passing, and with the medium of 
language which, always already ideologized, enables them to describe the ndescribable only 
through suppression of the subversiveness. I pointed out that, in a move that indicates their own 
awareness of this paradox, Faulkner, Johnson and Larsen all foreground the ideological 
entrapment of their character-narrators (Shreve and Quentin, the Ex-Colored Man, and Irene 
Redfield) to conceal, if not always successfully, their own inevitable appliction of the 
real-white/passing-white binary difference. 
One of the most disruptive dimensions of racial passing is that, given the essential lack of 
difference between a “real-white” body and a “passing-white” body, there is no such 
phenomenon as “racial passing” on the level of physical reality. Against this ac ual lack of the 
signified, white-supremacist ideology has repeatedly named “racial passing”—through 
discursively formulated policies such as the “one-drop rule”—to create and mai tain the illusion 




not depict material reality but operates as a “performative” language, which, according to J. L. 
Austin’s definition, “do[es] not ‘describe’ or ‘report’ or constate anything at all, [is] not ‘true or 
false’; and . . . [its utterance] is, or is a part of, the doing of an action, which again would not be 
normally described as saying something” (5). In other words, referring to a white body as 
“passing” is not a “description” nor a “report” but an “action” of making that body a “passing” 
body—just as Austin’s sample sentence: “I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth” (5). Here, too, 
racial passing is subversive only in a paradoxical fashion; addressing racial passing in language, 
even if intended to challenge the binary racial system, brings “passing-whiteness” into existence, 
thus ultimately serving that very racial system. 
In their inevitable emphasis upon racial passing for critical investigation, scholars of 
passing narratives also run the risk of serving the racial status quo. Indeed, to be a li erary-critical 
genre distinct from other race-related approaches, studies of passing fiction have necessarily to 
keep naming, and thus making and remaking, “passing-whiteness.” As I pointed out in my 
individual chapters, some scholars have uncritically followed the novels’ subscription to the 
real-white/passing-white difference, while others have themselves activated the binary paradigm 
to facilitate their interpretation. And, with all my attempts to point out and eventually overcome 
such a predicament, my writing itself, as just another discourse on racial passing, cannot be free 
from the same predicament. Throughout the composition, I found myself constantly checked by 
language from addressing the actual uncategorizability of a physical body. 
Let’s take an example from the fourth chapter on Larsen’s Passing. In the first draft, I 
concluded my thesis statement as follows: 
Whereas Larsen strives to expose the actual lack of difference between a 




character looks white, she is really black. 
At that point I casually thought that it would not give the false impression that I myself was 
assuming the presence of “real-whiteness,” “passing-whiteness” or “real-blackness,” because the 
sentence treats the “real-white”/“passing-white” difference as “actually lacking” and the 
character’s “real blackness” as “language’s suggestion.” Then, as I went through the draft for a 
revision, I realized that, on the level of discourse, the very use of the phrase “a real-whit  body” 
would bring such a body into existence, especially without clarification that Iquoted the phrase 
from somewhere else as a generally-held, questionable preconception. Indeed, as Jacque  Lacan 
pointedly argues, it is “a language’s [langue] world of meaning . . . in which the world of things 
will situate itself” (64) and, accordingly, language creates things in the world of discourse. As a 
result, the final draft saw quotation marks around “real-white” and “passing-white,” and 
italicized the phrase “really black.” 
It was, however, not the end of my struggle with linguistic entanglement. Language’s 
resistance to the real complexity of the material world further obstructed that chapter’s body 
argument. In its textual analysis, quotation marks should be used primarily for direct quotations 
from Larsen’s novel, which rendered me unable to put in quotation marks every argumentatively 
delicate phrase related to racial passing. Moreover, just like words themselv s, quotation marks 
as a sign function in binary opposition—i.e., indicating someone else’s word as opposed to mine.
And, again just like words in general, this binarization reduces the dichotomously cnceived 
other (“someone else’s word” in this case) into a homogeneous object. This further confounded 
my effort to distance my discourse from that of white-dominant ideology; here, quotation marks 
can indicate either a general preconception or Larsen’s critique of the preconception, both of 




Then, as long as we have to use language to address “racial passing,” are we—authors as 
well as critics—doomed to reproduce “passing-whiteness” and by implication “real-whiteness,” 
to suppress the subversive potential of the endlessly indeterminate white body, and ultimately to 
reconfirm white ideology? Friedrich Nietzsche may help us answer this question with his theory 
of how we mistake linguistic representation for truth:  
Are they [conventions of language] perhaps products of knowledge, that is, of 
the sense of truth? Are designations congruent with things? Is language the 
adequate expression of all realities? 
It is only by means of forgetfulness that man can ever reach the point of 
fancying himself to possess a “truth” of the grade just indicated. If he will not be 
satisfied with truth in the form of tautology, that is to say, if he will not be content 
with empty husks, then he will always exchange truths for illusions. (81) 
Nietzsche’s argument bears remarkable relevance to my discussion, with material “truth” 
corresponding to the indeterminate white body and “conventions of language” corresponding to 
the ideo-linguistically constructed “real-white”/“passing-white” difference. Indeed, we mistake 
the “conventions” for “truth” because we are reluctant to admit the “tautology”—i.e., that we call 
the body “passing-white” not because it is really “passing-white” but simply because we let 
ourselves call it “passing-white.” Readers of passing fiction believe the protagonist’s “actual 
blackness” to be “truth,” not a linguistically wrought “illusion” which even entraps the author. 
 It is worth noting that Nietzsche attributes our misunderstanding to “forget uln ss,” 
pointing out that “metaphorical,” “rhetorical” and thus fictive representations of reality, “after 
long usage, seem to a people to be fixed, canonical, and binding [as truth]” (84). If the long 




reality, then I believe that we have to keep “reminding” ourselves of the gap, as paradoxical as 
this attempt may be due to its inevitable dependence on language. Such a project would 
necessitate a language that “defamiliarizes” familiar concepts to address the chaotic reality 
behind the smooth and ordered surface that language presents to us. Furthermore, this 
“defamiliarizing” language would call for those readers who are ready to engage it in its 
inevitable awkwardness, complexity and unorthodoxy. By delving into conflicts and 
contradictions—intentional or unintentional on the part of the authors—in Faulkner’s, Johnson’s 
and Larsen’s writings, I tried to be such a reader, while striving to make my own critical 
language at once “defamiliarizing” and articulate. It almost felt as if I had to be my 2000 self, 
whose unfamiliarity with English paradoxically exempted me from the language’s deceptive 
influence, and my present, more discursively competent (but ideologically vulnerab e) self at the 
same time. I sincerely hope that, in one way or another, my dissertation has evaded the 
ideologically correct language and captured the complex, uncategorizable and irreducible reality 








1 In his study of blackness in Euro-American ideological contexts, Anthony Appiah 
argues that even genes are not a definitive indicator of racial difference; disproving the claim of 
nineteenth-century race sciences, “[w]hat modern genetics shows is that there is no such 
underlying racial essence” (39). Indeed, Appiah reports, “[a]part from the visible morphological 
characteristics of skin, hair, and bone, by which we are inclined to assign people to the broadest 
racial categories—black, white, yellow—there are few genetic characteristics to be found in the 
population of England that are not found in similar proportions in Zaire or in China, and few too 
(though more) that are found in Zaire but not in similar proportions in China or in England” (35). 
Racial passing puts to an extreme this lack of physical difference between races. While, as 
Appiah suggests, “the visible morphological characteristics of skin, hair, and bone” may give us 
a rationale for racial classification, a “passer”’s visual indeterminacy even nullifies such clues. 
2 Robyn Wiegman clarifies the interconnection between white ideology and the binarized 
racial categories of America in her observation that “the black/white axis works to secure the 
tenuousness of race to a framework of stable boundaries, which in turn provides the necessary 
grounding for the ideology of white supremacy” (9). As the American “one-drop rule” reads 
passing-whiteness automatically as blackness, the real-white/passing-white difference endorses, 
and also is endorsed by, white ideology just as “the black/white axis,” by helping order the 
boundless diversity of human beings into a hierarchy with whites on top. 
3 Elaine K. Ginsberg points out how passing compounds generally assumed notions of 




identity: “Whatever the rationale, both the process and the discourse of passing interro ate the 
ontology of identity categories and their construction. For the possibility of passing challenges a 
number of problematic and even antithetical assumptions about identities, the first of which is 
that some identity categories are inherent and unalterable essences: presumably one cannot pass 
for something one is not unless there is some other, pre-passing, identity that one is. Further, 
passing forces reconsideration of the cultural logic that the physical body is the site of identic 
intelligibility” (4). 
4 To challenge this invisible hegemony of whiteness, Rebecca Aanerud calls for critics’ 
foregrounding of the covert operation of whiteness in the works where all the characters are 
“unmarked”-ly white: “Reading whiteness into texts like The Awakening that are not overtly 
about race is an essential step toward disrupting whiteness as the unchallenged norm. Moreover, 
this critical reading practice will inevitably lead to a more complex and thoughtful understanding 
of whiteness and race in general. As readers of U.S. fiction and culture, we cannot avoid the 
politics of race that informs both the production and the reception of all texts. We must recognize 
that race is a vital and constant component of our literature even when all the characters are 
white” (43). My dissertation attempts to do this dismantling on the level of language and 
narrative, by exposing the “unmarked whiteness” of the logic—especially the assumption of the 
real-white/passing-white difference—that controls the work’s representatio  of racial passing and 
our interpretation of it. 
5 As suggested by this example, the act of defining “whiteness” already entails wielding 
the power of “white supremacy,” thus attesting to the mutual reinforcement Mason Stokes finds 
between the two terms: “In part, white supremacy makes whiteness possible because it allows 




often imagined as extreme, allows whiteness once again its status as the nonthreatening, as the 
good. White supremacy, then, becomes something of a scapegoat for whiteness, the convenient 
location of white violence and lawlessness, distracting our attention from the violence and 
lawlessness of whiteness itself” (13). 
6 Naomi Zack accurately points out that Harlem Renaissance writers contibuted 
paradoxically to the perpetuation of the “one-drop rule” and, by implication, of the idea of white 
racial purity: “it [one-drop rule] has survived slavery to this day, partly becaus it was taken up 
by black Americans themselves during the Harlem Renaissance of the 1920s and partly because 
it reinforces both black and white myths of white racial purity: to be white, an American need to 
have no known nonwhite ancestor, which is to say that to be white one must be purely white” 
(xvii). 
7 Valerie Smith’s study of passing fiction points out how, despite its subversive potential, 
racial passing often undergoes discursive containment in the system of binary raci l difference as 
well as in the stereotypical images of “passing as betrayal, blackness as self-denial, whiteness as 
comfort.” Thus, she continues, classic passing narratives “become sites wher antiracist and 
white supremacist ideologies converge, encouraging their black readers to stay in their places” 
(43-44). 
8 As Carol Roh Spaulding points out (and my reading of individual passing novels will 
demonstrate), the stability/instability duality of racial passing manifests itself also in the 
mixed-race protagonist’s conflict over his or her racial position. Spaulding argues that 
mixed-race characters, “serv[ing] a kind of barometric function [and] revealing the racial 
tensions embedded in the text,” eventually reach “a crisis point in the narrative when they are 




9 These endings’ resistance to finalizing a white body’s “black” identity is particularly 
noteworthy when contrasted with other passing novels from the early-twentieth-century America. 
As Sterling Brown points out in his 1937 study, most passing novels of the era follow the 
prototypical conclusion of the passer’s racial homecoming: “Negro novelists urge his 
unhappiness, until he is summoned back to his people by the spirituals, or their full-throated 
laughter, or their simple sweet ways” (144). For example, the ending of Walter hite’s Flight 
(1926), while registering the passer’s “white” body (“brilliant gold of her air”), “frees” the 
passing protagonist Mimi Daquin, a successful dress designer in white society, only by bringing 
her back to black identity: “‘Free! Free! Free!’ she whispered exultantly as with firm tread she 
went down the steps. ‘Petit Jean [an extramarital son between Mimi and a black man]—my own 
people—and happiness!’ was the song in her heart as she happily strode through the dawn, the 
rays of the morning sun dancing lightly upon the more brilliant gold of her hair . . .” (300). 
George S. Schuyler’s Black No More (1931), too, follows the convention by creating a 
denouement with passers’ embracement of black identity—despite the work’s anomaly that its 
passing characters are either “blacks” who have gained a white look through a medic l operation 
or “whites” whose part-black ancestry is not revealed until late in the story. To facilitate his 
application of racial binary, Schuyler even darkens the characters’ bodies at th  novel’s 
conclusion. Here, framed in “a photograph of a happy crowd of Americans arrayed in the latest 
abbreviated bathing suits on the sands at Cannes,” the passing characters “were quite as dusky as 
little Matthew Crookman Fisher [the protagonist’s mixed-race, dark-skinned son] who played in 
a sandpile at their feet” (179-80). 
10 Nathan Huggins points out how the dominance of white-oriented value system, as well 




Renaissance’s project of promoting blacks’ self-expression and self-determination: “As long as 
the white norms remained unchallenged, no matter what the Negro’s reaction to them, he always 
needed to return to the white judge to measure his achievement. It would have required a much 
more profound rejection of white values than was likely in the 1920s for Negroes to have freed 
themselves for creating the desired self-generating and self-confident Negro art” (306-07). 
 
Chapter 1 
1 One of a few exceptions to such a tendency, Barbara Ladd’s study delves into the 
subjectivity that interracializes Bon and elucidates why, “[a]lthough both [Quentin and his 
father] imagine Bon as a creole possessed of the expected creole decadence an  capable of 
corrupting the innocence of Sutpens, it is only in Quentin’s narrative that Bon is cstructed as 
black” (540). Ladd asserts that both Mr. Compson and Quentin, as historically conditioned 
subjects, invest in their narrative reconstruction their own anxiety over America’s constantly 
embattled providential design. Thus, Ladd argues, their fashioning of Bon varies due to the 
different historical forces that frustrated the American mission—i.e., Old World colonialism for 
Mr. Compson as the first postbellum generation, and racial “amalgamation” for hisson. And, 
alienated from the lost cause, the narrators find their own identities in the respective Bons they 
construct: “it is really not very far, in terms of metaphorical development, from Jason’s creation 
of Bon (and by extension of himself) as cynical or fatalistic European charged with the seduction 
of the South through the unveiling of the white negro—the beautiful octoroon woman or 
‘apotheosis of chattelry’ (Absalom 89)—to Quentin’s creation of Bon (and by extension himself) 
as the white negro, a man who has inherited both the violence and the illegitimacy, and whose 




southerner’s sense of his own construction by postbellum history” (Ladd 542). 
2 Despite his acknowledgment that “we never learn whether in fact Bon has black blood” 
(117), James Snead’s analysis of race and narrative in Absalom, Absalom! also fails to attend to 
Bon’s white-looking body in its endless indeterminacy. Noting that Shreve manages to expose 
“figures of merging” (e.g., Bon as an interracial Sutpen) of which the preceding Southern 
narrators dared not conceive, Snead argues that Shreve’s narrative operation still has a l mitation: 
Shreve finds the black in the most intimate circles of Southern and Northern 
white society . . . but his “admission” seems a non sequitur. Even were the 
black to be restored, the “carrier” would resist total signification here, as in 
Light in August. To Rosa, Clytie has an “inscrutable coffee-colored face” 
(Absalom 110); Sutpen cannot “read” the truth about his first wife from her 
“parchment-colored” face (Absalom 268); the parchment is written in an ink 
that was black until society made black invisible. Bon, the most “invisible” 
black, becomes real only by crossing the black shadow of the fence posts. 
“Crossing the fence” in every sense means the death of the black. Dead, he 
vanishes: “I never saw him. I never even saw him dead” (Absalom 121). The 
final message to be suppressed by the chain of carriers is that the tale, like the
“natural formation” of color designation, contains hiatus-like joints, each of 
which may sooner or later develop sprains, challenging its latent inaccuracies, 
particularly concerning its black figures. (131-32) 
Here, Snead ascribes the white narrators’ failure in “total signification,” exemplified by the lack 
of definitive blackness, to their willful concealment of the “sprains” symptomatizing the “latent 




discussion upon Bon’s blackness as “accurate” information and accordingly upon the very whit  
subjectivity that it has to critique. Given the significant role that racial passing plays in the 
novel’s thematic and structural complexity, I would argue, Faulkner seems to intend the 
not-black-enough bodies to indicate a deeper “sprain”—namely the fact that the narrators’ 
“restoring” move itself draws arbitrarily upon reading characters with inadequate bodily 
evidence as “interracial” or “black.” 
3 We can locate the implicit working of white subjectivity also in commentators’ New 
Critical impulse toward artistic unity, whose irrelevance to Absalom, Absalom! not only affected 
the book’s early reception but also formed a detrimental “trend in its future development” 
(Engler 221). Terry Eagleton points out that, while celebrating democracy of interpretations, 
New Criticism’s synthetic approach to texts paradoxically served the ideological status quo 
which, in an American racial context, took whites’ discursive legitimacy for granted: “Pluralism 
was all very well, provided that it did not violate hierarchical order; the varied contingencies of 
the poem’s texture could be pleasurably savoured, so long as its ruling structure remained intact. 
Oppositions were to be tolerated, as long as they could finally be fused into harmony. The limits 
of New Criticism were essentially the limits of liberal democracy: the poem, John Crowe 
Ransom wrote, was ‘like a democratic state, so to speak, which realizes the ends of a state 
without sacrificing the personal character of its citizens.’ It would be interesting to know what 
the Southern slaves would have made of this assertion” (43-44). 
4 With such a binarizing function built into the very medium of representation, even those 
works that feature passing characters to question racial hierarchy have drawn upon the same 
hierarchy unwittingly. Gayle Wald’s study of twentieth-century American “passing narratives” 




and black. She points out that, as a discursive act of stepping from one to the other binary 
division, racial passing predicates itself upon “a negotiation of categories that are authorized by 
racial ideology”: “whereas passing is conditioned on the radical instability of the racial sign, the 
fluidity of race that it appropriates is a function of its (socially produced) stability in marking out 
the binary possibilities of the national narrative. As my readings of various passing narratives 
have demonstrated, representation is the means by which race establishes social power—hence 
the metaphor of a dividing ‘line’ between black and white identities; yet it is hrough 
representation that we are able to envision challenges to the color line’s authority” (187). As I 
will argue in this chapter, Absalom, Absalom! indicates Faulkner’s struggle with this entrapment 
by making infinitely unclear the very existence of passing. 
5 Henry Louis Gates, Jr. regards race as “the ultimate trope of difference” (5) which does 
not signify substantial reality but only introduces a fictive order to the infinite diversity of human 
beings. He claims that such an arbitrary language of race reaffirms itself as authoritative 
classification through representational “popular usages” which repeatedly “inscribe” in one’s 
thinking the figuratively “described” racial differences: “The sense of difference defined in 
popular usages of the term ‘race’ has both described and inscribed differences of language, belief 
system, artistic tradition, and gene pool, as well as all sorts of supposedly natural attributes” (5). 
Mr. Compson’s use of “the octoroon” shows that Gates’s theory applies also to mixed-race as a 
racial category. Supposedly describing a physical feature of the woman, the term of address at 
the same time inscribes and thus imposes a stable interracial identity on her confusing 
“magnolia-colored” body. 
6 Accordingly, the narrators’ storytelling skips the question whether she is really 




an “interracial object,” she undergoes a fully subjective portrayal influenced by common 
stereotypes about mixed-race females. Looking for the cause of Henry’s murder of Bon, Mr. 
Compson conceives of her as “a woman with a face like a tragic magnolia, the eternal female, 
the eternal Who-suffers” (91) saved from slavery but sexually exploited by Bon. When Mr. 
Compson highlights her sexuality by referring to her as “a woman created of by and for darkness 
whom the artist Beardsley might have dressed, in a soft flowing gown designed not to infer 
bereavement or widowhood but to dress some interlude of slumbrous and fatal insatiation, of 
passionate and inexorable hunger of the flesh” (157), his description fits into the mold of the 
“tragic octoroon”: “an Anglo-American stereotype before the Civil War, [who] was usually a 
beautiful girl with only the slightest trace of Negro blood and no dialect; a conventional victim, 
threatened by the slave owner’s lust. . . . The beauty and innocence of the fated mixed-race 
heroine are, of course, a male fantasy, inevitably seeking to invest the object of d sire with an 
exciting element of forbidden fruit. Behind the innocence (her whiteness) lies the temptation of 
the sexually exotic (her blackness)” (Malchow 174). In Mr. Compson’s imagination which 
assumes Bon’s whiteness, “the octoroon,” a woman “created of” dark skin “by” the dark deeds of 
white men, is fatally “created for” the same deeds by whites like Bon. Here, somewhat betraying 
his own “male fantasy,” the narrator renders her potentially misleading “ma nolia”-color as 
“darkness,” thus foregrounding her “sexually exotic” African part (“passionate and inexorable 
hunger of the flesh”) rather than her desexualized paleness appropriate for “b reavement or 
widowhood.” And, as a reference point for later narrators, this cliché-ridden depiction by Mr. 
Compson in turn controls Quentin and Shreve’s reconstruction; tossed about by whites’ 
affairs—of Bon, his mother (both considered as white at this point) and their scheming 




loss of her guardian lover (249) and then over the poverty it causes (271). 
7 Just as with his “octoroon” mother, Charles Etienne as Mr. Compson’s mixed-race 
narrative object undergoes a stereotyping peculiar to the nineteenth-century Aglo-American 
discourse on “half-breeds.” Describing him as “the boy with his light bones and womanish hands 
struggling with what anonymous avatar of intractable Mule, whatever tragic and barren clown 
was his bound fellow and complement beneath his first father’s curse” (162), Mr. Compson 
juxtaposes Charles Etienne with the “Mule” which bears a symbolical assocition with racial 
hybridity: “The most common analogy [concerning racial hybrids] drawn from agricultural 
breeding practice was that of the mule (mulatto itself may be derived from the Spanish word for 
mule), a useful but ill-tempered and, of course, infertile, beast, fit for its task but awkward to 
handle” (Malchow 179). Somewhat informed of Charles Etienne’s adulthood, e.g., his emotional 
instability as well as begetting of a mentally challenged son, Mr. Compson tries to authenticate 
his version by presenting these stereotypes as the character’s deep-rooted attribute (“his bound 
fellow and complement”) that determines his future life. Also, Mr. Compson’s depiction of 
Charles Etienne’s “light bones and womanish hands” bases itself upon the contemporary 
stereotype of mixed-race emasculation: “The half-breed man . . . was often repr sented as 
somehow feminine in his emotional/biological instability” (Malchow 183). 
8 Malchow’s analysis of Victorian cultural imagination finds the same Gothicizing 
mechanism in the making of vampire and that of “half-breed”: “there is also lurking in the 
vampire the powerful suggestion of an explicitly racial obsession—that of the ‘half-breed.’ Both 
vampire and half-breed are creatures who transgress boundaries and are caught between two 
worlds. Both are hidden threats—disguised presences bringing pollution of the blood. Both may 




which the wary may read” (168). In the quoted scene, Faulkner has Clytie transcend su h a 
Gothic horror in the boys’ mind, thus suggesting how the white-dominant discourse on racial 
mixture fails to comprehend the issue in its bodily dimension. 
9 J. G. Brister points convincingly to the pre-linguistic, pre-subjective, “semiotic” quality 
of Rosa’s narrative in the chapter: “Rosa is presented as a subject ‘in process’ and ‘on trial,’ as 
her long middle chapter of italicized monologue attests. . . . Rosa’s italicized monologues are 
also an incursion of the semiotic on the narrative level” (46). Here, yet to gain stable ubjectivity 
with which to signify the world and put it in order, Rosa has little linguistic control over the 
chaotic reality she experiences. 
10 Tzvetan Todorov points to the “scientific mode of thinking” at work in racial 
categorization which puts to reasonable order the chaotic diversity of humanity: “o  he one hand 
human beings differ in physical appearance, and on the other they differ in social behavior. 
Racism begins when one proceeds to reason that the two series cannot possibly be independent 
of one another; the first must vary as the second, or vice versa. Now, this is a typically scientific 
mode of reasoning, since science consists in the effort to replace chaos with order” (372). 
11 Betina Entzminger’s study of whiteness and homosexuality in Absalom, Absalom! 
perceptively locates a continuity between the dissolution of difference in narrative and that in 
cultural identity such as race: “Absalom, Absalom! emphasizes the lack of definitive borders 
between black and white (Charles passes for white and the reader and characters ‘dis over’ that 
he has black blood only near the end of the novel), between the past and present (the narrativ  
shifts in time without demarcation or warning), between individuals (the narrative also shifts 
without demarcation or warning from one narrative voice to another), and even between thoughts 




techniques, the narrative’s blurring and crossing of boundaries unsettles the cultur ’s insistence 
on seeing other types of difference, such as those related to race, gender, and sexuality, in black 
and white” (91). 
12 In her study of postmodern historiographical metafiction, of which critics have rightly 
called Absalom, Absalom! a modern precursor, Linda Hutcheon aptly argues that the genre’s 
problematization of history construction amounts to that of narrative itself, especially its 
“imposition of meaning and formal coherence on the chaos of events”: “many theorists t day 
have pointed to narrative as the one concern that envelops all of these [subjectivity, 
intertextuality, reference, ideology], for the process of narrativization has come to be seen as a 
central form of human comprehension, of imposition of meaning and formal coherence on the 
chaos of events” (121). 
13 Anticipating the Derridian “signifying chain,” Faulkner also ascribes language’s 
incapability of mirroring reality to its self-contained circularity. According to Derrida, in an 
endless series of differentiative deferments, a signifier refers not to a real presence but only to 
another signifier: “One could call play the absence of the transcendental signified as 
limitlessness of play” (50). The “shadows” Quentin and Shreve retrieve in their narrative 
re-creation turn out to be not of physical bodies (“flesh and blood which had lived and died”) but 
of yet another set of narratively evoked images (“what were . . . shades”): “the two of them 
creating between them, out of the rag-tag and bob-ends of old tales and talking, people who 
perhaps had never existed at all anywhere, who, shadows, were shadows not of flesh and blood 
which had lived and died but shadows in turn of what were (to one of them at least, to Shreve) 
shades too” (Absalom 243). 




case of “success of imagination,” “tended to accept the Quentin/Shreve version on the sheer 
strength of its imaginative force and evocativeness” (Engler 234-35). Engler rightly points out 
the school’s theoretical problem in privileging particular narrators’ imag nation over others’: “If 
they assert the hypothesis that ‘history is not “out there,” but is a function of the consciousness of 
the historian’ (See Henderson 247), they should also concede that all reconstruction is but 
subjective conjecture, exhibiting only the prejudices of its author” (238). As my reading goes, 
Faulkner’s technique not only depicts Quentin and Shreve’s exertion of imagination but more 
specifically follows the process in which they overcome narrative distance to reach real-life 
occurrences. Indeed, Faulkner makes a careful distinction between imaginative re-creation and 
direct sighting when Mr. Compson portrays Sutpen’s troops in such a way that “it seemed to 
Quentin that he could actually see them” (154). Tellingly, Quentin soon realizes that the 
imagined picture has already reduced the complex original accessible only to those present at the 
scene: “he could see it; he might even have been there. Then he thought N . If I had been there I 
could not have seen it this plain” (155). 
15 This strategy foregrounds Faulkner’s own subjectivity comparable to his 
character-narrators’ desire to control their narrative object. Indeed, as Philip Weinstein 
perceptively points out, one can detect such a parallel in Faulkner’s “own subjective lineaments 
writ large in the lives and landscapes of his shaping,” since his “masculine urge toward 
self-ratification appears everywhere in the novels themselves, aggressively in the dynastic 
ambitions of a Sartoris or McCaslin or Flem Snopes, but just as often defensively a the need for 
sanctuary . . . or as the intensifying narrative desire for completion” (1). For Weinstein, with all 
its potentially “subject-altering” critique of the ideologically endorsed objectification of 




serves to structure “Faulkner” as an authoritative representer/representative of Southern 
ideologized discourse: “Absalom’s ‘illimitable courage for rhetoric’ (Selected Letters 188) 
registers less the subject-altering encounter with the voice and body of the Other than the 
subject-constituting drama of ‘Faulkner’ (through his various but kindred-voiced narrators) 
quarreling with—but more deeply insisting upon—the terrible beauty of his trope-saturated 
inheritance” (142). 
16 Faulkner’s use of the symbolically charged “parchment color,” echoing Joe Christmas 
in Light in August, indicates his observation of race, especially racial mixture, as cultural 
inscription rather than bodily feature. As Doreen Fowler points out, “Faulkner’s choice of 
parchment-color skin denotes that otherness is not determined by skin color (or any other 
physical trait) but by what other people project onto physical characteristics. Parchment is a 
sheet of writing material prepared from the skin of a sheep or a goat, and Joe’s 
parchment-colored skin symbolizes that Joe is a blank slate on which others write, that his
identity as racial other is culturally inscribed” (171). Indeed, Quentin and Shreve’s reading of 
“parchment color” into the “white”-looking body of Bon’s mother, opening up the possibility of 
passing, lays the ground for their later inscription of “interracial otherness” and construction of a 
culturally and ideologically acceptable discourse. 
17 Not only the “four of them” state but also its further fusion into “the two,” which 
would allow Quentin and Shreve to experience scenes of the mid-nineteenth-century Sou h from 
Henry’s and Bon’s perspectives, shows the narrators’ paradoxical reliance upon distinct 
subjectivity. Compounded into “just two—Charles-Shreve and Quentin-Henry” (267), they 
restore Henry’s thoughts as regards repudiating his birthright (which were inaccessible to the 




So that now it was not two but four of them riding the two horses through the 
dark over the frozen December ruts of that Christmas eve: four of them and 
then just two—Charles-Shreve and Quentin-Henry, the two of them both 
believing that Henry was thinking He (meaning his father) has destroyed us 
all, not for one moment thinking He (meaning Bon) must have known or at 
least suspected this all the time; that’s why he has acted as he has, why he did 
not answer my letters last summer nor write to Judith, why he has never 
asked her to marry him; believing that that must have occurred to Henry. 
(267) 
Here, though the Charles-Shreve, Quentin-Henry fusion gives a direct access to Henry’s mental 
process on the Christmas eve of 1860, Faulkner describes their epistemological move as
“believing”—an act that entails subjective agency. Indeed, at the very moment of retrieval, the 
passage has already edited what Henry actually said to himself (“He has destroyed us all”) to fit 
into the story Quentin and Shreve prepare. In order that the interior remark will not belie their 
version of Henry, Quentin and Shreve clarify the originally ambiguous “he” referenc  with a 
parenthetical annotation that assigns “his father,” and exclude the likely possibility of “Bon.” 
The statement that “He must have known or at least suspected this all the time” existed nowhere 
in Henry’s mind because it is what Henry was “not for one moment thinking.” Juxtaposed and 
thus contrasted with this forged content, what Henry actually thought comes to bear
connotations—such as his naïve trust in Bon—that are compatible with Quentin and Shreve’s 
ongoing reconstruction. 
18 Absalom, Absalom!’s revision process also attests Shreve’s virtual control of the 




compounded viewpoint without changing its content much: “In this chapter Faulkner made a 
final change in the viewpoint of narration. In the manuscript the account of the Confederate 
retreat was part of Shreve’s narration. . . . In the book this passage—an italicized interruption of 
Shreve’s recital—is presented as a shared visualization of the action instead of an oral account of 
it” (Langford 39). 
19 Once it interracializes Bon, Shreve’s imagination significantly limits the character’s 
subjectivity, which had earlier operated in the form of interior monologue, to that of “seeing”: 
“Bon pauses and looks at Henry; now he can see Henry’s face” (284). What little 
epistemological agency Bon keeps, however, suffers a further discursive containment, since 
Shreve’s representation makes Bon see “th whites of Henry’s eyes” (285), thus symbolically 
foregrounding the “whiteness” of Henry’s gaze that now differentiates Bon as racial other. 
20 Faulkner suggests the permanent indeterminacy of the book also through Quentin’s 
1909 interview with Henry in the final chapter. The conversation, far from clarifying Henry’s 
motive for murdering Bon, turns out a circular, near-palindromic exchange of sentenc s which, 
symbolizing the impossibility of a straightforward causal chain, goes no deeper than Henry’s will 
“ to die” (298) keeping his inner truth never verbalized. 
 
Chapter 2 
1 In her psychoanalytic study of Faulkner’s novels, Doreen Fowler makes a careful 
distinction between Lacan’s use of “Other” and “other.” According to Fowler’s explication, a 
baby identifies itself with the mother whom it later begins to recognize as “other” (though still 
identical with it) as it develops a sense of subjectivity in the “mirror stage.” Then it “castrates” 




meanings by (fictively) ordering the chaotic world through performative signification: “Lacan 
pointedly distinguishes between the Other (Autre) with a capital O and the other with a small o.
The other that is designated with the lowercase o originates with the mother, the first figure in 
whom the subject identifies itself, as well as the first from which it splis off. The use of the same 
word, changed only by the use of the upper- and lowercase first letter, calls attention o the 
metonymic substitution that takes place in the oedipal moment. As the mother is excluded, (made 
other), an Other, the father as imagined originator of being, is substituted for her and becomes 
the object of desire” (9). 
Fowler’s reading of the distinction further demonstrates the continuity between Lacan’s 
theory and Faulkner’s representation of Southern race relations. Lacan’s use of the lowercase 
“other” in the quoted passage indicates the paradoxical sameness/difference betwe n the 
speaking subject and the addressee, as well as the linguistic imposition of difference as a 
symbolic “castration” forced by the ordering law of the “Other.” Echoing this, Faulkner 
describes Chick and Aleck Sander as inseparable childhood companions who “spent a good part 
of [their] life [together] . . . when they were little” (12). Faulkner goes so far as to suggest their 
sharing of perceptive subjectivity: at the cabin of Aleck’s mother they eat “the food tasting the 
same to each” (12). Tellingly, Sheriff Hampton, an embodiment of the “symbolic order,” cannot 
but hierarchize the pair and see the “black” Aleck as the “white” Chick’s “secretary” (155). 
2 Suggesting the connection between whites’ creation of their racial identity in social 
practice and that in literary imagination, Toni Morrison’s wording echoes Faulkner’s when her 
Playing in the Dark points out that, despite its tacit self-recognition as a sufficient entity in and 
of itself, the white American literature has always relied for an exist ntial foothold on blackness: 




3 Robyn Wiegman’s study of race in America documents its categorical sh ft from 
“natural history” to “human sciences” during the early-nineteenth century. While the former, 
based upon empirical observations, comprehended race “as a product of climate and civilization, 
as a variation within the human species” (30), the latter’s essentialist approach “produced not 
simply the constancy of race as an unchanging, biological feature, but an inherent and 
incontrovertible difference of which skin was only the most visible indication” (31) and thus 
provided the white-supremacist ideology with a theoretical ground. Wiegman’s analy is offers a 
historical testimony to Faulkner’s representation of Southern race relations s she argues, 
drawing on Michel Foucault’s theory of panoptic discipline, that whites’ “community gazes” 
work to police the problematics of such “visible indication” through at once “reading,” 
“rendering,” and “producing” the dichotomized racial difference: “The binary cleavage of race to 
which this panoptic system applies radiated its significatory value through the ever-pr sent 
production of community gazes, inscriptions that read and rendered the truth of the body and, in 
doing so, produced the experiential truth of the subject as well. This experience has and 
continues to situate every subject in U.S. culture within the panoptic vision of racial meanings, 
regardless of the extent to which whiteness prefigures its own seeming invisibility” (40). 
4 Regarding women’s potential for escaping the language of the symbolic order, Julia 
Kristeva proposes “semiotic” language, which, derived from the pre-Oedipal mother-child unity 
and characterized as orderless, subversive, and heterogeneous, can embrace the world in its 
chaotic state and thus complicate the speaker’s subjectivity: “thus poeticlanguage making free 
with the language code; music, dancing, painting, reordering the psychic drives which have not 
been harnessed by the dominant symbolization systems . . . all seek out and make use of this 




(speaking) subjects” (30). Curiously, Miss Habersham’s language achieves s milar effects with 
all its “non-semiotic” plainness and clarity. For, while the semiotic regist ring of the world 
defies reductive ordering, the old woman’s language—just like Chick’s that calls for “just 
suppos[ing]” unreduced possibilities (79)—signifies the “unsignifiability” of such an ordering 
language; Miss Habersham’s “repeated” and “paraphrased” statement, as well as Chick’s original, 
expresses the need to “dig up” and “bring to town” Vinson Gowrie’s body—the origin of the, in 
fact, empty “murderous nigger” signification—which, tellingly, turns out to be someone else’s 
(102) and then absent (162). 
5 Karl F. Zender’s analysis of Lucas in “The Fire and the Hearth” provides a critical 
response to “postmodernist critics” (he quotes Clark as an example) who, focusing heavily on 
ideological containment, disapprove of “the limit [Lucas’s characterization] suggests on 
Faulkner’s ability to envision alternative forms of black male identity” (86). Applying Homi K. 
Bhabha’s theory of “hybridizing” cooption of colonial representation, Zender reads an 
empowerment into Lucas’s self-admitted dependence on Old Carothers’s voice. Zend r argues 
that, to claim “black self-affirmation and . . . the integrity of the black family,” Lucas 
appropriates the white patriarch’s discourse through “invert[ing] the relation of dominance and 
subordination” between “Old Carothers’s dominant sense of racial superiority” and “his 
subordinate sense of family feeling for the black descendants ensuring from those relations” (95). 
As my argument goes, Faulkner’s development of Lucas’s taciturn character in Intruder in the 
Dust enables the old man to unsettle, rather than exploit, “the relation of dominance and 
subordination”; in so doing, the novelist questions the very master-slave dialectic built n the 
ideologized language of the South. 




imaginatively making it respond to their self-subjectifying language. Sh  points out that white 
writers have constructed a coherent white American identity (which, given the ac ual “internal 
conflicts,” is highly problematical) through investing discursively in the silnced Africanist 
presence and making the silence speak for them in their literary creation: “ rtists—and the 
society that bred them—transferred internal conflicts to a ‘blank darkness,’ to conveniently 
bound and violently silenced black bodies” (38). 
7 Faulkner seems to find in the dissolution of hierarchical tension a clue toward liberation 
from Southern racial ideology. Long bothered by his childhood failure to pay Lucas bak for a 
rescue and a meal—a failure which in his mind has reflected upon “his masculinity and his white 
blood” (26)—Chick finally “frees” himself from the highly racialized sense of dishonor when his 
interior dialogue with the old man abolishes the differences between the addressing subject and 
the addressed object, between the superior and the inferior, and between the dominant and the 
dominated: 
and he saying to Lucas: I was the boy who when you gave me half of your dinner 
tried to pay you with some things which people in those days called seventy cents’ 
worth of money and so all I could think of to save my face was to fling it on the 
floor? Dont you remember? and Lucas: Was that me? or vice versa, turned around 
and it was Lucas saying I was the man when you throwed your money on the floor 
and wouldn’t pick it up I had to have two niggers pick it up and hand it back to 
you? Dont you remember? and he this time: Was that me? Because it was over 
now. He had turned the other cheek and it had been accepted. He was free. 
(26-27) 




invalidates the underlying hierarchy itself, since in either case the addrssee—not answering the 
addresser’s question but rather asking back, “Was that me?”—neither “assumes” nor “refuses” 
the addresser’s self-defining “evocation” of a racialized hierarchical rel tionship. With the 
original master-slave dialectic nullified this way, “the other cheek” Chick turns to express his 
surrender gets an “acceptance,” not a subjugating slap, from the imaginary Luc s. 
8 Erik Dussere is one of a few critics who point to the problematics of the scene. While 
acknowledging that “Lucas’s preoccupation with business debt and repayment” defines him as 
an economic agent equal to the white Gavin and liberates the black man from the paternalistic 
race relations based on “debt of honor” (53), Dussere also stresses Lucas’s simultaneous 
containment in the Southern social system: “Because Lucas’s insistence upon repayment is 
presented within the context of his Southern gentlemanliness, because his authority to ins st is 
derived from his aristocratic lineage, he is able to make such a demand without actually 
challenging the structure of honor” (54). 
 
Chapter 3 
1 I find Kawash’s apparently race-free term “cultural logic” at once argu ble and 
appropriate, because this actually white-oriented paradigm does present itself as racially neutral 
so as to incorporate even those whom it oppresses. Whiteness studies investigate how 
white-dominant ideology has presented itself as a race-less, unmarked norm. For example, while 
cautioning us to note “its constructedness, specificity, and localness” (16), Ruth Frankenberg 
characterizes the general working of whiteness as “mak[ing] itself invisible precisely by 
asserting its normalcy, its transparency, in contrast with the marking of others on which its 




2 Gayle Wald’s study of twentieth-century American passing narratives illustrates how, by 
reading a white-looking body as “actually part-black,” they as a genre draw unwittingly upon the 
same dominant ideology of racial difference that they critique. She points out that, as a discursive 
act of stepping from one to the other binary division, racial passing as portrayed in those works 
predicates itself upon “a negotiation of categories that are authorized by racial ideology”: 
“[W]hereas passing is conditioned on the radical instability of the racial sign, the fluidity of race 
that it appropriates is a function of its (socially produced) stability in marking out the binary 
possibilities of the national narrative. . . . [R]epresentation is the means by which race establishes 
social power . . . yet it is through representation that we are able to envision challeges to the 
color line’s authority” (187). 
3 For example, Neil Brooks’ study of U.S. passing novels correctly points out that 
“Johnson’s narrator relies on America’s ‘certainties’ about race to destabilize those very 
categories” (180) but does not delve into Johnson’s own “reliance” in creating such a narrator. 
One of the few exceptions to this critical tendency, Jennifer Schulz’s analysis of The 
Autobiography and Along This Way reveals how Johnson constructs his autobiographical self out 
of the Ex-Colored Man by “re-see[ing], although not . . . remov[ing] or discount[ing], the 
limitations and fictions embedded in the American social contract [of race] during the early 
twentieth century, which condition the ex-colored man’s experience” (34). 
4 I hold that, since a text reflects—if in subtle, complex and even contradictory ways—its 
context and vice versa, close analysis of Johnson’s discourse will help us better understand the 
author who wrote with a particular set of motives as well as the socio-cultural context that 
affected the way he thought and wrote. As I argue below, New Criticism has also affected the 




of meaning.” See Note 6 for more discussion. 
5 Du Bois’ term points to how a history of psychological oppression has forced blacks to 
internalize white subjectivity—as well as the black objectivity it automatically assigns to 
them—in their self-image and self-expression. On Johnson’s use of the concept, Robert Stepto’s
much quoted study observes that “the Ex-Coloured Man radically reduces this [duality] to a 
nearly grotesque oneness: ‘the view-point of a coloured man’” (Stepto 113). I would argue that 
the white-dominant, mainstream American perspective still polices the Ex-Colored Man’s 
thinking even as he makes such a “radical reduction.” Johnson later elaborates “the viewpoint of 
a colored man” (14) as “look[ing] at everything through the prism of his relationship to society 
as a colored man” (55) where, of course, “society” means that which operates under white 
hegemony. Also, as my thesis goes, the Ex-Colored Man’s self-definition as “a colored man,” as 
well as the reductive thinking it enables, derives from the white subjectivity he has assimilated. 
6 White subjectivity’s influence upon the act of reading also takes the form of “New
Critical” impulse toward artistic unity of meaning. Terry Eagleton exposes the ideological nature 
of this seemingly universal methodology. He notes that, while celebrating democracy of 
interpretations, New Criticism’s assumption of “hierarchical order,” “ruling structure” and 
“harmony” paradoxically served the ideological status quo which, in the American racial context, 
took whites’ discursive legitimacy for granted: “The limits of New Criticism were essentially the 
limits of liberal democracy: the poem, John Crowe Ransom wrote, was ‘like a democratic state, 
so to speak, which realizes the ends of a state without sacrificing the personal character of its 
citizens.’ It would be interesting to know what the Southern slaves would have made of this 
assertion” (43-44). 




plot elements, some of which Johnson utilizes, directly or with some twist, in The Autobiography. 
Judith R. Berzon points to the “rejection” of mixed-race people “by their white fath rs and white 
siblings” as a source of “tragic mulattoes”’ psychological suffering (52). Sterling Brown notes 
that urban black novels typically portray “mixed Negroes” as “discontented, aspiring, and 
therefore tragic” (144). Brown continues that, especially for “the mulatto who ‘passes,’” the 
genre prepares the plot of homecoming: “Negro novelists urge his unhappiness, until he is 
summoned back to his people by the spirituals, or their full-throated laughter, or their simple 
sweet ways” (144). 
8 Paul Gilroy’s study of the “Black Atlantic” intellectual history shows how black 
discursive agents, whether ex-slave narrators or post-slavery activists, had to negotiate with “the 
totalising power of universal reason held exclusively by white hands, pens, or publishing houses” 
(69). As the parameters of “the Enlightenment project”—a hemispheric promotion of the 
“universal reason”—Gilroy names “the idea of universality, the fixity of meaning, the coherence 
of the subject, and, of course, the foundational ethnocentrism in which these have all tended to 
be anchored” (55). In The Autobiography, strategically activating this association between 
rationality and whiteness, Johnson makes the Ex-Colored Man conceptualize emotionality in 
terms of being “colored.” For instance, what surprises the narrator when he meets his future 
wife—who is “as white as a lily,” “dressed in white” and “the most dazzlingly white thing I had 
ever seen”—is the “passionate color” her voice bears (144). When it comes to storytelling, the 
Ex-Colored Man considers such “color” detrimental due to the logical incoherence it causes. 
When his mother tells about his white father whom “She loved . . . [and] more, she worshiped” 
(30), the Ex-Colored Man regards the story as “colored by her feelings” and thus not truthful nor 




but half truth; and so I did not yet fully understand” (26). 
9 The long tradition of autobiography offers many examples of digression from and 
self-reflective return to the main narrative, such as in Benjamin Franklin’s Autobiography: “By 
my rambling digressions I perceive myself to be grown old. I us’d to write moreethodically. 
But one does not dress for private company as for a public ball. ’Tis perhaps only neglige ce. . . . 
To return: I continued . . .” (Franklin 9). As my analysis will show, in marked contrast with 
Franklin’s race-free approach, the Ex-Colored Man’s treatment of narrative problems indicates 
his, and Johnson’s own, racial anxiety resulting from their consciousness of a white-dom nant 
audience. 
10 Significantly, this reference to the Ex-Colored Man’s age occurs when he answrs the 
white father’s question, thus indicating Johnson’s strategic insinuation that the narrative’s 
meticulous register of time results from the character-narrator’s, not the author’s, white-audience 
consciousness. In remembering the scene, the narrator reads the father’s inquiry as “a test of my 
intelligence” which he answers to prove himself: “He asked me how old I was; which, of course, 
he must have done merely to say something more, or perhaps he did so as a test of my 
intelligence. I replied: ‘Twelve, sir’” (23). 
11 Among the numerous examples available from the slave narrative tradition, Lewis 
Clarke’s account—of the South’s grievous legal inequality concerning rape—shows a remarkable 
parallel to Johnson’s configuration of the Ex-Colored Man’s rhetoric: 
Kentucky is the best of the slave States, in respect to the laws; but the masters 
manage to fix things pretty much to their own liking. . . . I can’t tell these 
respectable people as much as I would like to; but jest think for a minute how you 




teetotally, and altogether, in the power of a master.—You can picture to 
yourselves a little, how you would feel; but oh, if I could tell you! A slave woman 
an’t allowed to respect herself, if she would. (Slave Testimony 155-56) 
The Ex-Colored Man’s description of being alone “in a strange city” without resource (“money 
or friends”) echoes the ex-slave narrator’s of Southern slaves who lack legal protection amid the 
white-supremacist society. And, as Johnson’s narrator emulates in his version, Clarke makes his 
story effectively poignant not only by challenging his “respectable” white audience to empathize 
but also by addressing the limitation of that very strategy. 
12 William L. Andrews notes that, at the time of Johnson’s composition, the slave 
narrative format was virtually the only option if a black writer sought a commercial success 
addressing racial issues to the white-dominant readership (xvi). 
13 These instances of conformity to the slave narrative genre are particularly noteworthy 
because the opening of The Autobiography reverses the traditional “first sentence beginning, ‘I 
was born . . . ,’ then specifying a place but not a date of birth” (Olney 50)—a convention that 
attests a slave’s lack of education and strong sense of place due to restricted mobility. While 
identifying his birth year as “a few years after the close of the Civil War,” the Ex-Colored Man 
admits that, though he could “mention the name of the town,” he has “only a faint recollection of 
the place of my birth” (2). 
14 Michel Foucault argues that “the name of the author,” itself a text, functions within the 
network of socio-culturally charged discourses: “It [the author name] points to the exist nce of 
certain groups of discourse and refers to the status [i.e., existence, circulation, and operation] of 
this discourse within a society and culture” (123-24). As my analysis will show, Along This Way 




apparent stability from white-subjective discourse, the dominant discourse of th  society in 
which the work circulated. 
15 Robert E. Fleming documents how, to address the racially “double audience” of Along 
This Way, Johnson had to suppress his negative feelings toward whites: “In spite of the fact that 
he spent a good bit of time during these prewriting exercises venting his anger at White America, 
Johnson also reminded himself that the message he was attempting to convey requir d a 
‘delicate’ touch because it was addressed to a ‘double audience’ (Item 110)—his Black 
readership and the large body of uninitiated Whites who might be brought to understand the 
African-American point of view” (225). 
16 Johnson’s later re-reference to Matthews’ comment on The Autobiography, juxtaposed 
with its black counterpart from John Rosamond Johnson, also indicates the scene’s racial 
undertone: “Brander Matthews had expressed a liking for the title, but my brother had thought it 
was clumsy and too long; he had suggested The Chameleon. In the end, I stuck to the original 
idea of issuing the book without the author’s name, and kept the title that had appealed to me 
first” (238). In the setting that binarizes the available options into “black” or “white,” Johnson 
emphasizes the concurrence of his subjectivity (“my original idea” as well as wh t “had appealed 
to me first”) with the white mentor’s “liking” which outweighs the black brother’s commentary. 
Significantly, in this “reasoned and reasonable book” (Fleming 225) full of detailed explanations, 
Johnson does not offer a reason for dismissing Rosamond’s more logic-oriented critique that th  
title “was clumsy and too long.” 
17 One can find textual evidence to the parallel between the two audiences in that, while 
Gilbert’s bicycle shop functions as “a place for the exchange of masculine talk and gossip” (135), 




“gallantry” and flirtation: “I got lots of fun out of the then current gallantry of teaching the art of 
riding to young ladies, many of whom . . . would with nice little screams turn loose the 
handle-bar and throw both arms around your neck” (135). 
 
Chapter 4 
1 In his study of blackness in Euro-American ideological contexts, Anthony Appiah 
argues that even genes are not a definitive indicator of racial difference, as “[w]hat modern 
genetics shows is that there is no such underlying racial essence” (39) aswas claimed by 
nineteenth-century race sciences. Indeed, Appiah reports, “[a]part from the visibl morphological 
characteristics of skin, hair, and bone, by which we are inclined to assign people to the br adest 
racial categories—black, white, yellow—there are few genetic characteristics to be found in the 
population of England that are not found in similar proportions in Zaire or in China, and few too 
(though more) that are found in Zaire but not in similar proportions in China or in England” (35). 
A person like Grace Johnson puts to an extreme this lack of physical difference betwen races, 
because her visual whiteness even nullifies “the visible morphological characteristi s of skin, 
hair, and bone.” 
2 In a further strategy to contain the disruptive potential of her passing, Larsen p esents 
the incident only as a personal episode, thus suppressing the political implications of her 
encroachment on the white sphere. Other letters Larsen wrote about her Tennesse  trip similarly 
avoid broaching the political dimension of race. As George Hutchinson notes, despite her 
otherwise close correspondence with Van Vechten and his wife Fania Marinoff, Larsen somewhat 
awkwardly avoided the topic of segregation when reporting her trip: “Costing no more than she 




Nashville] also avoided the insult and injury of Jim Crow accommodations (something she did 
not mention)” (402). 
3 As Robyn Wiegman points out, the white/black racial binary, as a discursive constru t, 
serves white ideology by introducing a fictive hierarchy with whites on top to the actually 
unclassifiable diversity of human beings: “the black/white axis works to secure the tenuousness 
of race to a framework of stable boundaries, which in turn provides the necessary grounding for 
the ideology of white supremacy” (9). This ideological “black/white axis” al o dictates the in fact 
fictive difference between “real-whiteness” and “passing-whiteness,” on which the American 
“one-drop rule” predicates itself to maintain the system of racial hierarchy.  
4 I consider that the most subversive of Larsen’s challenge to the racial status quo consists 
in her attentiveness to racial passing’s invisibility, indeterminacy, and defianc  of racial 
categories themselves. Accordingly, I find Martha J. Cutter’s claim inadequate and itself trapped 
in the white/black binary paradigm the novelist aims to dismantle, when the critic finds a 
“freedom” from the oppressive racio-class system in Clare’s mobility between two racial 
categories, i.e., whiteness and blackness: “Clare initially passes from the black to the white race 
to transcend her class position, but to flaunt this new class position, she must pass back from  
white racial identity to a black one. To have all she wants, Clare must maintain multiple 
identities—multiple subject positions—and pass back and forth between them. . . . Larsen’s text 
indicates that Clare demands to be central, not marginal, to a variety of different social networks, 
actually finding freedom in her plural and often contradictory subject positions” (92). 
5 Whiteness studies reveal how whiteness, as at once an instrument and effect of 
white-supremacist ideology, operates in the U.S. as a “race-less, unmarked norm.” For example, 




Ruth Frankenberg characterizes the general working of whiteness as “mak[ing] itself invisible 
precisely by asserting its normalcy, its transparency, in contrast with he marking of others on 
which its transparency depends” (6). 
6 Carol Roh Spaulding points to mixed-race fiction’s inevitable dependence on the 
“white”/“non-white” binary racial paradigm, where the mixed-race character’s racial position is 
defined only in relation to whiteness as the norm: “What has not changed is the binary system of 
classification itself. One is designated ‘white’ (or passes for ‘white’); one is designated ‘raced’ 
(or passes for ‘raced’). The more creative or adventurous may play at one designation or another 
in various times or places, but the choice of either-or remains intact. No matter how mixed one’s 
ancestry, racial identity in American literature is most influenced by a character’s status in 
relation to how the narrative defined ‘whiteness’” (99). My reading of Passing finds Larsen’s 
challenge, if only temporary, to this paradox. In the novel’s “race-less” opening sce es, Larsen 
carefully keeps whiteness undefined and thus unfixed, rendering it impossible for the reader to 
position the characters in the system of racial classification. 
7 Considering the semantic multiplicity of the novel’s title, “Passing,” as well as Larsen’s 
relative unfamiliarity to the contemporary white-dominant readership, I have reservation about 
Jacquelyn Y. McLendon’s claim that “[t]he simple title Passing suggests that what is to follow is 
the classic tale of the mulatto, usually the victim of uncontrollable urges of mixed blood, who 
tries to escape the miseries of black life by passing white” (96). Indeed, Van Vechten took 
advantage of the novel’s race-less first impression when devising a marketing strategy targeted 
for the formerly uninitiated white audience: “Since most potential readers would never pick up a 
black-authored novel in a bookstore, they would learn that Passing was a ‘Negro novel’ only 




8 Irene’s “double-conscious” look at herself also operates on the socio-cultural level. As 
numerous critics have pointed out, Irene internalizes the white-dominant society’  value system 
as she strives to maintain a stable and respectable middle-class life. For example, Jennifer 
DeVere Brody notes that “Irene consistently aligns herself with conservative and bourgeois 
elements in American society . . . . She persistently fights to preserve her ‘s curity’ and the status 
quo” (396). 
9 Valerie Smith points to “a range of contradictions inherent within” passing texts, such as 
that between the character’s racial instability and his/her fixation in the binarized 
black-passing-for-white identity. Thus, she continues, classic passing narratives “become sites 
where antiracist and white supremacist ideologies converge, encouraging their black readers to 
stay in their places” (43-44). 
 
Conclusion 
1 The writers treated in my dissertation, especially Faulkner, all suggest that language 
reduces chaotic reality on multiple levels of its operation. As my first two chapters indicate, 
Faulkner’s idiosyncratic typography as well as convoluted syntax suggests his keen awareness 
that, depending on the writer’s approach, even formalistic aspects of writing can limit or enable 
his exploration of the chaos. In his letter to Ben Wasson, co-editor of The Sound and the Fury, 
Faulkner specifically claims that, to portray the “confused” inner truths of the chara ter Benjy 
beyond his apparently “unbroken” and “logically coherent” position as an “idiot,” the author 
needs to complicate typography by means of italics and even different-colored ink: “I think 
italics are necessary to establish for the reader Benjy’s confusion; that unbroken-surfaced 
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